

The Prince

· 英汉对照典藏版 · 君主论

【意】马基雅维里

Niccolò Machiavelli

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
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The Prince

*Histories make men wise; poems witty;
the mathematics subtle; natural philosophy deep; moral grave;
logic and rhetoric able to contend.*



巅峰的阅读

—— 编者的话

俗说三十年风水轮流转。

有几岁年纪的人对出版物匮乏的时期当记忆犹新。其时，拿本不容易轮到手的书日以继夜地捧读者有之；把册学术著作从头至尾抄下来者有之；抱着套抢购来的文集泪雨滂沱者有之……哪能想到出版物堆得满坑满谷、睹之让人目眩、择之让人无所措手足的今天！


彼时至今，发生了一个我们能读什么书和我们该读什么书的转换。

政治的经济的社会的文化的理论的实践的……浩如烟海地铺排在我们面前，我们该怎么办？轻取直入的、蜻蜓点水的甚至短平快的精神快餐，倒也不妨去读，一是我们总得先顾住眼前的柴米油盐，二是日趋加快的生活节奏，我们还不得疏散疏散？只是要切实有效地拓宽自己的视野，厚积自己的学养，提高自己的生存竞争力，那就不是一个随意拿起、轻轻放下、等闲视之的问题了。切入的角度甚多，但要说潜下心来，读一点儿被时代潮水筛选出来的经典名著，是一个上上策，想来是不会听到什么异议的。

正是出于这个考虑，我们编辑了一套英汉对照的影响世界历史进程的书。第一辑计有五个品种：⑤《国富论》③《论法的精神》④《精神分析引论》①《君主论》②《社会契约论》。

影响世界历史进程的书！什么样的突破，什么样的影响力，才能使它们获此殊荣？





《君主论》的作者马基亚维里，乍看起来，活脱脱一个离经叛道者！他一反“以德治国”“以德服人”的社会基调，主张“目的总是为手段服务”，统治者必须同时是一个伟大的骗子和伪君子。这样另类的观点，甫出世便引起一片大哗，数代人激烈的论争中，人们终于看出了马基亚维里的前瞻性：“许多人曾经幻想那从未有人见过更没有人知道曾经在哪里存在过的共和国和君主国。可是从人们实际上怎样生活到人们应当怎样生活，其距离是如此之大，以致一个人要是为了应当怎样而忘记了实际怎样，那么他不但无法生存，而且会自取灭亡。”原来，他的论点不是凭空而起，而是对历代现实分析综合的升华！想通了其实不难理解，诸如所有的君主都希望落一个仁慈的美名，但比起坐视混乱从而危害整个社会的过分仁慈来说，能够创造秩序和统一的残酷实际上要仁慈多了。

天才的卢梭是自然之子。写作《社会契约论》的初衷，正是有感于本真的人在不合理社会中的异化。一如他在《社会契约论》中所叹息的，这些异化了的人“就像格老古斯的雕像一样，天气、大海和风暴已经大大地损毁了它的容貌，以至于它更像一头凶猛的野兽而不是一尊神”。什么样的原则能够引导近代民族摆脱堕落，走向澄明幸福的境界呢？他在书中这样回答：以一种新的契约形式来恢复和保障人的自由和平等，主权在于人民，政府当是主权体的公仆。这些指向封建专制制度和特权的尖锐的锋芒，为资产阶级法律制度的确立提供了理论基础，美国的《独立宣言》与法国的《人权宣言》，都把这些观点写了进去。

孟德斯鸠把他辽阔的视野、广博的学识、精辟的创见带进了《论法的精神》。什么精神呢？和同为启蒙思想家的卢梭有相似点，那就是从皇权向人权转化的历史时期中，人的价值、人的尊严与人的自由的精神！只是侧重点不同，一个偏于权，一个偏于法。行政、立法和司法三权分立、相互制衡，以充分保障公民权利的理论，



是孟德斯鸠对民主社会机制的绝大贡献。《人权宣言》就直截了当地指出，没有三权分立就没有宪法。他著名的“地理说”，认为地理环境尤其是气候、土壤等因素与人的性格发生直接的关系，为法律所不可忽视，又展现着怎样的人性的光辉！

好释梦的弗洛伊德，“是有史以来第一位正视人类心灵问题的人”。他打破了理性主义的传统，肯定了非理性因素在行为中的作用，换句话说，他把潜意识的概念引进到向被意识心理学所盘踞的领域。就其深广意义而言，他《精神分析引论》的影响遍及各个方面——心理学、医学、人类学、哲学以及文学艺术。

《国富论》何以维持它经久不衰的辉煌呢？作为政治经济学古典学派的创立者，亚当·斯密总结了近代初期各国资本主义发展的经验，对整个国民经济的运动过程做了系统的明白的描述，提出了自由放任的主张：自由经营，自由贸易，充分利用完全竞争的市场机制。书甫出版，就被有识之士把它和同年问世的《美国独立宣言》并列，称之为“产业自由宣言书”。迄今为止，斯密的经济自由主义和凯恩斯的国家干预主义，仍然是影响西方经济思潮与经济政策的两大思潮。

这些经典著作之能永不过时，常读常新，不仅因为它得出的结论，也在于它被推导出的过程。写作者既有强大的分析能力，能对他所触及的材料进行筛选；又有强大的综合能力，能按照新的和引人注目的方式将其重新组合。这种新的组合和升华，我们就谓之创新！

还有英文呢，我们采用的是英汉对照的方式，篇幅短的《君主论》《社会契约论》全文对照，另外三本，为了保持其原貌，我们采取节译，重要的推导和结论，可说是一字不少。一边是中文，一边是英文对照；一边是文章精华，一边是双语培训，这样，你在阅读中的收效之大，就不言而喻了！

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Dedicatory Letter

Niccolò Machiavelli to the Magnificent Lorenzo de' Medici:

It is customary most of the time for those who desire to acquire favor with a Prince to come to meet him with things that they care most for among their own or with things that they see please him most. Thus, one sees them many times being presented with horses, arms, cloth of gold, precious stones and similar ornaments worthy of their greatness. Thus, since I desire to offer myself to your Magnificence with some testimony of my homage to you, I have found nothing in my belongings that I care so much for and esteem so greatly as the knowledge of the actions of great men, learned by me from long experience with modern things and a continuous reading of ancient ones. Having thought out and examined these things with great diligence for a long time, and now reduced them to one small volume, I send it to your Magnificence.

And although I judge this work undeserving of your presence, yet I have much confidence that through your humanity it may be accepted, considering that no greater gift could be made by me than to give you the capacity to be able to understand in a very short time all that I have learned and understood in so many years and with so many hardships and dangers for myself. I have not ornamented this work, nor filled it with fulsome phrases nor with pompous and magnificent words, nor with any blandishment or superfluous ornament whatever, with which it is customary for many to describe and adorn their things. For I wanted it either, not to be honored for anything or to please solely for the variety of the matter and the gravity of the subject. Nor do I want it to be thought presumption if a man from a low and mean state dares to discuss and give rules for the governments of Princes. For just as those who sketch landscapes place themselves down in the plain to consider the nature of mountains and high places and to consider the nature of low places place themselves high atop mountains, similarly, to know well the nature of peoples one needs to be prince, and to know well the nature of princes one needs to be of the people.

Therefore, your Magnificence, take this small gift in the spirit with which I send it. If

致殿下书

尼科洛·马基雅维里敬致洛伦佐·德·梅迪奇殿下：

凡是渴望邀宠于君主者，最惯常的做法是献上自己的心爱之物，或者献上最能让君主高兴的东西。于是，常常可以看见人们献骏马、刀剑、金缕衣、宝石以及与君主尊贵地位相配的一类饰物。我也渴望对殿下您敬献物品，以表达我的敬意；我发现在我的财物中最为我喜爱和珍视的莫过于知识了——那是有关于伟人事迹的知识，是我长期与现代事物接触以及矻矻终日研读古书所积累起的知识。我长年累月孜孜思考，并在实践中加以检验，如今将这些知识浓缩为一本小册子，敬献给殿下您。

我深知拙作不配供殿下一阅，但唯此可作为我的最佳礼物，使殿下能够在极短的时间了解我多年呕心沥血、历经千难万险才掌握和明白的事理，所以我确信殿下一定会仁慈地收下我的赠礼。有许多人喜欢夸夸其谈，美化他们的东西，而我与他们不同，我没有让自己的书中充满肉麻的恭维，没有用华丽的辞藻和闪光的语言加以粉饰，也没有说奉迎的话、多余的话。拙作要么得不到赞誉，要么纯粹因为内容丰富和题材重大而受到欢迎，而后者才是我的愿望。地位低微的人对君主的统治发发议论、提提建议，但愿不要将此视为僭越。正如风景画家置身于平原可以一睹群山和高地的雄姿，而要观察低地则需攀上高山一样，作为君主需要体察民情，而广大人民也应该体谅君主的苦衷。

因而，恭请殿下怀着和我同样的心情收下这份薄礼吧。如果殿下用些心思、花



your Magnificence considers and reads it diligently, you will learn from it my extreme desire that you arrive at the greatness that fortune and your other qualities promise you. And if your Magnificence will at some time turn your eyes from the summit of your height to these low places, you will learn how undeservedly I endure a great and continuous malignity of fortune.

些精力阅读此书，就会看到我真真切切地希望殿下荣登高位，那是命运所赐，也是您有能力胜任的。倘若殿下什么时候从您的高位上俯瞰，看看脚下的地方，就会发现我长期以来一直都受着命运之神极为恶毒的捉弄。



Book 1 How Many Are the Kinds of Principalities and in What Modes They Are Acquired

All states, all dominions that have held and do hold empire over men have been and are either republics or principalities. The principalities are either hereditary, in which the blood line of their lord has been their prince for a long time, or they are new. The new ones are either altogether new, as was Milan to Francesco Sforza, or they are like members added to the hereditary state of the prince who acquires them, as is the kingdom of Naples to the king of Spain. Dominions so acquired are either in the habit of living under a prince or used to being free; and they are acquired either with the arms of others or with one's own, either by fortune or by virtue.

第一章 君主国的类型及其获得的方式

从古至今，对人民实行统治的所有国家及政权分为两类：共和国及君主国。君主国若非世袭的，便是新建的。在世袭的君主国里，长期以来，任君主的都是统治者的世代子孙。新建的君主国中有一种是全新的，如弗朗切斯科·斯福尔扎的米兰公国；还有一种是君主世袭国征讨得来的附庸国，如臣服于西班牙国王的那不勒斯王国就是一例。如此诞生的政权一般都是在君主的领导下，要不就是自由的。这些政权的获得，有的靠的是外部或自身的武力，有的则是命运的恩赐或懿德的影响所致。

nit



Book 2 Of Hereditary Principalities

I shall leave out reasoning on republics because I have reasoned on them at length another time. I shall address myself only to the principality, and shall proceed by weaving together the threads mentioned above; and I shall debate how these principalities may be governed and maintained.

I say, then, that in hereditary states accustomed to the blood line of their prince the difficulties in maintaining them are much less than in new states because it is enough only not to depart from the order of his ancestors, and then to temporize in the face of unforeseen events. In this way, if such a prince is of ordinary industry, he will always maintain himself in his state unless there is an extraordinary and excessive force which deprives him of it; and should he be deprived of it, if any mishap whatever befalls the occupier, he reacquires it.

We have in Italy, for example, the duke of Ferrara, who, for no other cause than that his line was ancient in that dominion, did not succumb to the attacks of the Venetians in '84, nor to those of Pope Julius in '10. For the natural prince has less cause and less necessity to offend; hence it is fitting that he be more loved. And if extraordinary vices do not make him hated, it is reasonable that he will naturally have the good will of his own. In the antiquity and continuity of the dominion the memories and causes of innovations are extinguished; for one change always leaves a dentation for the building of another. ①

① 齿状墙：在建筑上，墙的一端呈齿状，为的是与别的墙相连。作者此处隐喻的是“君主国”的变革一次接一次，永无止境，最终回到原处。

第二章 论世袭君主国

此处我就不谈论共和国了，因为在别的地方我有详尽的论述。我只讲君主国的问题，把上文罗列的线索进一步梳理，议论议论这些君主国该如何治理、如何维持。

依我看，由一脉相承的王朝统治的世袭君主国，治理起来要比新生的君主国容易得多，因为世袭君王只要不偏离祖宗定下的规矩就够了，而且在面对意外事件时要做到顺时应势。如此，即便君王业绩平平，也可以在自己的国家里长治久安，除非出现了非同一般的强大力量才会使他丧失王权；而且就算他没有了王冠，只要篡权者遇到飞来的横祸，他的王冠就又会失而复得。

我们举一个意大利的例子：费拉拉公爵在 1484 年遭到威尼斯人的攻击，在 1510 年又遇到朱利奥教皇的攻伐，却没有垮下来，这其中没有别的原因，只是因为他们家族在该领地的统治源远流长。世袭君王很少有原因和必要去得罪他人，所以备受爱戴就在情理之中了。倘若他没有犯下滔天的罪行，招致人民的怨恨，他自然就会事事如愿，这是顺理成章的事。这种统治历史久远、绵延不绝，其中也有过变革的记忆和动机，但都已烟消云散，因为一次变革总是为另一次变革的酝酿留下一道齿状墙。



Book 3 Of Mixed Principalities

But the difficulties reside in the new principality. First, if it is not altogether new but like an added member (so that taken as a whole it can be called almost mixed), its instability arises in the first place from a natural difficulty that exists in all new principalities. This is that men willingly change their masters in the belief that they will fare better; this belief makes them take up arms against him, in which they are deceived because they see later by experience that they have done worse. That follows from another natural and ordinary necessity which requires that one must always offend those over whom he becomes a new prince, both with men-at-arms and with infinite other injuries that the new acquisition brings in its wake. So you have as enemies all those whom you have offended in seizing that principality, and you cannot keep as friends those who have put you there because you cannot satisfy them in the mode they had presumed and because you cannot use strong medicines against them, since you are obligated to them. For even though one may have the strongest of armies, he always needs the support of the inhabitants of a province in order to enter it. Through these causes Louis XII of France quickly occupied Milan, and quickly lost it; and Ludovico's own forces were enough to take it from him the first time. For those people which had opened the gates to him, finding themselves deceived in their opinion and in that future good they had presumed for themselves, were unable to tolerate the vexations of the new prince.

It is indeed true that when countries that have rebelled are later acquired for the second time, they are lost with more difficulty, because the lord, seizing the opportunity offered by the rebellion, is less hesitant to secure himself by punishing offenders, exposing suspects, and providing for himself in the weakest spots. So it was that, if one Duke Ludovico stirring up a commotion at the borders was enough to make France lose Milan the first time, to make him then lose it the second time, the whole world had to be against him, and his armies eliminated or chased from Italy; this arises from the causes given above. Nonetheless, both the first and the second times it was taken from him.

第三章 论混合的君主国

在新生君主国里，有着重重的困难。首先，如果一个君主国不是一个崭新的国家，而是像个附庸国一样（从整体上，差不多可以称为混合君主国），那么，不安定的因素首先就会由于一种自然而然的困难而出现——这种困难存在于一切新生的君主国里。这就是：人民情愿更换他们的主人，认为如此便会有好一些的境遇，于是便拿起刀枪反对主人。结果他们走错了路，因为在以后的遭遇中他们发现自己的状况反不如以前。这也是另一种自然而平常的必须采取的措施所导致的结果——一位君主获得了一块新的疆土，就会带来士兵弹压，还会造成无穷无尽的伤害，这些势必会得罪新臣服的人民。于是，您攻占该君主国时所得罪的人都成了您的仇敌，同时您不可能与帮助过您的人保持友谊，因为您无法按他们所期望的那样满足他们的要求，而且，鉴于他们有恩于您，您又不能采取强烈的手段对付他们。一个君王即便拥有最强大的军队，如欲攻入一个地方，总还是要取得当地居民的支持。正是由于此因，法王路易十二很快攻占了米兰，而失去那块地方也是很快的。第一次收复失地，赶走路易十二时，仅靠洛多维科自己的军队就够了。法王又失去了米兰，是因为那些开门迎接法王的人事后发现自己打错了注意，并未得到他们预料的那种好处，于是便无法忍受新君主给他们带来的烦恼了。

有一个实实在在的真理：起来造反的地区后来再次被征服之后，就比较难失去了。因为统治者会利用造反这一机缘，毫不犹豫地惩罚反叛者，揭露出有嫌疑的人，弥补薄弱的环节。这就是为什么洛多维科公爵只要在边境煽动暴乱便足以令法国第一次丢掉米兰，而如欲叫法王再次失去米兰，就得动员全世界反对他，消灭他的军队，或者将其驱逐出意大利，这中间的原因上文也有交待。但是，法王非但第一次失去了米兰，第二次也没能保得住。



The universal causes of the first have been discussed; it remains now to say what were the causes of the second, and to see what remedies there were to him, which someone in his situation could use so as to maintain himself better in his acquisition than France did. Now I say, that such states which, when acquired, are added to an ancient state of him who acquires them, are either of the same province and same language, or not. When they are, they may be held with great ease, especially if they are not used to living free; and to possess them securely it is enough to have eliminated the line of the prince whose dominions they were. For when their old conditions are maintained for them in other things and there is no disparity of customs, men live quietly – as it may be seen that Burgundy, Brittany, Gascony, and Normandy, which have been with France for so long a time, have done; and although there may be some disparity of language, nonetheless the customs are similar, and they can easily bear with one another. And whoever acquires them, if he wants to hold them, must have two concerns; one, that the blood line of their ancient prince be eliminated; the other, not to alter either their laws or their taxes; so that in a very short time it becomes one whole body with their ancient principality.

But when one acquires states in a province disparate in language, customs, and orders, here are the difficulties, and here one needs to have great fortune and great industry to hold them; and one of the greatest and quickest remedies would be for whoever acquires it to go there to live in person. This would make that possession more secure and more lasting, as the Turk has done in Greece. Despite all the other orders he has established so as to hold that state, if he had not gone there to live, it would not have been possible for him to hold it. For if you stay there, disorders may be seen as they arise, and you can soon remedy them; if you are not there, disorders become understood when they are great and there is no longer a remedy. Besides this, the province is not despoiled by your officials; the subjects are satisfied with ready access to the prince, so that they have more cause to love him if they want to be good and, if they want to be otherwise, more cause to fear him. Whatever outsider might want to attack that state has more hesitation in doing so; hence, when one lives in it, one can lose it with the greatest difficulty.

The other, better remedy is to send colonies that are, as it were, fetters of that state, to one or two places, because it is necessary either to do this or to hold them with many men-at-arms and infantry. One does not spend much on colonies, and without expense of one's own, or with little, one may send them and hold them; and one offends only those from whom one takes fields and houses in order to give them to new inhabitants – who are a very

对于法王第一次失去米兰的那种普遍存在的原因我们已讨论过了，现在要说的
是米兰第二次沦陷的缘由，让我们看看法王有什么补救的良药，看看跟他处境相同
的人是否能利用这种良药比较成功地维持自己在领地上的统治。依我看，那些遭到
占领，成为占领者古老国家的附庸者的国家，可以分为两类：被占领者和占领者属
于同一地区，使用同一种语言，或者相反。在属于第一类情况的占领区，维持统治
不费吹灰之力，特别针对那些不习惯过自由生活的臣民更是如此。要让您的统治固
若金汤，只要对以前的王子王孙们来个斩草除根就够了。因为在其他方面，当地居
民原有的环境一如往初，被占领者和占领者的风俗习惯没有什么差异，于是人们便
过着安居乐业的生活；已经依附法国很久的布尔戈尼、布列塔尼、加斯科涅以及诺
曼底就属于这种情况，这是有目共睹的。被占领者与占领者之间或许操不同的语言，
然而风俗习惯却是相同的，他们也可以很容易相互迁就忍让。不管何人征服了这儿
的居民，如果想坚持下来，就必须考虑两点：一是要把原来的王族斩尽杀绝，还有一
点是要不要改变当地的法律及税收；这样，在很短的时间内，这块地方就会与古老
的君主国融为一体了。

但是，当一位君主征服了某地区的一些城邦，占领者与当地人在语言、风俗习
惯及制度上有着差异时，就会遇到重重的困难，必须花费巨大的财力及付出艰苦的
努力才能维持下来。一个最为有效、最快捷的办法就是请作为征服者的君王驾临该
地，并住下来。这样，他的占领就比较稳定和久远，土耳其君王攻占希腊后便是如
此做的。尽管您建立各种各样的秩序，希图保住占领地，但如果您不亲往该地扎下
营盘，就不可能维持下来。因为，如果您身临该地，骚乱一出现您就可以发现，并
可以很快采取行动；但假如您不在现场，乱子闹大了才察觉，到时候就没有补救的
办法了。另外，您御驾亲临，您的官员就不会对占领地巧取豪夺，而臣民们则会由
于能很容易接近君王而感到心满意足；于是，愿意当良民的便更有理由爱戴您，而
企图作叛民的则因此对您生畏惧之心。无论是哪个君王想从外部攻入您的这块领地，
都会三思而后行；正因为您住在这儿，所以别人要夺走就比登天还难了。

另外，在君主国内有些人是累赘，比较好的办法是把他们作为殖民者派往占领
地；这是很有必要的，如若不然，就得用大量的武士及士卒守护领地了。对于殖民
者不用花费很多的钱财，君主不用掏腰包，或者用极少的钱就可以把他们派往彼地
安家落户；君王把占领地一些人的田地夺走给新来的人耕种，把他们的房屋给新居
民住，这就得罪了他们，但他们只占该地人口的极小一部分。这些被得罪的人分居



small part of that state. And those whom he offends, since they remain dispersed and poor, can never hurt him, while all the others remain on the one hand unharmed, and for this they should be quiet; on the other, they are afraid to err from fear that what happened to the despoiled might happen to them. I conclude that such colonies are not costly, are more faithful, and less offensive; and those who are offended can do no hurt, since they are poor and dispersed as was said. For this has to be noted: that men should either be caressed or eliminated, because they avenge themselves for slight offenses but cannot do so for grave ones; so the offense one does to a man should be such that one does not fear revenge for it. But when one holds a state with men-at-arms in place of colonies, one spends much more since one has to consume all the income of that state in guarding it. So the acquisition turns to loss, and one offends much more because one hurts the whole state as one's army moves around for lodgings. Everyone feels this hardship, and each becomes one's enemy; and these are enemies that can hurt one since they remain, though defeated, in their homes. From every side, therefore, keeping guard in this way is as useless as keeping guard by means of colonies is useful.

Whoever is in a province that is disparate, as was said, should also make himself head and defender of the neighboring lesser powers, and contrive to weaken the powerful in that province and to take care that through some unforeseen event a foreigner as powerful as he does not enter there. And it will always turn out that a foreigner will be brought in by those in the province who are malcontent either because of too much ambition or out of fear, as once the Aetolians were seen to bring the Romans into Greece; and in every other province they entered, they were brought in by its inhabitants. And the order of things is such that as soon as a powerful foreigner enters a province, all those in it who are less powerful adhere to him, moved by the envy they have against whoever has held power over them. So with respect to these lesser powers, he has no trouble in gaining them, because all together they quickly and willingly make one mass with the state that he has acquired there. He has only to worry that these lesser powers may get too much force and too much authority; and with his forces and their support he can easily put down those who are powerful, so as to remain arbiter of that province in everything. And whoever does not conduct this policy well will soon lose what he has acquired, and while he holds it, will have infinite difficulties and vexations within it.

The Romans observed these policies well in the provinces they took. They sent out colonies, indulged the lesser powers without increasing their power, put down the powerful,

各处，而且都是些穷人，伤害不了他。一方面，其他居民的利益未受到伤害，所以他们悄无声息；另一方面，他们则害怕做错事情，担心遭掠夺的命运也会落到他们身上。我的结论是：这种殖民统治花费不大，殖民者们效忠于君王，且不太得罪当地人；而且那些被得罪的人也掀不起风浪，因为如上所述，他们一贫如洗，且分居各地。对于这一点，必须注意的是：君王要么安抚居民们，要么就消灭掉他们，因为他们会因小的怨仇报仇雪恨，但对深仇大恨却无计可施。所以，君主得罪居民，应该是不害怕对方实施报复的。可是，以军队代替殖民者去占据领地，花费就大得多了，因为君主必须把该地的全部收入用于防务。于是，收获变成了损失，鉴于频繁调动军队，危及到了整个附庸国的利益，这样得罪的人就多得多了。每个人都感受到了这种不幸，继而成为君主的敌人，而且是可以危及君主统治的敌人，因为他们虽被打败，但他们是在自己的家园。从各个方面看，这般武力防守是徒劳无益的，而以殖民统治的办法构筑防务则是有效的。

无论哪个君主入驻一个与自己的国家毫无关联的地区（如前所述），都应该充当周围弱小势力的首领和保护者，都应该不遗余力地削弱该地区的强大势力，当心不要让跟自己同样强大的君主借助意外的事件混进来。当地那些野心太大、恐惧感太强的居民不满于现状，往往会引狼入室，把外边的人领进来。罗马人曾经就是由埃托利亚人引入希腊的。罗马人所到之处，都有当地人作内应。事情的规律是：一旦哪位强大的外国君王进入一个地区，弱小的势力便会纷纷依附于他，这是因为这些弱小的势力妒忌曾经骑在他们头上的人。对于这些弱小的势力，君主不用费力就能把他们争取过来，因为这些势力全都会迅速地、心甘情愿地与君主征服的国家合为一体。他只要操点心，别叫这些弱小的势力获得太大的力量及权威就行。君主凭借自己的力量以及这些势力的支持，轻轻松松便能镇压住强大的敌人，主宰当地的一切事务。不管是谁，不很好地贯彻这一政策，很快就会失去占领地，即便守得住占领地，也会遇到无穷无尽的困难和烦心的事。

罗马人在他们占领的地区曾有效地推行了这些政策。他们派出殖民统治者，迁就弱小势力，同时又不允许他们扩张；他们镇压强大的势力，不准外国势力在当地



and did not allow foreign powers to gain reputation there. And I want the province of Greece alone to suffice as an example. The Achaeans and the Aetolians were indulged by the Romans; the kingdom of the Macedonians was brought down and Antiochus was chased out. Nor did the merits of the Achaeans or those of the Aetolians make the Romans permit them to increase any state of theirs; nor did the persuasions of Philip ever induce them to be his friends without putting him down; nor could the power of Antiochus make them consent to his holding any state in that province. For the Romans did in these cases what all wise princes should do: they not only have to have regard for present troubles but also for future ones, and they have to avoid these with all their industry because, when one foresees from afar, one can easily find a remedy for them, but when you wait until they come close to you, the medicine is not in time because the disease has become incurable. And it happens with this as the physicians say of consumption, that in the beginning of the illness it is easy to cure and difficult to recognize, but in the progress of time, when it has not been recognized and treated in the beginning, it becomes easy to recognize and difficult to cure. So it happens in affairs of state, because when one recognizes from afar the evils that arise in a state (which is not given but to one who is prudent), they are soon healed; but when they are left to grow because they were not recognized, to the point that everyone recognizes them, there is no longer any remedy for them.

Thus, the Romans, seeing inconveniences from afar, always found remedies for them and never allowed them to continue so as to escape a war, because they knew that war may not be avoided but is deferred to the advantage of others. So they decided to make war with Philip and Antiochus in Greece in order not to have to do so in Italy; and they could have avoided both one and the other for a time, but they did not want to. Nor did that saying ever please them which is every day in the mouths of the wise men of our times – to enjoy the benefit of time – but rather, they enjoyed the benefit of their virtue and prudence. For time sweeps everything before it and can bring with it good as well as evil and evil as well as good.

But let us return to France and examine whether he has done any of the things spoken of. I will speak of Louis and not of Charles, as the steps of the former, because he held his possession in Italy longer, may be seen better. And you will see that he did the contrary of the things that should be done to hold a state in a disparate province.

King Louis was brought into Italy by the ambition of the Venetians, who wanted to gain half the state of Lombardy for themselves by his coming. I do not want to blame the course

建立威信。我想只举希腊地区为例就足以说明问题了。罗马人对阿凯亚人以及埃托利亚人采取的是纵容迁就的态度，却摧毁了马其顿王国，赶走了安提奥库斯。阿凯亚人和埃托利亚人虽建立了功勋，罗马人却不允许他们扩展疆土；非力普摇唇鼓舌，想和罗马人交朋友，这也未妨碍罗马人将他打倒在地；安提奥库斯势力强大，也未能获得罗马人的准许在该地区安营扎寨。在这些事件中，罗马人的所作所为是英明的君王都应该采取的措施，因为他们不仅要顾及到眼前的困难，还要有高屋建瓴的目光；他们必须不惜一切手段避免灾难的发生，因为一个人高瞻远瞩，便可以很容易寻找到避灾禳祸的良方；但是，如果等到大难临头，已经到了无可救药的地步，再采取措施就为之晚矣。这种情况就跟医生疗治肺结核一样——病发初期，这种病容易治疗，却难以发现，而时间一长，诊断起来倒是不费力，但因在初期未得到诊治，再想治愈就不是轻而易举之事了。管理国家事务是同样的道理——君主登高望远，及时发现国内的祸端（此事唯英主可为），很快便能消灾解难；然而，如果不能及时发现灾祸，任其蔓延下去，等到人人都能看得见时，就再也找不到补救的锦囊妙计了。

所以，罗马人防患于未然，总是早早就发现问题，从不为避免战争而任凭问题发展下去。他们知道，战争是不能避免的，拖延的结果只会有利于他人。于是，他们决定在希腊对菲利普和安提奥库斯开战，为的是不在将来把跟他们的战事移到意大利去。这两次战争他们本来完全可以暂时不打，但他们不愿那样做。他们不喜欢我们这个时代的智者天天都说的座右铭“要享受时间所带来的恩赐”，而宁愿享受他们的实力及谋略给他们的恩赐。因为时间横扫一切，泥沙俱下，带来吉祥的同时也带来了灾难，在带来坏事之际也会带来好事。

现在，我们回到法国的问题上，看法王是否采取了以上提到的措施，我要讲的是路易王而非查理王，讲一讲前者所采取过的措施，因为他占领意大利的时间较长，其足迹可以看得比较清楚。您将会看到，他反其道而行之，没有采取为盘踞一个与自己国家各方面都不相同的占领地而应该采取的措施。

路易国王是因为威尼斯人野心膨胀才被引入了意大利——威尼斯人想迎入法王，自己瓜分到伦巴第区域的半壁河山。对于路易王所采取的措施，我并不想说长道短。



adopted by the king; for since he wanted to begin by gaining a foothold in Italy, and having no friends in this province, indeed, having all doors closed to him because of the conduct of King Charles, he was forced to take whatever friendships he could get. And having firmly adopted this course he would have succeeded if in managing other things he had not made some error. Thus, when he had acquired Lombardy, the king regained quickly the reputation that Charles had taken from him: Genoa yielded, and the Florentines became his friends; the marquis of Mantua, duke of Ferrara, Bentivoglio, Madonna of Forli, the lords of Faenza, of Pesaro, of Rimini, of Camerino, of Piombino, the Luccans, Pisans, and Sieneſe – everyone came to meet him so as to become his friend. And then the Venetians could consider the temerity of the course they had adopted: to acquire two territories in Lombardy they made the king lord of two-thirds of Italy.

One may now consider with how little difficulty the king could have maintained his reputation in Italy if he had observed the rules given above and had held secure and defended all those friends of his, who, because they were a great number, weak, and fearful – some of the Church, some of the Venetians – were always under a necessity to stay with him; and by their means he could always have secured himself easily against whoever remained great among us. But no sooner was he in Milan than he did the contrary by giving aid to Pope Alexander so that the pope might seize the Romagna. Nor did he notice that with this decision he was weakening himself, stripping himself of his friends and those who had jumped into his lap, while making the Church great by adding so much temporal greatness to the spiritual one that gives it so much authority. And having made the first error, he was compelled to continue, so that to put an end to the ambition of Alexander, and to prevent his becoming lord of Tuscany, he was compelled to come into Italy. It was not enough for him to have made the Church great and to have stripped himself of his friends, but because he wanted the kingdom of Naples, he divided it with the king of Spain. Whereas at first he was the arbiter of Italy, he brought in a companion so that the ambitious ones in that province and those malcontent with him had somewhere to turn; and whereas he could have left in that kingdom a king who was his pensioner, he threw him out so as to bring in one who could expel him.

And truly it is a very natural and ordinary thing to desire to acquire, and always, when men do it who can, they will be praised or not blamed; but when they cannot, and want to do it anyway, here lie the error and the blame. Thus, if France could have attacked Naples with his own forces, he should have done so; if he could not, he should not have divided Na-

他渴望在意大利获得立足之地，却在占领地没有朋友，由于理查王的倒行逆施的确是家家户户大门紧闭，所以他才被迫采用了不管任何朋友都来者不拒的方法。在坚定不移地推行这种政策的同时，如果在处理别的事务时不栽跟头，他肯定会大功告成的。情况是这样的：他在占领了伦巴第之后，很快便挽回了被查理王夺去的威望——热那亚拱手称臣，佛罗伦萨人成了好友；曼托瓦侯爵、费拉拉公爵、本蒂沃利奥、富尔利夫人，以及法恩扎、佩萨罗、里米内、卡梅里诺、皮奥姆比诺等地的王公贵族，另外还有卢卡比人、比萨人和锡耶纳人，全都对他迎迓唯恐不及，争着跟他交朋友。这时，威尼斯人真该反省一下自己的举措是何等愚鲁——他们原想获得伦巴第的两块地方，却令法王成了意大利三分之二疆土的统治者。

现在回想一下，法王如果遵守了以上提及的准则，并且笼络住和保护好他所有的朋友，便能不费吹灰之力维持住他在意大利的威信——他的朋友为数众多，都软弱而怯懦，有些害怕教会，有些则畏惧威尼斯人，所以总是需要跟随他左右；靠这些朋友的帮助，他完全可以确立自己的地位，与残存的强大势力相抗衡。然而，他刚一进驻米兰，就大反其道，帮助起教皇亚历山大来，让教皇去占领罗马格纳。他没有注意到，他的这一决策削弱了他自身的力量，丧失掉了盟友以及向他邀宠的人，同时使教会更加强大。在精神方面占据领导地位的教会，这一下又获得了世俗的控制力。法王犯下了第一个错误之后，只好一错再错。为了遏制住亚历山大扩张的野心，阻止其统治托斯卡尼，他被迫涉足于意大利。仅仅帮助教会扩大势力，自身众叛亲离还不够，他又想获得那不勒斯王国的疆域，于是便跟西班牙国王瓜分了那个王国。起初他是意大利的主宰，而今引来了一位伙伴，于是占领地的那些野心勃勃的人以及对他心怀不满的人可就有委身投靠的去处了。他原本完全可以在王国里安插一个对他俯首听命的国王，然而他却将这样的人赶出去，迎入一个能将他驱逐走的人。

的确，产生扩张领土的欲望是极其自然而普通的事情。您只要有这种能力，扩张时就会为世人所称道，而不会遭到指责。但没有这种能力的人却企图扩大自己的版图，那就是一种错误，会遭到谴责的。如此看来，假如法国当年能靠自身之力进攻那不勒斯，那就是应该的，倘若力所不及，就不应该瓜分那不勒斯。如果说法王



ples. And if the division of Lombardy he made with the Venetians deserves excuse because with it France gained a foothold in Italy, this other one deserves blame because it was not excused by that necessity.

So then Louis had made these five errors; he had eliminated the lesser powers; increased the power of a power in Italy; brought in a very powerful foreigner; did not come to live there; did not put colonies there. Yet if he had lived, these errors could not have hurt him if he had not made a sixth; depriving the Venetians of their state. For if he had not made the Church great or brought Spain into Italy, it would indeed have been reasonable and necessary to put down the Venetians. But when he had adopted these courses first, he should never have consented to their ruin, for while they were powerful they would always have kept others away from a campaign in Lombardy, whether it was because the Venetians would not have consented to them unless they themselves were to become its lords, or because the others would not have wanted to take Lombardy from France in order to give it to the Venetians, and they would not have had the spirit to go and attack both of them. And if someone should say: King Louis ceded Romagna to Alexander and the Kingdom to Spain to avoid a war, I reply with the reasons given above; that a disorder should never be allowed to continue so as to avoid a war, because that is not to avoid it but to defer it to your disadvantage. And if some others should bring up the faith that the king had pledged to the pope, to undertake that enterprise for him in return for dissolving his marriage and for the hat of Rouen, I reply with what I will say below on the faith of princes and how it should be observed. Thus, King Louis lost Lombardy for not having observed any of the conditions observed by others who have taken provinces and wished to hold them. Nor is this any miracle, but very ordinary and reasonable. And I spoke of this matter at Nantes with Rouen when Valentino (for so Cesare Borgia, son of Pope Alexander, was called by the people) was occupying Romagna. For when the cardinal of Rouen said to me that the Italians do not understand war, I replied to him that the French do not understand the state, because if they understood they would not have let the Church come to such greatness. And it may be seen from experience that the greatness in Italy of the Church and of Spain has been caused by France, and France's ruin caused by them. From this one may draw a general rule that never or rarely fails; whoever is the cause of someone's becoming powerful is ruined; for that power has been caused by him either with industry or with force, and both the one and the other of these two are suspect to whoever has become powerful.

跟威尼斯人一道瓜分伦巴第是情有可原的，因为他毕竟借此在意大利站住了脚跟，那么这次瓜分那不勒斯应该得到的是指责，因为他没有了上次的那种必要性。

综上所述，路易王犯了如下五个错误：扑灭弱小势力；扶植意大利强大的势力；引入了一个非常强有力的外国君王；没有御驾亲临占领地；没有安插殖民统治者。即便如此，假如他没有犯第六个错误——夺取威尼斯人的国家，那么，在他有生之年，以上的那些错误也是不会对他造成伤害的。倘若他没有帮助教会扩大势力，没有把西班牙引入意大利，实际上他理应将威尼斯人镇压下去。可是，既然他已先一步采取了以上的措施，就绝对不该任由威尼斯人遭到毁灭了。因为，威尼斯人只要保持着强大的势头，就会把别的势力拒之门外，免得在伦巴第燃起战火。除非威尼斯人自己想成为伦巴第的主宰，他们是不会同意外人介入的，要不然就是因为其他势力不愿从法国手中夺走伦巴第，转而赠送给威尼斯人，不管出于什么原因，反正没有人敢与法国人及威尼斯为敌，跑来向他们发起攻击。如果有人提出疑问说，路易国王把罗马格纳让给亚历山大，把那不勒斯王国交由西班牙宰割，为的是避免战争，那我就以前边陈述的理由作为回答：绝对不该为了避免战争而纵容祸端蔓延，因为这样不会避免战争，只是拖延时间罢了，结果会造成不利的局面。倘若有谁说路易国王曾对教皇有过承诺，要为他架桥铺路，以换取教皇的帮助，解除他的婚姻以及得到卢安枢机主教的位置，请容我在下文做出回答，谈谈君主的承诺以及如何兑现的问题。对于那些攻城掠地，又渴望守住城池的人所遵循的原则，路易国王连一条也没有遵循，所以才失去了伦巴第。这种情况没有什么可奇怪的，这是非常普通的一件事，完全在情理之中。瓦伦蒂诺（人们都这么称呼亚历山大教皇的儿子切萨雷·博尔贾）占领罗马格纳时，我在南特曾跟卢安枢机主教提过这事。卢安枢机主教跟我说意大利人不懂得战争，我的回答是：法国人不知道怎样管理占领地。因为法国人如果精通事理，就不会让教会肆意扩张了。从以往的历史可以看到：教会势力在意大利的壮大以及西班牙在该地的扩张，都是由法国一手造成的，而这也正是导致法国影响崩溃的原因。由此我们可以得出一条几乎是颠扑不破的真理：帮助别人壮大，势必导致自己灭亡。因为您扶植别人靠的是勤奋，要么就是武力，而别人壮大后，忌讳的正是这两点。



Book 4 Why the Kingdom of Darius Which Alexander Seized Did not Rebel from His Successors after Alexander's Death

The difficulties that are involved in holding a state newly acquired having been considered, one might marvel at how it happened that Alexander the Great became lord of Asia in a few years, and just after he had seized it, died – from which it appeared reasonable that all that state would rebel – nonetheless the successors of Alexander maintained it and had no other difficulty in holding it than that which arose among themselves out of their own ambition. I reply that principalities of which memory remains have been governed in two diverse modes; either by one prince, and all the others servants who as ministers help govern the kingdom by his favor and appointment; or by a prince and by barons who hold that rank not by favor of the lord but by antiquity of blood line. Such barons have their own states and subjects who recognize them as lords and hold them in natural affection. States that are governed by one prince and his servants hold their prince in greater authority because in all his province there is no one recognized as superior but himself; and if they obey someone else, they do so as a minister and official, and do not bear him any particular love.

In our times the examples of these two diverse kinds of government are the Turk and the king of France. The whole monarchy of the Turk is governed by one lord; the others are his servants. Dividing his kingdom into sanjaks, he sends different administrators to them, and he changes and varies them as he likes. But the king of France is placed in the midst of an ancient multitude of lords, acknowledged in that state by their subjects and loved by them; they have their privileges, and the king cannot take them away without danger to himself. Thus, whoever considers the one and the other of these states will find difficulty in acquiring the state of the Turk, but should it be conquered, great ease in holding it. So inversely, you will find in some respects more ease in seizing the state of France, but great difficulty in holding it.

The causes of the difficulties in being able to seize the kingdom of the Turk are that one cannot be called in by the princes in that kingdom, and that one cannot hope to facilitate the enterprise through the rebellion of those around him. This arises from the reasons given a-

第四章 为什么亚历山大大帝占领的大流士王国在他死后没有背叛他的继承者

考虑到在统治一个刚刚征服的国家时会遇到种种困难，我们也许会感到奇怪：亚历山大大帝怎么会在短短的几年之中便主宰了亚洲，而且就在他刚刚完成了大业便死去之后，他所建立的帝国中人民该揭竿而起才是合乎情理的，可他的继位者却保住了江山——除过统治者之间由于争权夺利闹出的风波之外，他再没有遇到别的困难。我的回答是：有史以来，君主国都是按照两种不同的模式实施统治的：一种是由一位君主统治王国，其他的大臣都处于仆从地位，帮助他治理国家，由他的恩宠决定大臣的任命；另一种是由君王及贵族们共同统治，贵族的地位不是由君主的恩宠决定，而是取决于他们的血统是否古老。这样的贵族都有自己的领地和臣民，被臣民们视为主宰，自然而然便赢得了爱戴。在由一位君主及其大臣统治的国家里，君主大权在握，因为在他的所有领地里，只有他一人被看做是至高无上的；人民服从于大臣和官员们，只是因为他们有着这样的地位，倒不是由于对他们有偏爱之情。

在我们这个时代，这两种不同的统治方式有两个例子——土耳其以及法国政权模式。整个土耳其的疆土都由一位君主统治，其他的人均是臣属。这位君王将王国划分为若干行省，派遣各种各样的官员去管理，人事更迭及官员的升迁都由他随心所欲地决定。而法国国王的周围却是一大群有古老血统的贵族，他们有着自己的臣民，受到自己臣民的承认和爱戴，并在王国里享有特权。国王不冒风险，是不能剥夺他们的特权的。所以，谁要是想想这两个国家的情况，就会发现：土耳其是一个难以攻占的国家，可一旦将其征服，要保住它就是轻而易举的事了。而从某些方面而言，法国则是一个易攻难守的国家。

土耳其王国之所以难以攻占，是因为在那个王国里不可能有诸侯将侵略者引入，而且侵略者也不能指望依靠土耳其国王周围的人举旗造反以实施自己的计划。其原因上文已做过交待，这是由于土耳其人都是国王的臣仆，都被自身的义务束缚住了



bove, for, since all are slaves and bound by obligation, they can be corrupted with much difficulty, and even if they are corrupted, one can hope but for little use from it, as they cannot bring their peoples with them, for the reasons indicated. Hence, whoever attacks the Turk must necessarily assume that he will find him entirely united, and he had better put his hope more in his own forces than in the disorders of others. But once the Turk has been overcome and defeated in the field in such a way that he cannot rally his armies, one has only to fear the blood line of the prince. If this is eliminated, there remains no one whom one would have to fear, since others do not have credit with the people; and just as the victor could put no hope in them before his victory, so he should not fear them after it.

The contrary occurs with kingdoms governed like France, because you can easily enter there, having won over to yourself some baron of the kingdom; for malcontents and those who desire to innovate are always to be found. For the reasons given, they can open the way for you into that state and facilitate victory for you. Then your desire to maintain that victory for yourself brings in its wake infinite difficulties both from those who have helped you and from those you have oppressed. Nor is it enough for you to eliminate the blood line of the prince, because lords remain there who put themselves at the head of new changes; and since you can neither content them nor eliminate them, you lose that state whenever their opportunity comes.

Now, if you consider what was the nature of Darius's government, you will find it similar to the kingdom of the Turk. Therefore, for Alexander it was necessary first to make an all-out attack on him and drive him from the field; after this victory, with Darius dead, that state remained secure for Alexander for the reasons discussed above. And if his successors had been united, they could have enjoyed it at leisure, nor did any tumults occur in that kingdom besides those they themselves incited. But it is impossible to possess states ordered like France with such quiet. Hence arose the frequent rebellions in Spain, France, and Greece against the Romans, because of the numerous principalities that existed in those states. As long as their memory lasted, the Romans were always uncertain of their possession, but when their memory was eliminated with the power and long duration of the empire, the Romans became secure possessors of them. And the Romans possessed them even though, when they later fought among themselves, each took for himself a part of those provinces in accordance with the authority he had got within it; and the provinces, because the blood line of their former lords was eliminated, acknowledged no one but the Romans. Having considered all these things, therefore, no one will marvel at the ease with which Alexan-

手脚，外人是很难笼络腐蚀的；即便令他们中了糖衣炮弹，也不能指望从中获得大的益处，因为他们无法一呼百应，使人民倒戈，其原因已做过陈述。所以，要进攻土耳其，就必须三思，考虑到土耳其是一个团结一致的整体，最好把希望寄托在自己的实力上，而不是依赖对方阵营内发生骚乱。但是，一旦将土耳其击败，使土耳其国王溃不成军，无法再重整旗鼓，那么，要担心的就只剩下那些王子王孙了。如果把他们斩草除根，就再没有可担心的人了，因为其他的人在人民中是没有威信的。胜利者在战前不能抱希望于那些臣仆们，胜利之后也没有必要害怕他们。

像法国国王统治下的那种王国，情况正好相反。入侵者把王国里的某位贵族争取到手，便可以轻轻松松地长驱直入，因为心怀不满、见异思迁者大有人在。鉴于以上原因，那些人可以穿针引线，帮您入侵他们的国家，使您取得胜利。但如果您想保住胜利果实，却会遇到无穷无尽的困难，有些是帮助过您的人所造成的，有些则是您压迫的人所造成的。而且，光把王子王孙斩尽杀绝还是不够的，因为残留下来的贵族会发动革命改朝换代；您既不能让他们感到满意，也无法将他们一举歼灭，那他们一有机会就会颠覆您征服的国家。

如果您仔细琢磨一下大流士政权的性质，就会发现它与土耳其的王国很相似。因而，亚历山大首先要做的是发动全面进攻，将大流士逐出战场。胜利之后，大流士命赴黄泉，亚历山大便稳稳地控制了他的国家，其原因在上文已做了陈述。如果亚历山大的继承人团结一致，便可以消消停停地享受胜利之果实；只要他们不起内讧，这个王国里就不会出现动乱的局面。但是，统治法国那样政权结构的国家，就不可能如此风平浪静了。在西班牙、法国和希腊，反对罗马人的起义风起云涌，因为在这些国家里存在着多如牛毛的君主国。根据罗马人的记忆，他们对巩固占领地总是怀着忐忑不安的心情，但由于他们力量强大以及罗马帝国社稷稳固，这种记忆便烟消云散了——他们的统治固若金汤。虽然他们后来你争我斗，按照各自在占领地的势力进行瓜分，得到了自己的一份领地，但居民们却依然只承认罗马人是他们的主宰，因为他们以前的统治者已被诛灭九族。把这些情况都做通盘考虑，我们就



der held the state of Asia and at the difficulties others such as Pyrrhus and many more like him had in keeping their acquisitions. This has come not from much or little virtue in the victor but from the disparity in the subject.

不会为亚历山大能够轻而易举地保持住亚洲的占领地，而皮鲁国王以及许多跟他一样的人却难以保住自己占领的河山感到惊奇了。这不在于胜利者的实力大小，而是由于占领地臣民情况有一定的差异。



Book 5 How Cities or Principalities Which Lived under Their Own Laws before They Were Occupied Should Be Administered

When those states that are acquired, as has been said, are accustomed to living by their own laws and in liberty, there are three modes for those who want to hold them; first, ruin them; second, go there to live personally; third, let them live by their laws, taking tribute from them and creating within them an oligarchical state which keeps them friendly to you. For since such a state has been created by that prince, it knows it cannot stand without his friendship and power, and it has to do everything to maintain him. And a city used to living free may be held more easily by means of its own citizens than in any other mode, if one wants to preserve it.

As examples there are the Spartans and the Romans. The Spartans held Athens and Thebes by creating oligarchical states there; yet they lost them again. The Romans, in order to hold Capua, Carthage, and Numantia, destroyed them and did not lose them. They wanted to hold Greece much as the Spartans had held it, by making it free and leaving it its own laws. But they did not succeed; so they were compelled to destroy many cities in that province so as to hold it. For in truth there is no secure mode to possess them other than to ruin them. And whoever becomes patron of a city used to living free and does not destroy it, should expect to be destroyed by it; for it always has as a refuge in rebellion the name of liberty and its own ancient orders which are never forgotten either through length of time or because of benefits received. Whatever one does or provides for, unless the inhabitants are broken up or dispersed, they will not forget that name and those orders, and will immediately recur to them upon any unforeseen event as did Pisa after having been kept in servitude a hundred years by the Florentines. But, when cities or provinces are used to living under a prince, and his blood line is eliminated – since on the one hand they are used to obeying, and on the other they do not have the old prince – they will not agree to make one from among themselves and they do not know how to live free. So they are slower to take up arms, and a prince can gain them with greater ease and can secure himself against them. But in republics there is greater life, greater hatred, more desire for revenge; the memory of their

第五章 如何治理那些被占领之前有着自己法律的城邦和君主国

如果被占领的国家如前所述，习惯于遵循自己的法律，而且是自由的，那么，想把它们掌握住，有三种办法：第一种是将它们夷为平地；第二种是您御驾亲临，驻扎在彼处；第三种办法是由着那儿的居民沿用他们的法律，对他们收取贡赋，建立一个对您友好的寡头政府统治他们。这样的政府是由君主建立的，它深知没有君主的友好帮助和武力支持，就无法站稳脚跟，所以便不遗余力地要讨君主的欢心。君主想保住习惯于过自由生活的城邦，靠市民的拥戴比任何其他的方式都更为容易些。

这方面的例子有斯巴达人和罗马人。斯巴达人在雅典和底比斯建立寡头政府实行统治，但最终还是失去了那两个地方。罗马人为了控制卡普阿、迦太基和努曼提亚，先对它们实行毁灭性打击，结果保住了它们。他们希望像斯巴达人一样在希腊长治久安，让希腊享有自由，并且允许其延循希腊自己的法律，然而却未成功，于是只好摧毁了希腊的许多城邦以保持自己的统治。实际上，如欲巩固这些占领地，没有什么别的办法比先摧毁它们更稳妥的了。对于习惯过自由生活的城邦，无论哪位君主成了这儿的统治者，却不预先摧毁它，那就一定会使自己断送于此，因为当地居民总会以自由以及他们古老的典章为借口起来造反；他们无论经历多么漫长的岁月，无论蒙受多大的恩赐，都绝不会忘掉自由和祖宗的制度。无论征服者怎样妥协和提供方便，除非让居民们四分五裂、散居各处，否则那些居民们绝不会忘掉自己的荣誉和过去，一有风吹草动就卷土重来，就如被佛罗伦萨奴役了百年之久的比萨一样。然而，对于习惯于被一位君主所统治的城邦或君主国，这位君主一旦被诛灭九族，居民们一方面因为习惯了俯首帖耳的日子，另一方面则由于他们以前的君主已不复存在，他们既不愿从他们中间推出新的君主，也不知道怎么过自由的生活。所以，他们不会揭竿而起反对占领者，而占领者可以比较从容地控制住他们，巩固自己的统治。可是在共和国则不然，那儿蕴藏着强大的生命力、深深的仇恨以及复



ancient liberty does not and cannot let them rest, so that the most secure path is to eliminate them or live in them.



仇的热切愿望；居民们缅怀昔日的自由，不可能安分守己，所以最稳妥的办法就是把他们消灭干净，要不就亲自驻扎在彼地。



Book 6 Of New Principalities That Are Acquired through One's Own Arms and Virtue

No one should marvel if, in speaking as I will do of principalities that are altogether new both in prince and in state, I bring up the greatest examples. For since men almost always walk on paths beaten by others and proceed in their actions by imitation, unable either to stay on the paths of others altogether or to attain the virtue of those whom you imitate, a prudent man should always enter upon the paths beaten by great men, and imitate those who have been most excellent, so that if his own virtue does not reach that far, it is at least in the odor of it. He should do as prudent archers do when the place they plan to hit appears too distant, and knowing how far the strength of their bow carries, they set their aim much higher than the place intended, not to reach such height with their arrow, but to be able with the aid of so high an aim to achieve their design.

I say, then, that in altogether new principalities, where there is a new prince, one encounters more or less difficulty in maintaining them according to whether the one who acquires them is more or less virtuous. And because the result of becoming prince from private individual presupposes either virtue or fortune, it appears that one or the other of these two things relieves in part many difficulties; nonetheless, he who has relied less on fortune has maintained himself more. To have the prince compelled to come to live there in person, because he has no other states, makes it still easier. But, to come to those who have become princes by their own virtue and not by fortune, I say that the most excellent are Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus, and the like. And although one should not reason about Moses, as he was a mere executor of things that had been ordered for him by God, nonetheless he should be admired if only for that grace which made him deserving of speaking with God. But let us consider Cyrus and the others who have acquired or founded kingdoms; you will find them all admirable; and if their particular actions and orders are considered, they will appear no different from those of Moses, who had so great a teacher. And as one examines their actions and lives, one does not see that they had anything else from fortune than the opportunity, which gave them the matter enabling them to introduce any form they pleased.

第六章 通过刀剑和实力新征服的君主国

如果在谈到新上台的君主治理新的君主国时，我引用几个辉煌的例子，没有人会感到惊奇的。人们总是走别人走过的老路，在行动上对别人进行模仿，但却不能始终沿着别人的路走，也不能通过模仿掌握别人的能力，所以聪明的人应该追寻伟人的足迹，模仿出类拔萃的人，于是他的能力即便不可与伟人同日而语，至少也会沾上伟人的气息。一位君主就应该像明智的弓箭手一样，如果他打算射击的目标显得太远，而他又知道自己力所不及，射出的箭可能会达不到目标，于是便会将瞄准的目标大大提高，此举并非要射得那般高，而是希图把箭送入高空，下落时能命中目标。

依我看，在全新的君主国里，如果统治者是一个新君主，他在治理国家时会遇到种种困难，困难之大小要取决于他实力的强弱。一位布衣成为君主，其先决条件是他应该拥有实力或命运的垂青，而这两个条件中的无论哪一条，从某种程度而言，都会为他排忧解难。不过，他依赖命运的程度越轻，越易于巩固自己的地位。另外，君主在没有旁的国土需要治理的情况下，应该君临新的君主国，在此处扎下根来，这样比较容易处理国事。但要是说到那些不是靠命运而是依赖自身的实力当上君主的人，我认为最为出类拔萃的应算摩西、居鲁士、罗慕洛、提修斯等人了。按说在此处是不该谈论摩西的，因为他只是奉命行事，执行了上帝的意旨，但仅就他功德高尚，能跟上帝对话这一点而言，他还是应该受到世人的敬慕。我们在考虑居鲁士及另外的一些征服或缔造了王国的人所处的境况时，就会发现他们全都值得钦佩。如果考察一下他们特殊的活动及行为准则，就会看到他们跟有一位伟大的导师指点迷津的摩西没什么两样。细想一下他们的活动和生活，就不难发现：命运之神除了赐给他们一些机会之外，再无其他，他们正是利用了机会所提供的因素，才按自己



Without that opportunity their virtue of spirit would have been eliminated, and without that virtue the opportunity would have come in vain.

It was necessary then for Moses to find the people of Israel in Egypt, enslaved and oppressed by the Egyptians, so that they would be disposed to follow him in order to get out of their servitude. It was fitting that Romulus not be received in Alba, that he should have been exposed at birth, if he was to become king of Rome and founder of that fatherland. Cyrus needed to find the Persians malcontent with the empire of the Medes, and the Medes soft and effeminate because of a long peace. Theseus could not have demonstrated his virtue if he had not found the Athenians dispersed. Such opportunities, therefore, made these men successful, and their excellent virtue enabled the opportunity to be recognized; hence their fatherlands were ennobled by it and became very prosperous.

Those like these men, who become princes by the paths of virtue, acquire their principality with difficulty but hold it with ease; and the difficulties they have in acquiring their principality arise in part from the new orders and modes that they are forced to introduce so as to found their state and their security. And it should be considered that nothing is more difficult to handle, more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to manage, than to put oneself at the head of introducing new orders. For the introducer has all those who benefit from the old orders as enemies, and he has lukewarm defenders in all those who might benefit from the new orders. This lukewarmness arises partly from fear of adversaries who have the laws on their side and partly from the incredulity of men, who do not truly believe in new things unless they come to have a firm experience of them. Consequently, whenever those who are enemies have opportunity to attack, they do so with partisan zeal, and the others defend lukewarmly so that one is in peril along with them. It is however necessary, if one wants to discuss this aspect well, to examine whether these innovators stand by themselves or depend on others; that is, whether to carry out their deed they must beg or indeed can use force. In the first case they always come to nothing and never accomplish anything; but when they depend on their own and are able to use force, then it is that they are rarely in peril. From this it arises that all the armed prophets conquered and the unarmed ones were ruined. For, besides the things that have been said, the nature of peoples is variable; and it is easy to persuade them of something, but difficult to keep them in that persuasion. And thus things must be ordered in such a mode that when they no longer believe, one can make them believe by force. Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus would not have been able to make their peoples observe their constitutions for long if they had been unarmed, as hap-

的意愿推出了某种形式的创造。没有机会的帮助，他们的实力及愿望就不能得以展现；如果不具备实力，那么机会来了也白搭。

摩西当年在埃及找到以色列人民是很有必要的。以色列人受到埃及人的奴役和压迫，他们愿追随摩西，以摆脱受奴役的处境。假如罗慕洛日后要成为罗马王以及这一国家的缔造者，那他在阿尔巴时就应该被拒之门外，在出生时就应该遭到遗弃。很有必要让居鲁士发现波斯人对梅迪人统治的帝国心怀不满，而梅迪人也由于太平日子过得太久变得懦弱无能。当年雅典人要不是四分五裂，提修斯也不可能有机会展示自己的实力。正是这种种的机会使这些人走向了成功，也正是因为有着非凡的实力才使得他们抓住了机会，他们的祖国才得以威名显赫，登上了繁荣昌盛的高峰。

诸如此类的人才，靠自己的实力成为君主，虽然在夺取国家时困难重重，但守住自己的江山却并不困难。他们在夺取国家时之所以遇到困难，部分原因是他们为了建立自己的国家和确保自身的安全，必须引入全新的典章以及治国的模式。我们应该想到：拉起大旗推行新的秩序，是世上最难办的事，成功的希望极为渺茫，实施起来是最为危险的。对于推行新法的人而言，所有从旧法中获利的人都成了他的仇敌，而且可能从新法中获益的人虽支持他，也是不冷不热的。这种暧昧态度的产生，部分是因为对敌手的恐惧，这在于敌手有法律的支持，还有一部分原因则是人的猜疑之心，因为人们除非对新的事物具有实实在在的体验，否则是不会真正相信新事物的。于是，那些仇敌一有机会便兴风作浪，以党派之争时的那种狂热对其进行攻击，而那些支持者则三心二意的，所以待在这些中间是很危险的。不过，要想深入地讨论这种情况，很有必要弄清那些改革者是独立的，还是仰仗别人的鼻息；也就是要弄清，他们是必须乞求别人的帮助实施自己的计划，还是靠自身的实力便能够胜任。出现了第一种情况时，他们总会无果而终，最终会一事无成，可如果他们自强自立，能够施展自身的实力，十有八九会逢凶化吉。由此而论，一切武装的改革者都会所向披靡，而所有没有武装的改革者则会一败涂地。因为，除过以上讲的原因之外，还有一些：人心是变幻莫测的。劝说他们去干某件事情是很容易的，但让他们坚持做下去就困难了。所以，诸事必须以如下方式进行安排：当他们对某事失去了信念时，可以用武力迫使他们坚持信念。摩西、居鲁士、提修斯和罗慕洛当年若是没有刀剑的卫护，就跟咱们这个时代季罗拉莫·萨沃纳罗拉道士所遇到的情况一样，是无法使他们的子民长时间地遵守他们制订的法律的。一旦人民大众开



pened in our times to Brother Girolamo Savonarola. He was ruined in his new orders as soon as the multitude began not to believe in them, and he had no mode for holding firm those who had believed nor for making unbelievers believe. Men such as these, therefore, find great difficulty in conducting their affairs; all their dangers are along the path, and they must overcome them with virtue. But once they have overcome them and they begin to be held in veneration, having eliminated those who had envied them for their quality, they remain powerful, secure, honored, and prosperous.

To such high examples I want to add a lesser example, but it will have some proportion with the others and I want it to suffice for all other similar cases; this is Hiero of Syracuse. From private individual he became prince of Syracuse, nor did he receive anything more from fortune than the opportunity. For when the Syracusans were oppressed, they chose him as their captain, and from there he proved worthy of being made their prince. And he was of such virtue, even in private fortune, that he who wrote of him said "that he lacked nothing of being a king except a kingdom". Hiero eliminated the old military and organized a new one; he left his old friendships and made new ones; and when he had friendships and soldiers that were his own, he could build any building on top of such a foundation; so he went through a great deal of trouble to acquire, and little to maintain.

始对萨沃纳罗拉倡导的新秩序失去信心，他便身败名裂了。他无计可施，既不能让相信新秩序的人坚定信念，也无法叫不相信的人相信新秩序。所以，像这样的改革者在从事他们的事业时困难重重，他们前进的道路上危机四伏，他们必须依靠自身的实力排除万难。不过，他们一旦克服了艰难险阻，赢得了人民的尊敬，消灭了那些对他们的地位怀觊觎之心的人，他们就会势力强大，他们的统治就会固若金汤，受到人民的崇敬，事业也会繁荣昌盛。

这是些光辉的典范，此处我还想增加一个较小的例子。这个例子虽小，但与别的典范也有着某些相通之处，我希望借此便足以说明所有其他类似的情况。这就是有关锡拉库萨王国海洛的例子。他出身于草莽，却当上了锡拉库萨的君主，而且除过机会之外，他再未得到过命运之神的任何恩赐。深受压迫的锡拉库萨人选他作了他们的军事首领，他也因此证明了自己的才干，证明他能够胜任君主的位置。他具有过人的才干，甚至在他仍是一介布衣时，就有人撰文盛赞他：“海洛具备了一位君主所应该有的一切素质，所缺的就是一个王国了。”海洛解散了旧的军队，建立了一支新军；他舍弃了旧友，又有了新交。他麾下有了朋友和军队，就可以以此为基础缔造任何一种国家了。他在缔造国家的过程中倒是经历了大风大浪，但这样一来，巩固政权就不费力了。



Book 7 Of New Principalities That are Acquired by Others' Arms and Fortune

Those who become princes from private individual solely by fortune become so with little trouble, but maintain themselves with much. They have no difficulty along the path because they fly there, but all the difficulties arise when they are in place. And such princes come to be when a state is given to someone either for money or by the favor of whoever gives it, as happened to many in Greece, in the cities of Ionia and of the Hellespont, where they were made princes by Darius so that they might hold on to those cities for his security and glory; as also those emperors were made who from private individual attained the empire through corrupting the soldiers. These persons rest simply on the will and fortune of whoever has given a state to them, which are two very inconstant and unstable things. They do not know how to hold and they cannot hold that rank; they do not know how, because if one is not a man of great ingenuity and virtue, it is not reasonable, that having always lived in private fortune, he should know how to command; they cannot hold that rank because they do not have forces that can be friendly and faithful to them. Then, too, states that come to be suddenly, like all other things in nature that are born and grow quickly, cannot have roots and branches, so that the first adverse weather destroys them – unless, indeed, as was said, those who have suddenly become princes have so much virtue that they know immediately how to prepare to keep what fortune has placed in their laps; and the foundations that others have laid before becoming princes they lay afterwards.

To both of the modes mentioned of becoming prince, by virtue or by fortune, I want to adduce two examples that have occurred in days within our memory; and these are Francesco Sforza and Cesare Borgia. Francesco became duke of Milan from private individual by proper means and with a great virtue of his own; and that which he had acquired with a thousand pains he maintained with little trouble. On the other hand Cesare Borgia, called Duke Valentino by the vulgar, acquired his state through the fortune of his father and lost it through the same, notwithstanding the fact that he made use of every deed and did all those things that should be done by a prudent and virtuous man to put his roots in the states that the arms

第七章 依靠别人的刀剑及命运的安排 所征服的新的君主国

纯粹靠机缘从布衣百姓飞黄腾达，当上了一国之君的人，倒不会遇到多少波折，但巩固自己的地位时就要大费周折了。他们在腾达的路上无艰难险阻，因为他们是一夜腾贵，但他们登上了王位之后，困难就全部出现了。这样的君王之所以能得到国家，或是靠金钱作用，或是靠别人的恩惠。在希腊这样的事屡见不鲜，例如在伊奥尼亚和赫莱斯蓬的城邦，大流士任命了一些君主，让他们守卫这些城邦，以保障大流士的安全及捍卫大流士的荣誉。另外，那些靠收买军队获得了帝国的政权、从平民登上皇帝宝座的人，情况也是如此。这些人靠的是帮助他们获得政权的人，简直是依赖于那些人的意志和命运，而这两点是变幻无常、极不稳定的。他们不知道如何保住也无法保住自己的地位。而他们不知所措也在情理之中，因为假如一个人既无经天纬地之才又无美德，一直过着寻常百姓的生活，突然懂得了治国之术，那才是咄咄怪事哩。他们无法保住自己的地位，因为他们麾下没有友好的效忠于他们的军队。而且，突然之间建立起来的国家，就跟自然界所有破土而生、长得非常好的东西一样，不可能根深叶茂，一遇到恶劣的天气便会毁于一旦。除非出现了上文提到的情况，突然之间当上了君主的人具备雄厚的实力，即刻便知道如何筹措，保住了命运之神恩赐给他们的政权。别人是在当上君主之前奠定基础，而他们则是掌权之后才奠基立业。

以上所提的是依靠实力或机缘当上君主的两种途径，此处我还想引出两个我们仍记忆犹新的例子——弗朗切斯科·斯福尔扎和切萨雷·博尔贾。弗朗切斯科靠的是恰当的方法以及自身雄厚的实力起身于草莽，当上了米兰的公爵。他历经千辛万苦，终于荣誉加身，不过他在巩固自己的地位时却没有费力气。另一例是切萨雷·博尔贾，人称瓦伦蒂诺公爵。他是依靠父亲的运势发迹的，也出于同样的原因下了台。尽管他殚精竭虑，采取了一个精明强干、深谋远虑的人应该采取的一切措施，



and fortune of others had given him. For, as was said above, whoever does not lay his foundations at first might be able, with great virtue, to lay them later, although they might have to be laid with hardship for the architect and with danger to the building. Thus, if one considers all the steps of the duke, one will see that he had laid for himself great foundations for future power, which I do not judge superfluous to discuss; for I do not know what better teaching I could give to a new prince than the example of his actions. And if his orders did not bring profit to him, it was not his fault, because this arose from an extraordinary and extreme malignity of fortune.

Alexander VI had very many difficulties, both present and future, when he decided to make his son the duke great. First, he did not see the path to being able to make him lord of any state that was, not a state of the Church; and when he decided to take that of the Church, he knew that the duke of Milan and the Venetians would not consent to it because Faenza and Rimini had for long been under the protection of the Venetians. Besides this, he saw that the arms of Italy, and especially the arms of anyone whom he might have been able to make use of, were in the hands of those who had to fear the greatness of the pope; and so he could not trust them, as they were all with the Orsini and the Colonna^① and their accomplices. It was thus necessary to upset those orders and to bring disorder to their states so as to be able to make himself lord securely of part of them. This was easy for him, because he found that the Venetians, moved by other causes, were engaged in getting the French to come back into Italy, which he not only did not oppose but made easier by the dissolution of the former marriage of King Louis. So the king came into Italy with the aid of the Venetians and the consent of Alexander, and he was no sooner in Milan than the pope got men from him for a campaign in Romagna, which was granted to him because of the reputation of the king. So after the duke had acquired Romagna and beaten down the Colonna, two things prevented him from maintaining that and going further ahead: one, that his arms did not appear to him to be faithful; the other, the will of France: that is, the Orsini arms of which he had availed himself, might fail under him, and not only prevent him from acquiring but also take away what he had acquired; and the king might also do the same to him. He had a test of the Orsini when, after the capture of Faenza, he assaulted Bologna and saw them go coolly to that assault; and regarding the king, the duke knew his mind when after he had taken the duchy of Urbino, he assaulted Tuscany, and the king made him desist from that cam-

① 奥尔西尼和科隆纳家族是罗马的两大贵族,长期以来都企图控制罗马,并觊觎教皇的位置。

但想在那个靠别人的刀剑及运势建立起的国家里站稳脚跟，仍是困难重重。如上所述，无论是谁，起初建国时未奠定基础，那就要靠雄厚的实力在建国后奠定；不过，此时完成奠基工作也许要经历千辛万苦，而且对建筑物也是有危险的。如果我们看一看这位公爵的筹措，就会发现他为将来的统治奠定了雄厚的基础，我认为此处对之加以讨论并不多余。我把他的所作所为作为例子，因为我不知道还有什么更好的教训可以讲给新执政的君主听了。如果说他的运筹帷幄没有使他功成名就，那不是他的过错，而是由于命运蹭蹬、世事凶险所致。

教皇亚历山大六世决定扶持他的儿子当大公爵时，无论是眼前还是将来都困难重重。首先，他看不出有什么办法可以叫儿子统辖不属于教会的国家。他决定把教会属下的国家划分走时，又担心米兰的公爵和威尼斯人不同意，因为法恩扎和里米尼长期以来一直处于威尼斯人的保护之下。另外，他看到意大利的军队以及任何一个他可以利用的人所掌握的军队，都控制在那些惧怕教会扩张势力的人手中。他不能相信那些人，因为那些人都是奥尔西尼和科隆纳家族阵营里的鹰犬。因而有必要搅乱那些人国内的秩序，在那儿兴风作浪，这样便可以把他们的一部分国土稳稳当当占为己有。这对他而言是很容易的，因为他发现威尼斯人在别的原因的驱动下正致力于帮助法国人重返意大利，对此他非但未加反对，而且解除了路易国王以前的婚姻为之推波助澜。于是，法王在威尼斯人的协助下，在亚历山大的许可下，长驱直入意大利。他刚一抵达米兰，教皇便向他借兵出征罗马格纳。慑于法王的威力，罗马格纳拱手称臣。就这样，瓦伦蒂诺公爵征服了罗马格纳，并打败了科隆纳家族。之后，他要巩固胜利成果并继续向前推进，就要遇到两重障碍。其一，他的军队似乎并不忠于他；第二重障碍便是法国的意愿。这就是说，他所征借的奥尔西尼家族的军队很可能会反水，不仅会阻止他去攻城掠地，而且还会将他所占的地盘抢走；法王也会对他做出同样的事情来。他在攻占了法恩扎之后，便向波洛格纳发动袭击，他发现奥尔西尼家族对这次袭击态度冷漠，由此便检验出了彼家族对他的成见。至于法国国王，瓦伦蒂诺公爵也算看穿了他的心思。公爵占领了乌尔比诺公国之后，



paign. Hence the duke decided to depend no longer on the arms and fortune of others. And the first thing he did was to weaken the Orsini and Colonna parties in Rome. For he gained to himself all their adherents, who were gentlemen, by making them his gentlemen and by giving them large allowances; and he honored them, according to their merits, with commands and with government posts, so that in a few months the partisan affections in their minds were eliminated, and all affection turned toward the duke. After this he waited for an opportunity to eliminate the Orsini chiefs, since he had dispersed those of the Colonna house. A good one came to him, and he used it better; for when the Orsini became aware, late, that the greatness of the duke and of the Church was ruin for them, they held a meeting at Magione, near Perugia. From that arose rebellion in Urbino, tumults in Romagna, and infinite dangers for the duke, who overcame them all with the aid of the French. And when his reputation had been restored, he trusted neither France nor other external forces, and so as not to put them to the test, he turned to deceit. He knew so well how to conceal his intent that the Orsini themselves, through Signor Paolo, became reconciled with him. The duke did not fail to fulfill every kind of duty to secure Signor Paolo, giving him money, garments, and horses, so that their simplicity brought them into the duke's hands at Sinigaglia. So, when these heads had been eliminated, and their partisans had been turned into his friends, the duke had laid very good foundations for his power, since he had all Romagna with the duchy of Urbino. He thought, especially, that he had acquired the friendship of Romagna, and that he had gained all those peoples to himself since they had begun to taste well-being.

And because this point is deserving of notice and of being imitated by others, I do not want to leave it out. Once the duke had taken over Romagna, he found it had been commanded by important lords who had been readier to despoil their subjects than to correct them, and had given their subjects matter for disunion, not for union. Since that province was quite full of robberies, quarrels, and every other kind of insolence, he judged it necessary to give it good government, if he wanted to reduce it to peace and obedience to a kingly arm. So he put there Messer Remirro de Orco, a cruel and ready man, to whom he gave the fullest power. In a short time Remirro reduced it to peace and unity, with the very greatest reputation for himself. Then the duke judged that such excessive authority was not necessary, because he feared that it might become hateful; and he set up a civil court in the middle of the province, with a most excellent president, where each city had its advocate. And because he knew that past rigors had generated some hatred for Remirro, to purge the spirits of

把锋芒指向托斯卡尼，法王从中作梗，不让他打那一仗。自此，公爵拿定主意，再也不依赖别人的刀剑和财势了。他做的第一件事便是削弱奥尔西尼家族及科隆纳家族在罗马的势力。他把那两大家族的心腹都争取到自己的麾下，是贵族的充当他的贵族，并厚恩重赐，宠爱有加，按功行赏，封官许愿。没出几个月，那些人心中的党派感情便烟消云散了，纷纷对公爵效忠邀宠。瓦伦蒂诺公爵驱散了科隆纳家族的党羽之后，接下来便等待时机，要一举歼灭奥尔西尼家族的首领们。后来他遇到了一个良机，并充分地利用了那一良机。当奥尔西尼家族意识到瓦伦蒂诺公爵以及教会势力的壮大将会导致他们灭亡的时候，已为时过晚。他们在佩鲁贾附近的马焦内开了一次碰头会。接着，乌尔比诺的叛乱以及罗马格纳的骚动便此起彼伏，给公爵带来了无穷无尽的危险，但公爵在法国人的帮助下一一化险为夷。待他恢复了自己的威信后，他就再也不信任法国及其他外部的力量了。为了不让对方觉察他的意图，他采用了欺骗的手段。他深藏不露，不显山不露水，使得奥尔西尼家族通过西格诺·保罗讲情要跟他和好。他履行了方方面面的义务笼络西格诺·保罗，赠给他金钱、华服及骏马。奥尔西尼家族头脑简单，在西尼加尼亚终于栽在了他手中。该家族的领头人被一举歼灭，那些党羽们却成了公爵的朋友。公爵把罗马格纳连同乌尔比诺公国都掌握在了手中，奠定了极为牢固的权力基础。他尤其看重的是：他在罗马格纳化敌为友，将所有的人都争取了过来，因为这儿的人民已经开始尝到了甜头。

这一点应该引起人们的注意，应该为他人所仿效，所以我不愿将这一话题束之高阁。瓦伦蒂诺公爵占领了罗马格纳之后，便发现以前在这儿作威作福的净是些无才无能的老爷们。那些家伙对人民不是以身施教，而是巧取豪夺，给人民带来的是分裂的因素，而非团结的保障。这一地区盗患蔓延，强徒横行，人民争斗不息。公爵认为，要想获得太平，让当地人服从王权，就需要为之提供一个有效的政府。于是，他把梅塞尔·雷米诺·德·奥尔科——一位残忍、果断的人安插在了那儿，授予他一切权力。在很短的一段时间里，雷米诺便把此地治理得呈现出太平、统一的气氛，并为自己赢得了极高的威望。这时，公爵认为权力过大是不应该的，恐怕会招致民众的愤恨。于是，他在该地区的中部建立了一个民事法庭，委派了一个出类拔萃的人主持，每个城市都选拔了律师参加。他深知雷米诺在过去推行的严刑重罚惹起了民愤；为了清除人民心中的不满情绪，把他们完全争取到自己这一边，他希

that people and to gain them entirely to himself, he wished to show that if any cruelty had been committed, this had not come from him but from the harsh nature of his minister. And having seized this opportunity, he had him placed one morning in the piazza at Cesena in two pieces, with a piece of wood and a bloody knife beside him. The ferocity of this spectacle left the people at once satisfied and stupefied.

But let us return to where we left off. I say that when the duke found himself very powerful and secure in part against present dangers – since he had armed to suit himself and had in good part eliminated those arms which were near enough to have attacked him – there remained for him, if he wanted to proceed with acquisition, to consider the king of France. For he knew that this would not be tolerated by the king, who had been late to perceive his error. And so he began to seek out new friendships and to vacillate with France in the expedition that the French were making toward the kingdom of Naples against the Spanish who were besieging Gaeta. His intent was to secure himself against them; in which he would soon have succeeded, if Alexander had lived.

And these were his arrangements as to present things. But as to the future, he had to fear, first, that a new successor in the Church might not be friendly to him and might seek to take away what Alexander had given him. He thought he might secure himself against this in four modes; first, to eliminate the blood lines of all those lords he had despoiled, so as to take that opportunity away from the pope; second, to win over to himself all the gentlemen in Rome, as was said, so as to be able to hold the pope in check with them; third, to make the College of Cardinals as much his as he could; fourth, to acquire so much empire before the pope died that he could resist a first attack on his own. Of these four things he had accomplished three at the death of Alexander; the fourth he almost accomplished. For of the lords he had despoiled he killed as many as he could reach, and very few saved themselves; the Roman gentlemen had been won over to himself; in the College he had a very large party; and as to new acquisition, he had planned to become lord over Tuscany, he already possessed Perugia and Piombino, and he had taken Pisa under his protection. And, as soon as he did not have to pay regard to France (which he did not have to do any longer, since the French had already been stripped of the kingdom by the Spanish, so that each of them was forced of necessity to buy his friendship), he would have jumped on Pisa. After this, Luca and Siena would have quickly yielded, in part through envy of the Florentines, in part through fear; the Florentines had no remedy. If he had succeeded in this (as he was succeeding the same year that Alexander died), he would have acquired such force and reputa-

望能向世人表明：任何残暴的行为都不是他授意造成的，而是由于那位大臣刁悍刻薄的天性所致。他抓住这一时机，一天早晨在切塞纳广场把雷米诺用刀劈成了两半，在他的尸体旁放了一块木牌和一把血淋淋的刀子。这一恐怖的场面立刻赢得了人民的欢心，也让他们心惊肉跳。

不过，还是让我们回到刚才的话题上吧。依我看，当公爵已经非常强大，有几分把握对付眼前的危险时（他武装起来以适合自己的处境，并充分地消灭了近旁能够对他实施攻击的军队）；他如果想继续扩张，接下来要做的就是考虑一下怎样对付法国国王了。他知道法王虽然很晚才意识到自己的失误，但对他蚕食鲸吞的行为是绝不会容忍的。于是他开始寻找新的盟友，对法国的态度举棋不定，不知是否应该参加法国对那不勒斯王国的远征。当时，西班牙人把加埃塔围得水泄不通，法国的远征针对的正是西班牙人。公爵的小算盘是巩固地位，以求自保。假如亚历山大没有离开人世的话，他很快就能如愿以偿。

针对目前的局势，这些便是他的安排。可是对于未来，他就不得不担忧了。首先，教廷里新上台的继承人也许会对他不友好，很可能把亚历山大给他的东西夺走。他认为自己应该采取四项措施以防意外，保障自身的安全：一是对他废黜了的王公贵族，连其子孙都要斩尽杀绝，让新教皇无机可乘；二是把罗马的贵族全部争取过来（上文已谈过），这样便可以利用他们制约教皇；三是最大限度地控制枢密院；四是在亚历山大教皇未死之前最大限度地操纵帝国，这样便可以抵御对他发起的攻击。亚历山大辞世时，他已把这四件事完成了三件，连第四件事也大功垂成。对于遭到罢黜的王公贵族们，他大开杀戒，能除掉多少就除掉多少，很少有人幸免于难，罗马的贵族们都被争取到了他的门下；在枢密院里，他拥有很大的势力。至于新的扩张政策，他计划成为托斯卡尼的主宰，他已经控制了佩鲁贾和皮奥姆比诺，并将比萨置于自己的保护伞之下。只要他不必再顾忌法国（在这方面他不必再夹着尾巴做人，因为西班牙人已从法国人手中抢走了那不勒斯王国，双方都出于需要，巴不得获得他的友谊），他就会向比萨下手。他得逞之后，卢卡和锡耶纳定会很快不战而降，一方面是出于对佛罗伦萨人的妒忌之心，一方面则是因为恐惧。对此，佛罗伦萨人无计可施。如果在这一点上获得成功（亚历山大去世的那一年，他的事业



tion that he would have stood by himself and would no longer have depended on the fortune and force of someone else, but on his own power and virtue. But Alexander died five years after he had begun to draw his sword. He left the duke with only the state of Romagna consolidated, With all the others in the air, between two very powerful enemy armies, and sick to death. And there was such ferocity and such virtue in the duke, and he knew so well how men have to be won over or lost, and so sound were the foundations that he had laid in so little time, that if he had not had these armies on his back or if he had been healthy, he would have been equal to every difficulty. And that his foundations were good one may see; Romagna waited for him for more than a month; in Rome, though he was half-alive, he remained secure; and although the Baglioni, Vitelli, and Orsini came to Rome, none followed them against him; if he could not make pope whomever he wanted, at least it would not be someone he did not want. But if at the death of Alexander the duke had been healthy, everything would have been easy for him. And he told me, on the day that Julius II was created, that he had thought about what might happen when his father was dying, and had found a remedy for everything, except that he never thought that at his death he himself would also be on the point of dying.

Thus, if I summed up all the actions of the duke, I would not know how to reproach him; on the contrary, it seems to me he should be put forward, as I have done, to be imitated by all those who have risen to empire through fortune and by the arms of others. For with his great spirit and high intention, he could not have conducted himself otherwise and the only things in the way of his designs were the brevity of Alexander's life and his own sickness. So whoever judges it necessary in his new principality to secure himself against enemies, to gain friends to himself, to conquer either by force or by fraud, to make himself loved and feared by the people, and followed and revered by the soldiers, to eliminate those who can or might offend you, to renew old orders through new modes, to be severe and pleasant, magnanimous and liberal, to eliminate an unfaithful military, to create a new one, to maintain friendships with kings and princes so that they must either benefit you with favor or be hesitant to offend you – can find no fresher examples than the actions of that man. One could only indict him in the creation of Julius as pontiff, in which he made a bad choice; for, as was said, though he could not make a pope to suit himself, he could have kept anyone from being pope. And he should never have accepted for the papacy those cardinals whom he had offended or who, having become pope, would have to be afraid of him. For men offend either from fear or for hatred. Those whom he had offended were, among others,

正一帆风顺)，他就会兵强马壮、威势大增，就会独立于世，那时就不需要再仰仗别人的财运和武力了，而是依靠自身的武功和实力。然而，就在他动手拔出宝剑之后的第五年，亚历山大撒手而去了。亚历山大留给瓦伦蒂诺公爵的疆土，只有罗马格纳是稳固的，其他的地方都是虚无飘渺的，处于两只非常强大的敌军夹击之中，而且公爵已病入膏肓。公爵狠劲十足、势大力强；对于怎样做会赢得人心或者怎样做会失去人心；他深谙其理；在很短的时间里，他便奠定了牢固的基业。鉴于这些原因，他假如不是腹背受敌，假如身体状况良好，他一定有能力克服千难万险。人们可以看到他的基业是牢固的，罗马格纳等待他的大驾光临，等了一月有余；在罗马，他虽然半死不活，但仍然可以高枕无忧；尽管巴利奥尼的人、维泰利的人和奥尔西尼的人来到了罗马，但没有人追随那些人跟他作对；即便他不能够按自己的意愿挑出教皇的人选，当教皇的起码也不会是他不愿见到的人。假如亚历山大去世的时候，公爵有一副健康的身体，一切对他而言都会易如反掌。就在朱利奥二世荣任教皇的那一天，他曾经告诉过我，说他对父亲去世时所能发生的情况做了通盘考虑，并制订了应付一切变故的万全之策。只不过，他绝没有想到，他父亲走上了黄泉路时，他自己也走到了鬼门关的门口。

如果把公爵的所作所为做一综合回顾，我真不知他有什么可指责之处；恰恰相反，依我看，应该将他推荐给世人（正如我所做的一样），让那些靠着运气以及别人的刀剑登上王位的人仿效。他有崇高的精神和远大的志向，所以这也是他唯一可行的人生之路；只是由于亚历山大猝然辞世以及他本人也疾病缠身，才阻碍了他实现自己的鸿鹄之志。一个君主在新建立的君主国里靖内攘外，招揽四方朋友，靠武力或诈术出奇制胜，让人民既爱戴又畏惧，使士兵既服从又尊敬，消灭一切可能会伤及自身的仇敌，靠新的办法恢复原来的秩序，恩威并用、慷慨大度，解散不忠实的军队，建立一支新军，与别国的国王及诸侯友好往来，让他们造福于自己，给自己带来好处，或者不敢轻易攻击——那么，任谁也找不到比瓦伦蒂诺公爵更鲜明的例子了。只是在朱利奥当教皇一事上，我们才可以挑出他的不足之处，因为他做了一个糟糕的选择。如前所述，虽然他不能按自己的意愿委任教皇，但他却可以阻止任何一个人当上教皇。他怎么也不应该容忍他曾经得罪过的红衣主教登上教皇的宝座，也不该让那些当上教皇后会畏惧他的人掌权。因为，人们会出于恐惧或仇恨起来造反。在他曾经得罪过的人当中，有圣·皮耶罗·阿德·温库拉、科隆纳、圣·



San Piero ad Vincula, Colonna, San Giorgio, Ascanio; all the others, if they had become pope, would have had to fear him, except Rouen and the Spaniards, the latter because of kinship and obligation, the former for his power, because he was connected to the kingdom of France. Therefore the duke, before everything else, should have created a Spaniard pope, and if he could not, should have accepted Rouen, and not San Piero ad Vincula. And whoever believes that among great personages new benefits will make old injuries be forgotten deceives himself. So the duke erred in this choice and it was the cause of his ultimate ruin.

乔治和阿斯卡尼奥等；另外还有一些人，如果当上了教皇，会对他生出畏惧之心。这些人当中不包括卢安及西班牙人，因为后者和他亲如一家，有义务保护他，而前者则与法兰西王国关系亲密，大权在握。因而，公爵最应该做的就是推举出一位西班牙人当教皇，假如力所不及，那就应该接受卢安而非圣·皮耶罗·阿德·温库拉。谁要是相信那些显赫的人物受了一些小恩小惠就会忘掉旧日的伤疤，那他就大错特错了。所以说，公爵在教皇的人选上走了一步错棋，这导致了他最后的灭亡。



Book 8 Of Those Who Have Attained a Principality through Crimes

But, because one becomes prince from private individual also by two modes which cannot be altogether attributed either to fortune or to virtue, I do not think they should be left out, although one of them can be reasoned about more amply where republics are treated. These are when one ascends to a principality by some criminal and nefarious path or when a private citizen becomes prince of his fatherland by the support of his fellow citizens. And, to speak of the first mode, it will be demonstrated with two examples, one ancient, the other modern, without entering otherwise into the merits of this issue, because I judge it sufficient, for whoever would find it necessary, to imitate them.

Agathocles the Sicilian became king of Syracuse not only from private fortune but from a mean and abject one. Born of a potter, he always kept to a life of crime at every rank of his career; nonetheless, his crimes were accompanied with such virtue of spirit and body that when he turned to the military, he rose through its ranks to become praetor of Syracuse. After he was established in that rank, he determined to become prince and to hold with violence and without obligation to anyone else that which had been conceded to him by agreement, having given intelligence of his design to Hamilcar the Carthaginian, who was with his armies fighting in Sicily, one morning he assembled the people and Senate of Syracuse as if he had to decide things pertinent to the republic. At a signal he had ordered, he had all the senators and the richest of the people killed by his soldiers. Once they were dead, he seized and held the principate of that city without any civil controversy. And although he was defeated twice by the Carthaginians and in the end besieged, not only was he able to defend his city but also, leaving part of his men for defense against the siege, he attacked Africa with the others. In a short time he freed Syracuse from the siege and brought the Carthaginians to dire necessity; they were compelled of necessity to come to an agreement with him, to be content with the possession of Africa, and to leave Sicily to Agathocles. Thus, whoever might consider the actions and virtue of this man will see nothing or little than can be attributed to fortune. For as was said above, not through anyone's support but through the ranks

第八章 不惜犯罪掌握王权者

从平民百姓摇身成为一国之君，还有两种途径，这两种途径不能说纯粹靠的是运气或实力，我认为此处不应该避而不谈。只不过，这其中的一种途径我们可以在谈到共和国的章节时详加议论。有的人不惜用罪恶的勾当通过非法的途径登上王位，有的草莽之民却是在本国国民的拥戴下当上了君主。为了阐明第一种途径，我们将引用两个例子，一个是古代的，另一个是现代的。对于这一问题的功与过我们不做探讨，因为我认为对任何有必要走这一步的人而言，看看这两个例子就足够他们效仿了。

西西里人阿加托克雷不仅出身草莽，更是从一个低微卑贱的位置当上了锡拉库萨的国王的。他出身于陶工之家，一直过着一种罪恶的生活，人生道路上的每一步都与罪恶有关，但他精力充沛、体魄强健，当兵入伍之后步步高升，最终当上了锡拉库萨的地方长官。在坐稳了这个位置之后，他决心要当上一国之君，而且要以暴力捍卫王位，根本不考虑要对那些姑息纵容、妥协让步的人承担义务。他把这一计划透露给了正率军在西西里征战的伽太基人阿米尔卡。一天早晨，他把锡拉库萨的人民及元老院的人召集在了一起，仿佛要决定一些关乎共和国命运的事务似的。结果，他一声令下，他的士兵们举起屠刀杀害了所有的元老以及国内最富的人。那些人一死，民间便没有了反对的声音，于是他顺顺当当掌握了这个城邦国家的王权。他虽然两次败在了伽太基人的手中，最后遭到了围困，可他不仅能够分出兵力防守危城，而且还出奇兵进攻非洲。没过多久，他就解了锡拉库萨之围，使伽太基陷入了困境之中，对方只好跟他握手言和，并仅仅满足于对非洲的占领，而将西西里拱手让给了阿加托克雷。无论谁对这个人的所作所为和功过做一些思考，都会看到运气在他的生活中没有发挥作用或者只起到了一点儿作用。如上所言，他登上王位并非靠的是别人的支持，而是经历了千辛万苦，克服了种种危险，通过在军队里步步



of the military, which he had gained for himself with a thousand hardships and dangers, he came to the principate and afterwards he maintained it with many spirited and dangerous politics. Yet one cannot call it virtue to kill one's citizens, betray one's friends, to be without faith, without mercy, without religion; these modes can enable one to acquire empire, but not glory. For, if one considers the virtue of Agathocles in entering into and escaping from dangers, and the greatness of his spirit in enduring and overcoming adversities, one does not see why he has to be judged inferior to any most excellent captain. Nonetheless, his savage cruelty and inhumanity, together with his infinite crimes, do not allow him to be celebrated among the most excellent men. Thus, one cannot attribute to fortune or to virtue what he achieved without either.

In our times, during the reign of Alexander VI, Oliverotto da Fermo, having been left a fatherless child some years before, was brought up by a maternal uncle of his named Giovanni Fogliani, and in the first years of his youth he was sent out to soldier under Paolo Vitelli so that when he was versed in that discipline, he would attain an excellent rank in the military. Then when Paolo died, he fought under Vitellozzo, his brother, and in a very short time, since he was ingenious and dashing in person and spirit, he became the first man in his military. But as it appeared to him servile to be at the level of others, he thought that with the aid of certain citizens of Fermo to whom servitude was dearer than the liberty of their fatherland, and with support from the Vitelli, he would seize Fermo. And he wrote to Giovanni Fogliani that since he had been away from home a few years, he wanted to come to see him and his city, and in some part to acknowledge his patrimony; and because he had not troubled himself for anything but to acquire honor, he wanted to come in honorable fashion accompanied by a hundred horsemen of his friends and servants, so that his citizens might see that he had not spent the time in vain. He begged Giovanni to please order that he be received honorably by the inhabitants of Fermo, which would direct honor not only to him but to Giovanni himself, since Liverotto was his ward. Thereupon Giovanni did not fail in any proper duty to his nephew; and when Oliverotto had been honorably received by the inhabitants of Fermo, he was lodged in Giovanni's house. There, after a few days had passed, and after he had waited to order secretly what was necessary for his future crime, he held a most solemn banquet to which he invited Giovanni Fogliani and all the first men of Fermo. And when the food and all other entertainments customary at such banquets had been enjoyed, Oliverotto, with cunning, opened certain serious discussions, speaking of the greatness of Pope Alexander and of Cesare Borgia, his son, and of their undertakings. While Gio-

高升，最后如愿以偿。他在捍卫王权时，推行了许多大胆和冒险的政策。然而，对于杀害自己的同胞、出卖朋友、不讲诚信以及缺乏怜悯之心的行为，我们不能称之为道德之举；这种行为方式可以为一个人赢得王权，但是却不能使他获得荣誉。如果我们考虑一下阿加托克雷出生入死的勇气以及他在逆境中表现出的坚忍不拔的精神，我们可以看到他与那些出类拔萃的将领相比较毫不逊色。但是，他野蛮残暴、惨无人性，犯下了累累罪行，这些都不允许他跻身于那些超凡入圣的伟人中。总之，他并没有依靠运气和才德成就事业，所以我们不能把这两点归作他成功的原因。

在我们这个时代，亚历山大六世统治期间，有个叫奥利韦罗托·达·费尔莫的人，几岁时就死了父亲，是由名叫乔万尼·福利尼亚的舅舅抚养大的，在步入青年时代的头几年就被送去当兵，在保罗·维泰利手下服役。这样，在经过了良好的军事训练之后，他就可以在军界爬到显赫的位置了。保罗死后，他在保罗的弟弟维泰洛佐麾下作战。由于他机智勇敢，富于谋略，没过多久便成了军界的头号人物。然而他认为跟芸芸众生混迹于一处无异于奴隶，于是便萌发一念，想获取费尔莫某些市民的帮助（这些人认为做亡国奴比祖国的自由更珍贵），并且在维泰洛佐的支持下，一举占领费尔莫。他给乔万尼·福利尼亚写了信，说他离开家乡数年，很想回去看望他，并且看看故乡，部分原因也是为了认认自己的家产。他在信中还说他对他什么都不关心，关心的只是荣誉，所以他想衣锦还乡，由他的一百名朋友及仆人组成一支马队风风光光地拥送他还乡，让市民看看他这些年并未虚度光阴。他恳求乔万尼发布命令，让费尔莫的居民们体面地欢迎他的到来，这不仅是他的荣耀，也是乔万尼本人的荣耀，因为乔万尼是他的监护人。结果，乔万尼一丝不苟地对外甥履行了义务；奥利韦罗托受到了费尔莫的居民们体面的欢迎，而后住进了乔万尼的府邸。他一方面等待时机，一方面做出安排，为未来的犯罪做准备。几天之后，他举办了一个极为隆重的宴会，邀请了乔万尼·福利尼亚以及费尔莫所有的头面人物。客人们酒足饭饱，像在寻常的宴会上那般寻欢作乐之后，奥利韦罗托狡猾地推出一些严肃的话题，提到了教皇亚历山大和他的儿子切萨雷·博尔贾的伟大之处以及他们的事迹。乔万尼和其他的客人们也加入了讨论之中，这时却见奥利韦罗托突然站



vanni and the others were responding to these discussions, Oliverotto suddenly stood up, saying that these were things that should be spoken of in a more secret place; and he withdrew to a room into which Giovanni and all the other citizens came behind him. No sooner were they seated than soldiers came out of secret places and killed Giovanni and all the others. After this homicide, Oliverotto mounted on horse, rode through the city, and besieged the highest magistracy in the palace so that through fear they were compelled to obey him and to establish a government of which he was made prince. And since all those who could have harmed him because they were malcontent were dead, he strengthened himself with new civil and military orders, so that in the period of one year that he held the principality, he was not only secure in the city of Fermo but had become fearsome to all his neighbors. And to overthrow him would have been as difficult as to overthrow Agathocles if he had not permitted himself to be deceived by Cesare Borgia when at Sinigaglia, as was said above, he took the Orsini and the Vitelli. There Oliverotto too was taken, one year after the parricide he committed, and together with Vitellozzo, who had been his master in his virtues and crimes, he was strangled.

Someone could question how it happened that Agathocles and anyone like him, after infinite betrayals and cruelties, could live for a long time secure in his fatherland, defend himself against external enemies, and never be conspired against by his citizens, inasmuch as many others have not been able to maintain their states through cruelty even in peaceful times, not to mention uncertain times of war. I believe that this comes from cruelties badly used or well used. Those can be called well used (if it is permissible to speak well of evil) that are done at a stroke, out of the necessity to secure oneself, and then are not persisted in but are turned to as much utility for the subjects as one can. Those cruelties are badly used which, though few in the beginning, rather grow with time than are eliminated. Those who observe the first mode can have some remedy for their state with God and with men, as had Agathocles; as for the others it is impossible for them to maintain themselves.

Hence it should be noted that in taking hold of a state, he who seizes it should examine all the offenses necessary for him to commit, and do them all at a stroke, so as not to have to renew them every day and, by not renewing them, to secure men and gain them to himself with benefits. Whoever does otherwise, either through timidity or through bad counsel, is always under necessity to hold a knife in his hand; nor can one ever found himself on his subjects if, because of fresh and continued injuries, they cannot be secure against him. For injuries must be done all together, so that, being tasted less, they offend less; and benefits

起身，说大家应该到一个比较隐秘的处所谈这种事情。他钻进了一间密室里，乔万尼及其他人也尾随而去。大家刚一落座，就见士兵们从暗处蜂拥而上，将乔万尼等人全部杀死。大屠杀之后，奥利韦罗托骑上马穿街走巷，包围了宫廷里的最高行政官员，吓得那些人屁滚尿流，只好听命于他，建立了一个由他作君主的政府。由于那些对他心存不满、可能会危及到他的人都被处死了，所以他高枕无忧，实行了一套新的民法和军事管制，在他当君主的一年期间，他不仅在费尔莫城邦稳坐江山，还令邻国望而生畏。假如切萨雷·博尔贾在西尼加利亚进攻奥尔西尼和维泰利时（我们在上文已提到），奥利韦罗托没有被博尔贾所欺骗，那么推翻他就跟推翻阿加托克雷一样困难了。然而，就在他犯下了弑亲之罪一年后，他被抓了起来，与他那位道德沦丧和犯罪方面的导师维泰洛佐一道上了绞刑架。

有人可能会问，阿加托克雷之类的暴徒为何在实施了无数次诈术，犯下了罄竹难书的罪恶之后仍能够在自己的国家坐那么长时间的江山呢？一方面是因为他率众抵御外来之敌，另一方面则是国内风平浪静，无人起来造反。而另外还有许多人也采用同样残暴的手段，却无法保住王权，甚至在和平时期都保不住，更别提风雨飘摇的战争岁月了。我认为这之间的区别就在于残暴的手段是否运用得当。残暴的手段所谓运用得当（如果允许我们为罪恶说点儿好话），那就是出于巩固自身地位的需要一蹴而就，不再连续使用，而是尽其所能转而为臣民躬身效力。残暴手段使用不得当，就是在开始的时候零星使用，随着时间的推移不是终止，而是扩大使用的规模。采用第一种方式的人，像阿加托克雷那样，可以缓和他们与上帝及人民的关系，采用后一种方式的人可就泥菩萨过河自身难保了。

因而，应该指出的是：在占领了一个国家时，掌权的君主应审时度势，看必须采取哪些严酷的措施，毕其功于一役，这样就不必天天干得罪人的事。只要不得罪人，再施些小恩小惠，就可以把人民争取到自己的一侧。谁要是反其道而行之，或者是出于怯懦，要不就是听了谗言，那时刻都得手握刀剑保持警惕；他持续不断地给人民造成新的伤害，使人民朝不保夕，那他永远都无法依赖自己的臣民。缺德的事要干就一下子干完，让人民尝到的苦头少一些，他们的怨恨也就小一些，而恩惠



should be done little by little so that they may be tasted better. And above all, a prince should live with his subjects so that no single unforeseen event whether bad or good has to make him change; for when necessities come in adverse times you will not be in time for evil, and the good that you do does not help you, because it is judged to be forced on you, and cannot bring you any gratitude.

却应点点滴滴地赐给人民，让他们细品慢嚼。最为重要的是：君主应当和自己的臣民水乳交融，这样无论发生任何不可预测的事件，不管是凶事还是吉事，他都会处事不惊；否则，厄运来临时，需要他采取行动时，他会来不及应付变故；他就是做积德的事也救不了他，因为别人会以为他是被迫的，没有人会对他心存感激。



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Book 9 Of the Civil Principality

But, coming to the other policy, when a private citizen becomes prince of his fatherland, not through crime or other intolerable violence but with the support of his fellow citizens (which one could call a civil principality; neither all virtue nor all fortune is necessary to attain it, but rather a fortunate astuteness) – I say that one ascends to this principality either with the support of the people or with the support of the great. For in every city these two diverse humors are found, which arises from this: that the people desire neither to be commanded nor oppressed by the great, and the great desire to command and oppress the people. From these two diverse appetites one of three effects occurs in cities: principality or liberty or license.

Principality is caused either by the people or by the great, according to which of these sides has the opportunity for it. For when the great see they cannot resist the people, they begin to give reputation to one of themselves, and they make him prince so that they can satisfy their appetite under his shadow. So too, the people, when they see they cannot resist the great, give reputation to one, and make him prince so as to be defended with his authority. *He who comes to the principality with the aid of the great maintains himself with more difficulty than one who becomes prince with the aid of the people, because the former finds himself prince with many around him who appear to be his equals, and because of this he can neither command them nor manage them to suit himself. But he who arrives in the principality with popular support finds himself alone there, and around him has either no one or very few who are not ready to obey. Besides this, one cannot satisfy the great with decency and without injury to others, but one can satisfy the people; for the end of the people is more decent than that of the great, since the great want to oppress and the people want not to be oppressed. Furthermore, a prince can never secure himself against a hostile people, as they are too many; against the great, he can secure himself, as they are few. The worst that a prince can expect from a hostile people is to be abandoned by it; but from the great, when they are hostile, he must fear not only being abandoned but also that they may come against*

第九章 民众的君主国

现在谈一谈另外一种政体。有的人从一介草民当上了一国之君，采用的不是罪恶的手段或其他令人发指的罪行，而依凭的是同胞国人的拥戴（我们把这样的君主国称为民众的君主国，无需借助实力或运气，而仅靠审时度势的精明眼光就可大功告成）。依我看，登上王位的人不是靠人民鼎力相助，就是靠大人物的扶持。在每个城市里都有两种迥然不同的情绪，究其根源无怪乎：人民不愿意听大人物发号施令，遭受他们的压迫；大人物却渴望统治和压迫人民。由于这两种不同的愿望，在城市里便出现了以下三种结果当中的一种：君主权、自由权或者无政府状态。

君主权的建立是出自于人民的意愿，或由大人物决定，这要看哪一方把握时机了。大人物看到无法与人民抗衡时，便着手抬高他们当中某个人的威望，让他当上君主，这样便可以在这位君主的庇护下满足他们自己的欲望。人民一方也是如此：一旦看到自己无法与大人物抗衡，就树立他们当中一个人的威信，让他登上王位，借他的权势保护自己的利益。在大人物的扶持下获得王权的人，比靠人民的拥戴当上君主的人难以巩固自己的地位。前者登上王位后，身边有许多人似乎都可以和他平起平坐，于是他既不能统治他们也不能管理他们，更不能让他们服从于他。但是，在民众的拥戴下登上王位的人却惟我独尊，身边没有不愿意服从他的人，或者说这样的人寥寥无几。除此之外，君主无法不失偏颇地满足大人物的愿望，而这势必会伤及其他的人，然而一位国君是可以满足民众的愿望的。因为人民的愿望比大人物的愿望更具正义性——他们的愿望是不受压迫，而大人物的愿望则是压迫别人。再说，君主是无法防范充满敌意的民众的，因为他们多如牛毛，而对于大人物则可以加以防范，因为那毕竟是一小撮人。面对充满敌意的民众，君主最坏的结局也仅仅是众叛亲离，而大人物要是跟他势不两立，他要担心的就不单纯是遭人背弃了，而



him, for since there is more foresight and more astuteness in the great, they always move in time to save themselves, and they seek rank from those they hope will win. Also, the prince always lives of necessity with the same people, but he can well do without the same great persons, since he can make and unmake them every day, and take away and give them reputation at his convenience.

And to better clarify this issue, I say that the great must be considered in two modes chiefly. Either they conduct themselves so that in their proceedings they are obligated in everything to your fortune, or not. Those who are obligated, and are not rapacious, must be honored and loved; those who are not obligated have to be examined in two modes. Either they do this out of pusillanimity and a natural defect of spirit; then you must make use especially of those who are of good counsel, because in prosperity they bring you honor and in adversity you do not have to fear them; but, when by art and for an ambitious cause, they are not obligated, it is a sign that they are thinking more for themselves than for you; and the prince must be on guard against them, and fear them as if they were open enemies, because in adversity they will always help ruin him.

Therefore, one who becomes prince through the support of the people should keep them friendly to him, which should be easy for him because they ask of him only that they not be oppressed. But one who becomes prince against the will of the people with the support of the great must before everything else seek to gain the people to himself, which should be easy for him when he takes up its protection. And since men who receive good from someone from whom they believed they would receive evil are more obligated to their benefactor, the people immediately wish him well more than if he had been brought to the principality with their support. The prince can gain the people to himself in many modes, to which one can not give certain rules because the modes vary according to circumstances, and so they will be left out. I will conclude only that for a prince it is necessary to have the people friendly; otherwise he has no remedy in adversity.

Nabis, prince of the Spartans, withstood a siege by all Greece and by one of Rome's most victorious armies, and defended his fatherland and his state against them; and when danger supervened it was enough for him to secure himself against a few, which would not have been enough if he had had a hostile people. And let no one resist my opinion on this with that trite proverb, that whoever founds on the people founds on mud. For that is true when a private citizen lays his foundation on them, and allows himself to think that the people will liberate him if he is oppressed by enemies or by the magistrates (in this case one

且还会被人群起而攻之，因为大人物比较有眼光，比较精明，他们随时都会采取行动以自救，与他们希望能赢的人结盟。而且，君主有必要时时与民众生活在一国之中，没有大人物在跟前，他照样能生活得很好；每一天，他都可以策封及废黜达官贵人，随心所欲地贬低他们以及树立他们的威信。

为了更清楚地阐述这个问题，我认为大体而言必须从两个方面看待大人物。有些大人物循规蹈矩，常怀感恩之心，做的每件事都符合君主的利益，而有些则不然。那些感恩戴德，也不贪得无厌的人，必须得到荣誉，受到君主的宠爱。对于那些不怀感恩之心的人，则需要从两个方面加以分析。有的人生性优柔寡断，天生就缺乏热情。君主尤其要启用那些能忠言直谏的人，因为他们会在繁荣期给君主带来荣誉，而君主在逆境中时也不必担心他们拆台。但如果大人物工于机巧、野心勃勃，而没有感恩之心，那就是一种征兆，证明他们更多的是考虑自身的利益，而很少为君主着想。对这样的人必须像对待公开的敌人一样提高警惕，因为他们在君主遭殃时往往会落井下石。

一个人在民众的拥戴下当上了一国之君，就应该善待民众——这是轻而易举之事，因为民众对他的要求只是不受压迫而已。至于那些违背民意、被达官贵人扶上台的君主，最最应该做的事情就是赢得民心；君主把人民置于自己的保护之下时，要把民众争取到自己的身边也并不困难。人们原以为会受到虐待，谁料却得了恩惠，定会对施恩者感激涕零。民众立刻会对这样的君主充满良好的祝愿，即便他们亲手扶君主登上王位也没有如此强烈的热心肠。君主争取民心可以采用多种办法，我们不能列出具体的规则，因为根据情况的不同，所采取的办法会千变万化。故尔，我们对此不加议论。我要总结的只有一点：君主必须善待民众；否则，在身处逆境的时候，就没有补救的办法了。

斯巴达的君主纳比斯在大军压境的情况下抵住了整个希腊国以及罗马的一支所向披靡的军队的围攻，捍卫了自己的祖国以及他的王权。灾难降临时，他能够稳如磐石，抵御外敌，但如果面对的是充满敌意的民众，他就力不能支了。有人说：“民众犹如一盘散沙，不可以依赖。”千万不要用这样的陈词滥调和我的观点唱对台戏。一个平民百姓如果寄希望于民众，以为在受到敌人或官吏的欺压时，民众会解救他，在这种情况下，以上的论调倒讲的是实情。此时，人们往往会生出错觉，就像罗马的格拉古和佛罗伦萨的梅塞尔·乔治·斯卡利一样。然而，如果依赖民众的是一位



can often be deceived, like the Gracchi in Rome and Messer Giorgio Scali in Florence). But when a prince who founds on the people knows how to command and is a man full of heart, does not get frightened in adversity, does not fail to make other preparations, and with his spirit and his orders keeps the generality of people inspired, he will never find himself deceived by them and he will see he has laid his foundations well.

These principalities customarily run into peril when they are about to ascend from a civil order to an absolute one. For these princes either command by themselves or by means of magistrates. In the latter case their position is weaker and more dangerous because they remain altogether at the will of those citizens who have been put in the magistracies, who, especially in adverse times, can take away his state with great ease either by turning against him or by not obeying him. And the prince does not have time in the midst of danger to seize absolute authority because the citizens and subjects, who are accustomed to receive commands from the magistrates, are not ready, in these emergencies, to obey his; he will always have, in uncertain times, a shortage of those one can trust. For such a prince cannot found himself on what he sees in quiet times, when citizens have need of the state, because then everyone runs, everyone promises, and each wants to die for him when death is at a distance; but in adverse times, when the state has need of citizens, then few of them are to be found. And this test is all the more dangerous since one cannot make it but once. And so a wise prince must think of a way by which his citizens, always and in every quality of time, have need of the state and of himself; and then they will always be faithful to him.

君主，一位懂得如何驾驭人民、富于感情的君主，那么他在逆境中就不必胆战心惊了；他一定会做好一切准备，靠自己的勇气和指挥才能使全体人民保持斗志；他永远也不会被民众所欺骗，他会看到依赖民众是正确的。

这样的君主国在从民权政府向专制政府过渡时，通常会遇到重重的危险。因为君主们不是自己发号施令，就是通过官吏管理国家。遇到后一种情况，他们的根基就会更为薄弱、状况更为危险，因为他们的命运要完全取决于某些市民的意志——这些市民坐上了官位，在大难临头时可能会起来反对君主或者不服从他们的命令，借此不费吹灰之力便可以剥夺他们的王权。在身处险境时，君主来不及把绝对的权力掌握在自己的手中；市民及臣子们已习惯听命于官吏，在紧急情况出现的时候不会对君主唯命是从的。在政局不稳定的时期，君主的身边总是缺乏可以信赖的人。这样的君主不能把和平时期看到的情况作为依据，因为市民们在和平期有求于国家，每个人都为国家奔忙，每个人都信誓旦旦愿为国家捐躯（此时死亡的危险尚在千里之遥）。但大难临头，国家需要市民时，就找不到他们的踪影了。这样的考验简直太危险了，只试上一次就足够了。所以，一位英主必须想出对策，让市民们无论何时何地都有求于国家，有求于他，一直对他忠心耿耿。



Book 10 In What Mode the Forces of All Principalities Should Be Measured

In examining the qualities of these principalities one must admit another consideration; that is, whether a prince has enough of a state that he can rule by himself when he needs to, or whether he is always under the necessity of being defended by others. And, to better clarify this issue, I say that I judge those capable of ruling by themselves who can, by abundance of either men or money, put together an adequate army and fight a battle against whoever comes to attack them; and I judge as well that those always have necessity of others who cannot appear in the field against an enemy, but are compelled of necessity to take refuge behind walls and to guard them. The first case has been discussed, and in what is to come we will say what is required for it. In the second case one can only exhort such princes to fortify and supply their own towns, and to take no account of the countryside. And whoever has fortified his town well, and has managed the other governing of his subjects as was said above and will be said below, will be attacked always with great hesitation; for men are always hostile to undertakings where difficulties may be seen, and one can see it is not easy to attack one who has a strong town and is not hated by the people.

The cities of Germany are very free, have little countryside, and obey the emperor when they want to; they do not fear either him or any other power around, because they are so well fortified that everyone thinks their capture would be toilsome and difficult. For all of them have suitable ditches and walls, and sufficient artillery; they always keep in their public stores enough to drink and to eat and to burn for a year. Besides this, so as to keep the plebs fed without loss to the public, they always keep in common supply enough to be able to give them work for a year in employments that are the nerve and the life of that city and of the industries from which the plebs are fed. They still hold military exercises in repute, and they have many institutions to maintain them.

Thus a prince who has a strong city and does not make himself hated cannot be attacked; and if indeed there is someone who would attack him, he would have to retreat in shame, for worldly things are so variable that it is next to impossible for one to stand with his

第十章 衡量君主国实力的办法

在研究君主国实质的时候，我们还必须考虑到一点：看君主在国内是否有足够的实力，必要时是否能实行独裁，还是总要依靠别人保护自己。为了更清楚地阐明该问题，依我的标准衡量，那些能够实行独裁统治的君主应该能聚集起大量的人力和钱财组织生力军，与任何前来进犯的敌人决战；我还可以断定，那些总是依赖他人的君主不可能到疆场上杀敌，而是被迫藏在城墙后边以求自保。前一种情况我们已做过探讨，下文如再出现，我们只交待必须说明的情况。对于第二种情况中涉及的君主，我们只奉劝他们加固城市的工事，准备充足的粮草，先不要考虑如何防守农村。只要把城防事务搞得固若金汤，同时分出精力管理好臣民（这一点前边已谈过，以后还要讨论），那么来犯之敌就一定会三思，因为人们对看起来困难重重的事情总是退避三舍。谁都看得清，要进犯一位把城防搞得很牢固，而且没有民愤的君主，绝不是等闲之事。

德国的城市都是非常自由的，在农村的领地微乎其微，对于皇帝愿服从才服从。他们对皇帝或周围的任何势力都无畏惧之心，因为他们的城市防务非常牢固，一切来犯之敌都会认为攻占他们的城市太费事、太困难。这些城市都有深深的壕沟、厚厚的城墙，交战时火力充足，而且公共库房里贮藏着大量的粮草，足够全城的人吃喝一年，当然，另外还有够一年用的燃料。为了解决老百姓的温饱问题，同时又无损于公众的利益，这些城市总是能够为他们提供长达一年的就业机会，让他们在关系到国计民生的行业工作，使他们从中获取衣食。而且，这些城市还以军事训练著称于世，制订了许多规章制度以持之以恒。

所以，对于把城防搞得固若金汤，而且没有结怨于民的君主，是不能够发起攻击的；如果真的有来犯之敌，最终也会灰溜溜地跑掉。世界上的事情变幻无常，来犯之敌几乎不可能率领大军把城市围困上一年，什么别的事情也不做。也许有人会



armies idle in a siege for a year. And someone might reply: if the people have their possessions outside, and see them burning, they will not have patience for this, and the long siege and their love for their own will make them forget the prince. I respond that a powerful and spirited prince will always overcome all these difficulties, now by giving hope to his subjects that the evil will not last long, now by giving them fear of the enemy's cruelty, now by securing himself skillfully against those who appear to him too bold. Besides this, the enemy reasonably would burn and ruin the countryside on his arrival, at a time when men's spirits are still hot and willing for defense; and thus the prince should hesitate so much the less, because after several days, when spirits have cooled, the damage has already been done, the evil has been received, and there is no more remedy for it. At that time they come to unite with their prince so much the more, since it appears he has an obligation toward them, their houses having been burned and their possessions ruined in his defence. And the nature of men is to be obligated as much by benefits they give as by benefits they receive. Hence, if one considers all this well, it should not be difficult for a prudent prince to keep the spirits of his citizens firm in the siege, at first and later, provided he does not lack the wherewithal for life and for defense.

说：如果市民在城外拥有家产，眼睁睁看着家产遭到焚毁，他们会失去耐心的，而且长期的围困以及对亲人的爱会使他们忘掉君主。我的回答是：强大勇敢的君主一定会排除千难万险，让他的臣民们看到希望，让他们知道灾难一定不会长久；他会让臣民们害怕敌人的残暴行为，还会巧妙地保护自己，提防那些在他看来过于鲁莽的人。另外，敌人一到来，势必会在乡村地区烧杀，此时，居民们士气旺盛，愿意保卫家乡。作为君主，不应该优柔寡断，因为几天过后，一旦人们的士气低落下来，战争的损失已经造成，灾难已成既定事实时，要补救就为时晚矣。在这种时候，人民和他们的君主就更加团结一心了；人民在为君主守城时，房舍遭到焚毁，财物化为灰烬，于是，君主似乎对人民欠下了人情。按人的天性，施恩和接受恩惠的人之间会涉及到人情债。对于一位深谋远虑的君主来说，只要把这一点好好做一思索，在遭到围困的时候，只要不缺乏生活及守城必须用品，就自始至终不难使人民保持坚定的意志。



Book 11 Of Ecclesiastical Principalities

It remains now only to reason about ecclesiastical principalities. All difficulties regarding them come before they are possessed, because they are acquired either by virtue or by fortune and are maintained without the one or the other, for they are sustained by orders that have grown old with religion, which have been so powerful and of such a kind that they keep their princes in the state however they proceed and live. These alone have states, and do not defend them; they have subjects, and do not govern them; and the states, though ungoverned, do not care, and they neither think of becoming estranged from such princes nor can they. Thus, only these principalities are secure and prosperous. But as they subsist by superior causes, to which the human mind does not reach, I will omit speaking of them; for since they are exalted and maintained by God, it would be the office of a presumptuous and foolhardy man to discourse on them. Nonetheless, if someone were to inquire of me how it came about that the Church has come to such greatness in temporal affairs despite the fact that, before Alexander, the Italian powers, and not only those that are called powers but every baron and lord, even the least, held her in low esteem in temporal affairs – and now a king of France trembles at her and she has been able to remove him from Italy and to ruin the Venetians – though this is known, it does not seem to me superfluous to recall a good part of it to memory.

Before Charles, king of France, came into Italy, this province was under the domination of the pope, the Venetians, the king of Naples, the duke of Milan, and the Florentines. These powers had to have two principal concerns: one, that a foreigner not enter into Italy with arms; the other, that none of them enlarge his state. Those who concerned them the most were the pope and the Venetians. And to hold back the Venetians the union of all the others was needed, as in the defense of Ferrara; to hold down the pope they made use of the barons in Rome. Since these were divided into two factions, Orsini and Colonna, there was always cause for quarrel between them; and standing with arms in hand under the eyes of the pontiff, they kept the pontificate weak and infirm. And although a spirited pope, like

第十一章 教会的君主国

现在只剩下教会的君主国要讨论了。至于这类君主国，君主所遇到的困难全都出现在拥有国家之前。夺取政权靠的是实力或运气，但维持政权却既不靠实力也不靠运气，靠的是与宗教一般古老的清规戒律。这种清规戒律有着强大的约束力，而且属于这么一种类型——不管君主怎么行事、怎么生活，都让他们稳坐王位。这些君主拥有自己的国家，却不问及防务，拥有臣民，却不加以管理。国家无人统治，却并不在乎，它们不想也不可能背弃自己的君主。所以，只有这样的君主国才秩序稳定，繁荣昌盛。鉴于这些国家的运转，靠的是人类心志所无法企及的超然的因素，此处我就略而不谈了。它们是靠上帝的力量建立和维护的，我们对之品头论足，就成了不知天高地厚的愚蠢行为。不过，也许会有人问我：教会怎么会在世俗事务中有如此大的势力？岂不知，在亚历山大教皇之前，意大利有权有势的人——不仅是那些能称为当权者的人，就连所有的爵士及领主们，甚至把最弱小的包括在内——在涉及到世俗事务时都是不尊重教会的。现在，法国国王却会在教会面前吓得发抖。教会可以把他驱逐出意大利，可以把威尼斯人打入十八层地狱，这已广为世人所知，但我认为再重温一下历史并不多余。

在法国国王查理进入意大利之前，意大利处于教皇、威尼斯人、那不勒斯国王、米兰公爵以及佛罗伦萨人的统治之下。这些势力所关心的事情主要有两方面：其一，不许外国人武装入侵意大利；其二，不许他们当中的任何人扩张领土。最关心这两点的莫过于教皇和威尼斯人了。为了阻止威尼斯人胡作非为，所有别的势力必须结成联盟，就像打费拉拉保卫战时那样；为了压制住教皇的崛起，他们利用了罗马的贵族。罗马的贵族分裂为两大派别——奥尔西尼派以及科隆纳派，他们之间总是争斗不休。这些人手握刀剑，站在教皇的眼皮底下，使教皇软弱不堪，前怕狼后怕虎。虽然也会出现像塞克斯都那样志向远大的教皇，但时运以及智慧都没有让他们



Sixtus, sometimes rose up, still fortune or wisdom could never release him from these inconveniences. And the brevity of their lives was the cause of it; for in the ten years on the average that a pope lived, he would have trouble putting down one of the factions. If, for instance, one pope had almost eliminated the Colonna, another one hostile to the Orsini rose up, which made the Colonna rise again, and there would not be time to eliminate the Orsini.

This caused the temporal forces of the pope to be held in low esteem in Italy. Then Alexander VI arose; of all the pontiffs there have ever been he showed how far a pope could prevail with money and forces. With Duke Valentino as his instrument and with the invasion of the French as the opportunity, he did all the things I discussed above in the actions of the duke. And though his intent might not have been to make the Church great, but rather the duke, nonetheless what he did redounded to the greatness of the Church. After his death, the duke being eliminated, the Church fell heir to his labors. Then came Pope Julius, and he found the Church great, since she had all Romagna, had eliminated the barons in Rome, and had annihilated those factions through the blows struck by Alexander; Julius found the path still open to a mode of accumulating money, never used before Alexander. These things Julius not only continued but increased; and he thought about how to gain Bologna for himself, eliminate the Venetians, and expel the French from Italy. All these enterprises succeeded for him, and with all the more praise, inasmuch as he did everything for the increase of the Church and not of some private individual. He also kept the Orsini and Colonna parties within the same limits in which he found them; and although there might be some chief among them ready to make a change, still two things restrained them: one, the greatness of the Church, which frightened them; the other, not having cardinals of their own, for they are the origin of the tumults among them. Nor will these parties ever be quiet as long as they have cardinals; for cardinals nourish parties, within Rome and without, and the barons are forced to defend them. Thus, from the ambition of prelates arise disorders and tumults among the barons. His Holiness Pope Leo, then, has found this pontificate most powerful; one may hope that if the others made it great with arms, he, with his goodness and infinite other virtues, can make it very great and venerable.

从泥潭中挣脱出来。再者，教皇的短寿也是其中的一个原因。教皇在位的平均时间为十年，在这期间他费尽千辛万苦才能把其中的一个宗派压制下去。譬如，如果一位教皇几乎消灭了科隆纳的势力，而另一位敌视奥尔西尼的教皇上了台，这就让科隆纳东山再起，结果也会失去消灭奥尔西尼的良机。

这种情况使得教皇的世俗权力在意大利受到鄙视。后来，亚历山大六世执掌了教皇的权柄。在历代的教皇中，唯有他向世人展示了教皇是可以利用金钱和武力创造伟大业绩的。由瓦伦蒂诺公爵充当他的左膀右臂，他利用法国入侵意大利的时机大作文章（至于他的功过，我在上文讨论瓦伦蒂诺公爵的事迹时已做过交待）。也许他的初衷并非为教会创造辉煌，而是扶持瓦伦蒂诺公爵，然而他的所作所为却为教会势力的壮大起了推动作用。他死后，瓦伦蒂诺公爵也一命呜呼，教会继承了他的成果。教皇朱利奥登位时，教会已今非昔比——教会的势力控制了整个罗马格纳，消灭了罗马的贵族党羽，那些宗派势力在亚历山大的铁拳打击下已被连根拔掉。朱利奥还发现了在亚历山大之前从未有人使用过的敛财聚富的途径。朱利奥不仅继续了前人的事业，还将其进一步发扬光大。他绞尽脑汁，考虑着怎样把波洛格纳划入教会的势力范围，怎样压住威尼斯人的气焰，以及怎样将法国人赶出意大利。所有的这一切都获得了成功，为他赢得了一片赞扬之声，因为他做的每一件事情都是为了壮大教会的力量，不含一点个人目的。他还把奥尔西尼以及科隆纳两派的力量限定在一定的范围之内，不准他们越过雷池。在这两派势力中，也许有人蠢蠢欲动，想改变局势，但是有两种原因令他们望而却步：其一，教会过于强大，这叫他们害怕；其二，他们当中无人担任红衣主教的位置，因为这种职位是在他们中间制造混乱的根源。这些宗派中只要某一派有人担任了红衣主教，这一派就不会安分守己了。红衣主教在罗马城的里里外外都会广植党羽，这就迫使贵族们奋起自卫。所以，贵族间明争暗斗、同室操戈，都是由于主教的野心造成的。利奥教皇陛下执政时，教皇的权力已非常强大。如果说别的教皇是靠武力为教会创造了辉煌，那我们希望利奥教皇会以他的仁慈以及广阔无边的美德让教会变得非常伟大、备受世人尊敬。



Book 12 How Many Kinds of Military There Are and Concerning Mercenary Soldiers

Having discoursed in particular on all the qualities of those principalities which at the beginning I proposed to reason about, having considered in some part the causes of their well-being and ill-being, and having shown the modes in which many have sought to acquire and hold them, it remains for me now to discourse generally on the offense and defense befitting each of those named. We have said above that it is necessary for a prince to have good foundations for himself; otherwise he must of necessity be ruined. The principal foundations that all states have, new ones, as well as old or mixed, are good laws and good arms. And because there cannot be good laws where there are not good arms, and where there are good arms there must be good laws, I shall leave out the reasoning on laws and shall speak of arms.

I say, therefore, that the arms with which a prince defends his state are either his own or mercenary or auxiliary or mixed. Mercenary and auxiliary arms are useless, and dangerous; and if one keeps his state founded on mercenary arms, one will never be firm or secure; for they are disunited, ambitious, without discipline, unfaithful; bold among friends, among enemies cowardly; no fear of God, no faith with men; ruin is postponed only as long as attack is postponed; and in peace you are despoiled by them, in war by the enemy, The cause of this is that they have no love nor cause to keep them in the field other than a small stipend which is not sufficient to make them want to die for you. They do indeed want to be your soldiers while you are not making war, but when war comes, they either flee or leave. It should be little trouble for me to persuade anyone of this point, because the present ruin of Italy is caused by nothing other than its having relied for a period of many years on mercenary arms. These arms once made some headway for some, and may have appeared bold among themselves; but when the foreigner came, they showed what they were. Hence Charles, king of France, was allowed to seize Italy with chalk. ① And he who said that our sins were

① 法军在进攻途中未遇到抵抗，一路上用粉笔标出接纳士兵住宿的房屋。

第十二章 军队的类型及雇佣兵

在该书开端处我提出要对君主国的性质做一论述，现在业已以详尽的笔触阐述完了，而且还从某些方面讲到了导致了君主国兴衰的原因，并展示了许多君主夺取王权和巩固江山所采取的手段，现在剩下来该做的就是概括地论述以上提及的君主国攻伐和防御的事务了。上文提到过，说君主必须为自己奠定牢固的基础，否则，就一定会遭到灭亡。在所有的国家里，不管是新国还是旧国，或者是混合型的国家，最重要的基础就是明智的法律和强大的军队。由于没有强大的军队就不会有明智的法律，所以此处我将抛开法律不谈，只议论议论军队。

依我看，君主用来保卫国家的军队可以是他自己的军队，也可以是雇佣军、援军或者混合军。雇佣军和援军都是些饭桶、危险人物；如果让一个国家依赖雇佣军，就永远也不会得到稳定和安宁；雇佣兵们是一盘散沙，一个个野心勃勃、纪律涣散、不讲信义，在朋友面前夸夸其谈，一旦大敌当前就成了懦夫；他们无法无天，没有忠义之心；国家之所以还未遇灭顶之灾，只是因为敌人还未发动进攻。在和平时期，你会遭到他们的劫掠，战争中敌人则成了掠夺者。原因就在于他们除了一点可怜的军饷之外，没有爱或者别的什么理由能让他们上疆场拼杀，而那点军饷不足以让他们为你卖命。要是不打仗，他们倒是实心实意想当你的士兵，但战争的烽烟一起，他们不是当逃兵就是告假离队。我要让诸位相信这个道理，是没有什么困难的，因为当今意大利走向灭亡的原因不是别的，正是它多年依赖雇佣军的结果。这些军队曾经一度赢得过一些人的信任，未临敌时倒显得很骁勇，可一旦进犯之敌出现，他们就原形毕露了。法国国王查理当年手拿粉笔，长驱直入地占领了意大利。有人说



the cause of it spoke the truth. But the sins were surely not those he believed, but the ones I have told of and because these were the sins of princes, they too have suffered the punishment for them.

I want to demonstrate better the failure of these arms. Mercenary captains are either excellent men of arms or not; if they are, you cannot trust them because they always aspire to their own greatness, either by oppressing you, who are their patron, or by oppressing others contrary to your intention; but if the captain is not virtuous, he ruins you in the ordinary way. And if one responds that whoever has arms in hand will do this, mercenary or not, I would reply that arms have to be employed either by a prince or by a republic. The prince should go in person, and perform the office of captain. The republic has to send its citizens, and when it sends one who does not turn out to be a worthy man, it must change him; and if he is, it must check him with laws so that he does not step out of bounds. And by experience one sees that only princes and armed republics make very great progress; nothing but harm ever comes from mercenary arms. And a republic armed with its own arms is brought to obey one of its citizens with more difficulty than is a republic armed with foreign arms.

Rome and Sparta stood for many centuries armed and free. The Swiss are very well armed and very free. The Carthaginians are an example of ancient mercenary arms; they were nearly oppressed by their own mercenary soldiers at the end of the first war with the Romans, even though the Carthaginians had their own citizens as heads. After the death of Epaminondas, Philip of Macedon was made captain of their troops by the Thebans; and after his victory he took their liberty from them. The Milanese, after Duke Filippo died, hired Francesco Sforza against the Venetians; when he had overcome the enemy at Caravaggio, he joined with them to oppress the Milanese, his patrons. Sforza's father, in the hire of Queen Giovanna of Naples, left her of a sudden disarmed; then, in order not to lose the kingdom, she was forced to throw herself in the lap of the king of Aragon. And, if the Venetians and the Florentines have in the past increased their empire with these arms, and their captains did not thereupon make themselves princes but defended them, I respond that the Florentines were favored by chance in this case, because, of the virtuous captains whom they could have feared, some did not win, some had opposition, others turned their ambition elsewhere. The one who did not win was Giovanni Acuto. Since he did not win, one could not discover his faith, but everyone will confess that if he had won, the Florentines would have been at his discretion. Sforza always had the Bracceschi against him, so that each watched the other; Francesco turned his ambition to Lombardy, Braccio against the Church and the

导致意大利沦陷的原因是意大利犯下的罪恶，这倒是实情。不过，这种罪恶当然不是他想象中的那种，而是我已经提到过的那种，是君主造下的孽，而且君主已为此遭到了惩罚。

我想再进一步阐述这些军队一败涂地的原因。有些雇佣军的将领是杰出的人物，而有的则是庸才。如果他们是出类拔萃的，你可不能信任他们，因为他们总是处心积虑地扩大自己的势力，不是采取压制雇主的方式，就是违背雇主的意愿去压制别人；然而，如果遇到的是一位无能的将领，他会以平平常常的方式把你逼上绝路。假如有人说，不管是不是雇佣军，谁手中有了武器都会这么做的，我的回答是：武器必须操纵在君主的手中，或者供共和国使用。君主应御驾亲征，亲自挂帅率军。共和国则应当派市民挂帅，如果所委派的人经证明不称职，就必须撤换；倘若他是称职的，就必须用法律加以约束，防止他干出越轨的事。经验告诉我们，惟有君主和武装起来的共和国才能干出非常伟大的事业来，而雇佣军只会祸国殃民。要让一个拥有自己军队的共和国听命于一位市民，做起来要比由外国军队协助的共和国难一点。

在许多世纪以来，罗马和斯巴达都是尚武和提倡自由的国家。瑞士人武装到了牙齿，而且非常自由。伽太基人在古时使用的雇佣军，成为这方面的一个例证。他们虽然派了自己的市民充当雇佣军的首领，但在与罗马人所进行的第一次战争接近尾声时，差不多就已经被雇佣军的士兵们压迫得透不过气来了。埃帕米农达死后，底比斯人请马其顿的菲利普统领他们的军队，可是菲利普取得了胜利之后却剥夺了底比斯人的自由。菲利普公爵辞世后，米兰人花钱请来弗朗切斯科·斯福尔扎与佛罗伦萨人抗衡。斯福尔扎在卡拉瓦乔将敌人击败，继而与敌人狼狈为奸算计起他的雇主米兰人来。斯福尔扎的父亲曾受雇于那不勒斯的女王乔万娜，此时却突然一走了之，使女王没有了武装护卫。女王为了不失掉她的王国，迫不得已只好投入了阿拉贡国王的怀抱。如果说威尼斯人和佛罗伦萨人在过去利用这样的军队增强了帝国的势力，而且那些雇佣军的将领没有自立为王，却保卫了那些君主，那我的回答则是：佛罗伦萨人只是碰上了好运气罢了，因为在那些令人担忧的精明强干的将领中，有些没有把仗打赢，有些遇到了阻力，另外还有一些是把野心施展在了别的方面。没有打胜仗的首领名叫乔万尼·阿库托。由于他并非胜利者，我们也就无从得知他是否有一副忠肝义胆了，但谁都得承认，假如他打了胜仗，佛罗伦萨人可就要听由他去摆布了。斯福尔扎一直都跟布拉齐吉家族势不而立，双方都在虎视眈眈地注视着自己的敌人；弗朗切斯科把他的野心转向了伦巴第；布拉齐奥却和教会及那不勒



kingdom of Naples.

But let us come to what happened a little while ago. The Florentines took as their captain Paolo Vitelli, a most prudent man who from private fortune had secured very great reputation. If he had captured Pisa, no one would deny that the Florentines would have had to stay with him, because if he had gone over in hire to their enemies, they would have had no remedy; and if they had kept him, they would have had to obey him. If one considers the progress of the Venetians, one will see that they acted securely and gloriously while they themselves made war (which was before they turned to enterprises on land). With their own gentry and armed plebs, they performed most virtuously, but when they began to fight on land, they left this virtue behind and they followed the customs of wars in Italy. And at the beginning of their expansion on land, because they did not have much of a state there and because they were held in great repute, they did not have much to fear from their captains; but as they expanded, which was under Carmagnola, they suffered an instance of this error. For when they saw he was most virtuous, since the duke of Milan had been defeated by them under his leadership, and when they learned on the other hand that he had turned cool toward the war, they judged they could not win again with him because he did not want to, nor could they dismiss him without losing what they had acquired. So in order to secure themselves, they were forced of necessity to kill him. Then they had as their captains Bartolomeo da Bergamo, Roberto da San Severino, the count of Pitigliano, and such. With these they had to fear for loss, not for their gain, as then happened at Vaili: there they lost in one day what they had acquired with such trouble in eight hundred years. For these arms bring only slow, late, and feeble acquisitions, but sudden and miraculous losses. And because with these examples I have come into Italy, which has been governed for many years by mercenary arms, I want to discourse on them more deeply, so that, when their origin and progress have been seen, one can correct them better.

So you have to understand that in recent times as soon as Italy began to rebel against the empire, and the pope gained much reputation in temporal affairs, Italy divided into many states. For many of the large cities took up arms against their nobles, who formerly, supported by the emperor, had kept them under oppression; and the Church supported the cities to give herself reputation in temporal affairs. In many other cities their citizens became princes over them. Hence, since Italy had almost fallen into the hands of the Church and a few republics, and since the priests and the other citizens did not have knowledge of arms, they began to hire foreigners. The first who gave reputation to this kind of military was Al-

斯王国水火不相容。

现在，我们还是来看一看不久前发生的一件事吧。佛罗伦萨人把保罗·维泰利请来做了军队的将领。此人极有谋略，起自于草莽，早已名声显赫。如果他占领了比萨，那谁都不能否认，佛罗伦萨人定会依从于他，因为他要是投靠敌人，成为对方的鹰犬，那佛罗伦萨人可就无计可施了。可是，佛罗伦萨人倘若留用他，就必须对他俯首贴耳。假如我们考虑一下威尼斯人所取得的成就，便会看到他们在战争中稳扎稳打，战绩辉煌（这是在他们将战场转向陆地之前）。他们的贵族以及平民都武装起来，极大地发挥出了自身的实力。可是，他们一旦在陆地上作战，就把优势抛在了身后，而依从了意大利的战争规则。在陆地扩张伊始时，因为他们并没有很多的疆土，而且自身又威名赫赫，所以没必要对军队的将领们提心吊胆。可一旦在卡尔马尼奥拉的指挥下开始攻城掠地，他们就由于这一失误尝到了苦头。在他的运筹帷幄之下，他们一举击败了米兰公爵，由此他们看到卡尔马尼奥拉绝非等闲之辈，而另一方面他们也了解到他对战争换上了一副冷漠的态度。他们认为，绝不可能再依靠他去打胜仗了，因为他压根就没有这方面的意愿。可是，他们又不能解雇他，因为这样会失去已经占领的疆土。于是，为了保住自身的利益，他们在万般无奈之下杀死了他。后来，他们又请了巴尔托洛梅奥·达·贝尔加莫、罗贝尔托·达·桑·塞维里诺、皮蒂利亚诺伯爵以及诸如此类的人充当军队的将领。聘用这些人，他们总是在担心会遭受到损失，而且也不能指望这些人他们谋利益。正像在维拉的遭遇一样：他们在八百年中含辛茹苦所取得的成就，一日之间就丧失了个干干净净。这样的军队给你带来的收获是缓慢、微乎其微的，但他们却可以在瞬间造成令人不可思议的损失。通过这些事例，我们对多年来受制于雇佣军的意大利进行了探讨。针对雇佣军的问题，我还想再进一步发些议论，让人们了解雇佣军的起源及发展情况，这样可以纠正弊端。

诸位肯定知道，最近意大利一开始起来反对帝国的压迫，教皇一旦在世俗事务中获取了显赫的名声，意大利便分裂成了许多个国家。许多大城市都拿起刀枪反对贵族，而那些贵族以前在皇帝的支持下一直骑在人民的头上作威作福。教会支持城市的行动，以彰显自身在世俗事务中的声誉。另外还有许多城市，市民们当上了国君，成了统治贵族的人。由于意大利险些落入教会及几个共和国的手中，由于僧侣及市民们对军事一窍不通，于是他们开始雇外国人帮助他们。头一个为这类军队赢得盛誉的人是罗马格纳的阿尔贝里戈·达·科尼奥。布拉齐奥以及斯福尔扎和一些



berigo da Conio, from Romagna. From his discipline came, among others, Braccio and Sforza, who in their times were the arbiters of Italy. After them came all the others who have controlled these arms until our times. And the result of their virtue has been that Italy has been overrun by Charles, taken as booty by Louis, violated by Ferdinand, and insulted by the Swiss. The order they have held to has been, first, to take away reputation from the infantry in order to give reputation to themselves. They did this because they were men without a state who lived on industry. Having a few infantry did not give them reputation and they could not feed very many; so they were left with horse, and were fed and honored in tolerable number. And things came to the point that in an army of twenty thousand soldiers not two thousand infantry were to be found. Besides this, they had used all their industry to rid themselves and the soldiers of trouble and fear by not killing one another in battles but taking prisoners without asking ransom. They did not go against towns in the night; those in the towns would not go against their tents; around the camp they made neither stockade nor trench; they did not campaign in winter. And all these things were permitted in their military orders and discovered by them, as has been said, so as to escape trouble and dangers, so that they have led Italy into slavery and disgrace.

其他的人都接受过他的训练，后来这二人风光一时，成为意大利的主宰。继这些人之后，又有一些人操纵了军队，这种情况延续至今。他们表现出了卓越的才能，其结果是意大利被查理所颠覆、遭到路易的劫掠、费尔南多的侵犯以及瑞士人的凌辱。他们一贯的作法是削弱步兵的威望，以提高自己的声威。他们如此行事的原因在于：他们没有国籍，吃的就是雇佣军这碗饭。拥有一些步兵不会给他们以威望，而步兵数量多了又供养不起，于是他们只好靠骑兵了，而且使其保持一定的数量，并因此获得了荣誉。最后已到了这种地步：在一支两万人的军队里，步兵的人数连两千都不足。除此之外，他们还千方百计地避免在战场上和敌手相互厮杀，而是尽量抓活的，之后连赎金也不要便放走俘虏，这样，他们以及士兵们就省去了麻烦，也消除了恐惧。他们不会在夜间攻城，而守城的敌军也不会夜袭他们的军营。他们的营地四周不设栅栏，不挖壕沟；他们在冬季不出征打仗。根据他们的军事战略，这一切都是天经地义的；如前所述，他们发明这样的战术是为了省去麻烦和避开危险，然而却因此把意大利引向了遭受奴役和凌辱的地步。



Book 13 Of Auxiliary, Mixed, and One's Own Soldiers

Auxiliary arms, which are the other useless arms, are those of a power that is called to come with its arms to help and defend you, as was done by Pope Julius in recent times. When he had seen in the campaign of Ferrara the sad result of his mercenary arms, he turned to auxiliary ones; and he agreed with Ferdinand, king of Spain, that Ferdinand would help him with his men and armies. These arms can be useful and good in themselves, but for whoever calls them in, they are almost always harmful, because when they lose you are undone; when they win, you are left their prisoner. And although ancient histories are full of examples, nonetheless I do not wish to depart from this recent example of Pope Julius II, whose course of thrusting himself entirely into the hands of a foreigner, when he wanted Ferrara, could not have been less thought out. But his good fortune gave rise to a third thing so that he did not reap the fruit of his bad choice; for when his auxiliaries were defeated at Ravenna, the Swiss rose up and beyond all expectation, his own and others, drove out the victors; and he came out a prisoner neither of his enemies, who had fled, nor of his auxiliaries, since he had won with other arms than theirs. The Florentines, who were entirely unarmed, brought in ten thousand French to Pisa to capture it, for which course they incurred more danger than in any other time of their travails. The emperor of Constantinople, so as to oppose his neighbors, sent ten thousand Turks into Greece; when the war was finished, they refused to leave. This was the beginning of the servitude of Greece under the infidels.

Let him, then, who wants to be unable to win make use of these arms, since they are much more dangerous than mercenary arms. For with these, ruin is accomplished; they are all united, all resolved to obey someone else. But mercenary arms, when they have won, need more time and greater opportunity to harm you, since they are not one whole body and have been found and paid for by you. In them the third party whom you may put at their head cannot quickly seize so much authority as to offend you. In sum, in mercenary arms laziness is more dangerous; in auxiliary arms, virtue is.

A wise prince, therefore, has always avoided these arms and turned to his own. He has

第十三章 援军、混合军及自己的军队

援军也是一种无用的军队，是强国应邀派去帮助和保卫某个国家的军队，朱利奥教皇最近就请求过援军的支持。在费拉拉战役中，朱利奥教皇看见雇佣军造成了可悲的战局，于是便将目光投向了援军；他与西班牙国王费迪南多达成协议，由费迪南多派遣军队协助他作战。这些军队就本身而言是有效力的威武之师，但不管谁把他们请去，几乎都会深受其害，因为一旦他们打了败仗，那就是你的末日，如果他们取得了胜利，就会把你作为他们的俘虏。在古代的历史上这种例子不胜枚举，可我还是想举一个最近的例子，谈谈教皇朱利奥二世的情况。他渴望占领费拉拉，却不幸完全落入了外国人的手中，他在其中所采取的措施恐怕是再为草率不过了。不过，他还算运气好，遇到了新的情况，没有吃下做错事情的苦果。当他的援军在拉文纳战败时，出乎他以及所有人意料的是，瑞士人奋然而起，赶走了胜利者。结果，他既未成为敌军的俘虏——对方已落荒而逃，也未被援军拘禁起来，因为他取得战争的胜利靠的是友军而非援军。佛罗伦萨人压根就没有自己的军队，曾请来一万法军进攻比萨，而这一举措令他们身陷危境，经历了前所未有的磨难。君士坦丁堡的皇帝为了跟邻国作对，曾派遣一万多土耳其军队进驻希腊。战争落下了大幕，可那些士兵拒绝离开希腊的国土，这便开始了异教徒对希腊的奴役。

所以说，谁要是不想打赢战争，那就让他请援军好啦。援军可比雇佣军还要危险得多呢！依赖援军，灾难势必会降临。他们团结一致，全部会果断地听命于某一个居心叵测的人。而雇佣军要是打了胜仗，想加害于你的话，必须要费些周折和时间，得瞅准机会，因为他们并非一个整体，而且是你雇来的，靠着你发军饷哩。在雇佣军里有第三种势力，那就是你委派的将领。他们不可能那么快就威力无边，对你造成威胁。总结起来说：对于雇佣军，懒惰是比较危险的因素；对于援军，最为危险的则是他们的实力。

因而，英君明主时时刻刻都要对这样的军队退避三舍，而要以自己的军队为依



preferred to lose with his own than to win with others, since he judges it no true victory that is acquired with alien arms. I shall never hesitate to cite Cesare Borgia and his actions. This duke came into Romagna with auxiliary arms, leading there entirely French troops, with whom he took Imola and Forli. But when such arms no longer appeared safe to him, he turned to mercenaries, judging there to be less danger in them; and he hired the Orsini and Vitelli. Then in managing them, he found them doubtful, unfaithful, and dangerous; he eliminated them, and turned to his own arms. And one can easily see the difference between these arms if one considers what a difference there was in the reputation of the duke when he had only the French, and when he had the Orsini and Vitelli, and when he was left with his own soldiers and himself over them; his reputation will be found always to have increased, but he was never so much esteemed as when everyone saw that he was the total owner of his arms.

I did not want to depart from examples that are Italian and recent; yet I do not want to leave out Hiero of Syracuse, since he was one of those named above by me. When he, as I said, was made head of the army by the Syracusans, he knew immediately that their mercenary military was not useful because they were condottieri set up like our Italians. Since he thought he could neither keep them nor let them go, he had them all cut to pieces, and then made war with his arms and not with alien arms. I want further to recall to memory a figure of the Old Testament apt for this purpose. When David offered to Saul to go and fight Goliath, the Philistine challenger. Saul, to give him spirit, armed him with his own arms – which David, as soon as he had them on, refused, saying that with them he could not give a good account of himself, and so he would rather meet the enemy with his sling and his knife.

In fine, the arms of others either fall off your back or weigh you down or hold you tight. Charles VII, father of King Louis XI, who had liberated France from the English with his fortune and virtue, recognized this necessity of arming himself with his own arms, and laid down an ordinance in his kingdom for men-at-arms and infantry. Then his son King Louis eliminated the ordinance for infantry and began to hire Swiss; this error, continued by others, is, as one sees now in fact, the cause of the dangers to that kingdom. For when he gave reputation to the Swiss, he debased all his own arms, because he had eliminated the infantry entirely and he had obligated his men-at-arms to the arms of others. For after they had become accustomed to fighting with Swiss, they did not think they could win without them. From this it follows that French are not enough against Swiss and without Swiss do not try against anyone else. Thus, the armies of France have been mixed, part mercenary and part their own. These arms all together are much better than simple auxiliary or simple mercenary arms, but

托。他宁肯靠自己的军队吃败仗，也不愿依赖别人打胜仗，因为借助于外国军队取得的胜利并非真正的胜利。我很愿意在此处引用切萨雷·博尔贾的例子。这位公爵曾经就借用过援军，把法国军队领进了罗马格纳，靠着法军占领了伊莫拉和富利。可是，后来他觉得这些军队靠不住，便转过身去请雇佣军，认为雇佣军的危险性要小一些。他花钱雇来了奥尔西尼和维泰利的军队。但在跟那些人打交道时，却发现他们疑心大、奸猾、具有危险性，于是便解雇了他们，把注意力转向了自己的军队。这几种军队之间的区别是显而易见的。公爵有依靠法国人的时候，有雇佣奥尔西尼及维泰利军队的时候，也有他和他自己的战士们同甘共苦的时候，在这三个阶段，他在人们心中的地位也有所不同。当天下人都看到，他统领着自己的军队作战时，他的威望马上大增，受到了人们前所未有的尊敬。

前边，我想讲的是有关于现今意大利的例子，而现在我的打算是议论议论锡拉库萨的海洛（我在上文中曾提到过此人）。正如我所言，他被锡拉库萨人推举为军队的将领，之后他很快就发现他们的雇佣军都是些无用之徒，跟我们意大利的雇佣军一样是乌合之众。他认为既不能留用那些雇佣兵，也不能放他们走掉，于是便大开杀戒，把他们全都砍了头，然后带着他自己的军队在沙场转战，再也不用外国的军队了。为了进一步说明这个问题，我还想回顾一下《旧约全书》里的一段典故：大卫向扫罗王提出，说他想去和非利士的挑战者歌利亚比个高低；扫罗王为了鼓舞他的士气，把自己的铠甲让他穿上；大卫试了试，随即便谢绝了，说他穿上铠甲便无法充分地施展本事了，所以他宁愿用自己的投石器和砍刀迎战敌人。

总之，别人的铠甲披在你身上，是会从你的背上滑落下来的，要不然也会把你压垮，或者将你拘得死死的。法王路易十一的父亲查理七世凭着运势及实力把法国从英国人的手中解放了出来，他深切地意识到必须用自己的军队张扬武力，于是便在自己的王国里颁布法令以确保骑兵及步兵的地位。后来，他的儿子路易国王废除了关于步兵的法令，开始雇佣起瑞士人来。这一错误延续了下来，现在我们可以实实在在地看到，正是这一错误给那个王国带来了诸多危险。路易国王使瑞士人声望大增，却贬低了本国军队的荣誉；他彻底废除了步兵，而且将骑兵交由别国的军队制约。骑兵们养成了和瑞士人一起作战的习惯，最终就觉得没有瑞士人他们就打不了胜仗了。结果就出现了这样的情况：法国人无法与瑞士人抗衡，而离了瑞士人他们又根本没指望与别人争高低。于是，法国的军队成了大杂烩，里边有雇佣军，也有他们本国的军队。这种军队总体而言要比单纯使用援军或单纯依赖雇佣军强得多，



much inferior to one's own. And the example given is enough, because the kingdom of France would be unconquerable if the ordering of Charles had been expanded or preserved. But lack of prudence in men begins something in which, because it tasted good then, they do not perceive the poison that lies underneath.

Therefore, he who does not recognize evils when they arise in a principality is not truly wise, and this is given to few. And if one considers the first cause of the ruin of the Roman Empire, one will find it to have begun only with the hiring of Goths, because from that beginning the forces of the Roman Empire began to weaken, and all the virtue that was taken from it was given to them.

I conclude, thus, that without its own arms no principality is secure; indeed it is wholly obliged to fortune since it does not have virtue to defend itself in adversity, and it has always been the opinion and judgment of wise men "that nothing is so infirm and unstable as the reputation of power not sustained by one's own force." And one's own arms are those which are composed of either subjects or citizens or your creatures; all others are either mercenary or auxiliary. And the mode of ordering one's own arms will be easy to find if one reviews the orders of the four I have named above and if one sees how Philip, father of Alexander the Great, and how many republics and princes have armed and ordered themselves. I submit myself entirely to these orders.

但却远远逊色于清一色的本国军，以上的例子足以说明这一点。如果查理国王制订的法典能发扬光大，并被严格地执行，法兰西王国会是不可战胜的。可人们缺乏远见卓识，一尝到甜头就草草行事，而看不到事情本身所隐含的危机。

作为一个君主，看不到君主国内潜伏的危险，就不是名符其实的英君明主，而英明的君主寥若晨星。如果我们分析一下导致罗马帝国衰亡的最重要的原因，就会发现罗马帝国是雇佣了哥特人后才开始走下坡路的。自那以后，罗马帝国的势力一天不如一天，他们的实力全部转移到了哥特人那儿。

我的结论是：君主国没有自己的军队，江山就不牢靠。在这种情况下，国家完全靠命运操纵，因为它在遇到大风大浪时没有实力自卫。明智的人都会有这样的看法和观点：“凡是缺乏实力基础的威望及权势都是最为虚幻和不牢靠的。”所谓自己的军队就是由本国臣民或王侯的属下组成的军队，而其他的军队就是雇佣军或援军。至于如何指挥本国的军队，办法是很容易找到的。我们只要回顾一下上文提到的那四个人的所作所为，回顾一下亚历山大大帝的父亲菲力普，以及许多共和国和君主们是如何组织军队、驾驭军队的，那就可以了。我本人完全赞同他们的谋略。



Book 14 What a Prince Should Do Regarding the Military

Thus, a prince should have no other object, nor any other thought, nor take anything else as his art but the art of war and its orders and discipline; for that is the only art which is of concern to one who commands. And it is of such virtue that not only does it maintain those who have been born princes but many times it enables men of private fortune to rise to that rank; and on the contrary, one sees that when princes have thought more of amenities than of arms, they have lost their states. And the first cause that makes you lose it is the neglect of this art; and the cause that enables you to acquire it is to be a professional in this art.

Francesco Sforza, because he was armed, became duke of Milan from a private individual; and his sons, because they shunned the hardships of arms, became private individuals from dukes. For, among the other causes of evil that being unarmed brings you, it makes you contemptible, which is one of those infamies the prince should be on guard against, as will be said below. For there is no proportion between one who is armed and one who is unarmed, and it is not reasonable that whoever is armed obey willingly whoever is unarmed, and that someone unarmed be secure among armed servants. For since there is scorn in the one and suspicion in the other, it is not possible for them to work well together. And therefore a prince who does not understand the military, besides other miseries, cannot, as was said, be esteemed by his soldiers nor have trust in them.

Therefore, he should never lift his thoughts from the exercise of war, and in peace he should exercise it more than in war. This he can do in two modes, one with deeds, the other with the mind. And as to deeds, besides keeping his armies well ordered and exercised he should always be out hunting, and through this accustom the body to hardships; and meanwhile he should learn the nature of sites, and recognize how mountains rise, how valleys open up, how plains lie, and understand the nature of rivers and marshes – and in this invest the greatest care. This knowledge is useful in two modes. First, one learns to know one's own country, and one can better understand its defense; then, through the knowledge of and experience with those sites, one can comprehend with ease every other site that it may be neces-

第十四章 君主在军事方面的作为

作为一个君主，应该致力于研究战争艺术，致力于指挥和训练士卒，而不应该有别的追求和想法，也不应该把心思放到别的事情上去，因为只有战争艺术对于一个指挥者来说才是至关重要的。这门学问包含着强大的实力，不仅可以让那些继承王位的君主保住江山，也频频地帮助起自于草莽的平民登上王位。相反的情况则是：作为君主，一味沉湎于声色犬马而不过问军事，就会沦为亡国之君。导致亡国的最重要的原因是对战争艺术掉以轻心；而能够帮助你获得王权的原因则是精通战争艺术。

弗朗西斯科·斯福尔扎由于精于武道，从一介草民摇身变成了米兰公爵，而他的儿子因为惧怕鞍马劳顿，不愿吃那份苦，结果丢掉了爵位，被贬为庶民。不过问军事的弊端是很多的，其中之一就是让你受到世人的蔑视，这样丢人的事是君主们应该提防的。关于这一点，我下边还要论述。一个手无寸铁的人和一个全副武装的人是无法进行比较的。要说一个手持刀剑的人会心甘情愿地听命于空着手的人，或者说，一个没带刀剑的主人在荷枪实弹的臣仆中间会感到安全，这都是不合乎情理的。持有刀枪的人对没有武装的人嗤之以鼻，而没有武装的人则满腹猜疑，双方不可能精诚合作。因而，一个君主如果不懂军事，除了会遭遇到其他的不幸，还会如以上如说的那样，得不到士卒的敬重，而他本人也不会信任自己的部下。

因此，君主不可稍有懈怠，时时要加强战备，和平时期的训练应多于战时。他可以从两个方面做到这一点——身体力行以及运筹帷幄。所谓的身体力行即：除过很好地组织军队和训练士卒之外，他还应该常常出外狩猎，使自己的身体习惯于艰苦的生活，同时还应该熟悉地形，了解起伏的群山、深凹的沟壑、广阔的平原、纵横的河流及沼泽。对于这些他应给予最大的关注。掌握这种知识有两点好处：其一，君主可以了解本国的河山，这样便能够更有效地进行防御；其二，通过熟悉地形及巡视河山，君主在需要探索 and 了解新的区域时，便轻而易举能做得到。譬如，托斯



sary to explore as new. For the hills, the valleys, the plains, the rivers, and the marshes that are in Tuscany, for example, have a certain similarity to those of other provinces, so that from the knowledge of a site in one province one can easily come to the knowledge of others. And the prince who lacks this skill lacks the first part of what a captain must have, for this teaches him to find the enemy, seize lodgings, lead armies, order battles, and besiege towns to your advantage.

Among other praise given by writers to Philopoemen, prince of the Achaeans, is that in times of peace he never thought of anything but modes of war; and when he was on campaign with friends, he often stopped and reasoned with them: "If the enemy were on top of that hill and we were here with our army, which of us would have the advantage? How could one advance to meet them while maintaining order? If we wanted to retreat from here, how would we have to do it? If they retreated, how would we have to follow them?" And he put before them, as he went along all the chances that can occur to an army; he listened to their opinions, gave his own, supported it with reasons, so that because of these continued cogitations there could never arise, while he led the army, any unforeseen event for which he did not have the remedy.

But, as to the exercise of the mind, a prince should read histories and consider in them the actions of excellent men, should see how they conducted themselves in wars, should examine the causes of their victories and losses, so as to be able to avoid the latter and imitate the former. Above all he should do as some excellent man has done in the past who found someone to imitate who had been praised and glorified before him, whose exploits and actions he always kept beside himself, as they say Alexander the Great imitated Achilles; Caesar, Alexander; Scipio, Cyrus. And whoever reads the life of Cyrus written by Xenophon will then recognize in the life of Scipio how much glory that imitation brought him, how much in chastity, affability, humanity, and liberality Scipio conformed to what had been written of Cyrus by Xenophon.

A wise prince should observe such modes, and never remain idle in peaceful times, but with his industry make capital of them in order to be able to profit from them in adversities, so that when fortune changes, it will find him ready to resist them.

卡尼的山峦、峡谷、平原、河流及沼泽与别的地区有着相似之处，所以了解一个区域的地形便能够很容易掌握其他区域的地形。作为一个君主，如果不具备这方面的知识，就失去了一个将领所应该具备的基本素质。因为熟悉了地形便给他以优势，使他能从容地发现敌人、安营扎寨、领导军队、指挥作战以及攻城略地。

史书上充溢着对阿凯亚人的君主菲利波门的赞誉之辞，其中有一点是说他在和平时期念念不忘对战争的谋划。他和友人一道出猎时，常常停下来跟他们商讨战术。他说：“假如敌人出现在那座山头上，而我们率领着军队驻扎在此处，哪一方会占优势呢？我们怎样才能对敌方实施攻击，而又阵脚不乱呢？假如我们要撤退，怎么样做才对呢？敌方如果撤退，我们该怎样去追击呢？”他侃侃而谈，将军队可能遇到的情况一一摆出来，并聆听友人的意见。他提出自己的方案，并以种种观点加以佐证。这样，由于他平时反复地谋划，所以当他率军打仗时，就绝对不会遇到让他措手不及的意外情况了。

作为一位君主，应该进行一定的思维训练，如读一些史书，分析史书中记载的杰出人物的事迹，了解一下那些人在战争中的举措，研究他们成功与失败的原因，以便借鉴成功的经验，避免重蹈失败的覆辙。最为重要的是，他应该像历史上的那些杰出人物一样，以前人为师，仿效那些口碑载道、荣誉加身的人物，把他们的丰功伟绩牢记在心头。在历史上，亚历山大大帝仿效过阿基里斯，凯撒则以亚历山大大帝为楷模，而西庇阿师从的则是居鲁士。我们读读色诺芬撰写的有关居鲁士的生平，就会看到西庇阿仿效居鲁士给他自己带来了多么大的荣誉；而且，我们还会看到西庇阿天性高雅、和蔼、仁慈和宽厚，与色诺芬笔下的居鲁士是何等相像。

一位英明的君主应当如此束身立世，绝不可在太平时期无所事事，而应勤奋努力，充分利用时间，这样在灾难来临时便可以由此获益。如此，风云突变时，他就有能力严阵以待，应付一切情况。



Book 15 Of Those Things for Which Men And Especially Princes Are Praised or Blamed

It remains now to see what the modes and government of a prince should be with subjects and with friends. And because I know that many have written of this, I fear that in writing of it again, I may be held presumptuous, especially since in disputing this matter I depart from the orders of others. But since my intent is to write something useful to whoever understands it, it has appeared to me more fitting to go directly to the effectual truth of the thing than to the imagination of it. And many have imagined republics and principalities that have never been seen or known to exist in truth; for it is so far from how one lives to how one should live that he who lets go of what is done for what should be done learns his ruin rather than his preservation. For a man who wants to make a profession of good in all regards must come to ruin among so many who are not good. Hence it is necessary to a prince, if he wants to maintain himself, to learn to be able not to be good, and to use this and not use it according to necessity.

Thus, leaving out what is imagined about a prince and discussing what is true, I say that all men, whenever one speaks of them, and especially princes, since they are placed higher, are noted for some of the qualities that bring them either blame or praise. And this is why someone is considered liberal, someone mean (using a Tuscan term because *avaro* [greedy] in our language is still one who desires to have something by violence, *misero* [mean] we call one who refrains too much from using what is his); someone is considered a giver, someone rapacious; someone cruel, someone merciful; the one a breaker of faith, the other faithful; the one effeminate and pusillanimous, the other fierce and spirited; the one humane, the other proud; the one lascivious, the other chaste; the one honest, the other clever; the one hard, the other agreeable; the one grave, the other light; the one religious, the other unbelieving, and the like. And I know that everyone will confess that it would be a very laudable thing to find in a prince all of the above mentioned qualities that are held good. But because he cannot have them, nor wholly observe them, since human conditions do not permit it, it is necessary for him to be so prudent as to know how to avoid the infamy of those vices that would take

第十五章 对于世人，尤其是对于君主的褒贬

现在，让我们来看看，作为一个君主，该怎样对待朋友以及怎样统治臣民吧。我知道关于这方面的论述已颇为丰富。我现在旧话重提，而且我的观点与他人相比是离经叛道的，一定会有目中无人之嫌。不过，我的意图是写点儿东西给想了解这方面情况的人提供帮助，所以我觉得最好开门见山，秉笔直书真实有效的东西，而非沉湎于幻想。许多人想入非非，他们幻想中的共和国以及君主国实际上是不存在的，既无人看到过也无人知道。生活现实与理想中的生活有着天壤之别。如果一个人无视现实，一味地想象理想中的东西，就不能久远，势必会遇到灭顶之灾。周围不怀好意的人比比皆是，如果你处处希求积德行善，肯定会自毁其身。所以，一个君主如果想保护好自己，就得学会行不善之事，具体何时使用这种办法应酌情而定。

此处暂不议论理想中的君主，只讲一讲现实中的情况。依我说，所有的人都有独到之处，这些独到之处给他们带来了指责或赞扬，其中以君主为甚，因为他们身居尊位。所以，有人被誉为慷慨，而有人被贬为悭吝（此处使用的是托斯卡尼的语言，因为在我们的词汇里，贪婪的人还指那些依靠暴力劫财掠物的人，悭吝的人还指那些不愿多使用自己东西之徒）。有人被认为是乐善好施，有人则被认为是贪得无厌；有人被认为是残酷无情，有人则被认为是怀有菩萨心肠；有人被认为是言而无信，有人则被认为是忠心耿耿；有人被认为是软弱、怯懦，而有人则被认为是刚勇、强悍；有人被认为是谦和，有人则被认为是傲慢；有人被认为是荒淫好色，有人则被认为是洁身自好；有人被认为是诚实，有人则被认为是狡猾；有人被认为是苛刻，有人则被认为是可亲；有人被认为是庄重，有人则被认为是轻浮；有人被认为是虔诚，有人则被认为是不虔诚。凡此种种，不一而足。我知道每个人都会承认：一个君主如果具备了上面列举的一切优点，将会是天大的一件好事。但他不可能成为浑身优点的完人，也不可能表现出这么多的优点，因为这是人类自身的条件所不允许的。只要他把眼睛擦亮，避开那些可能会导致亡国的恶行劣迹就行了，如有可能，



his state from him and to be on guard against those that do not, if that is possible; but if one cannot, one can let them go on with less hesitation. And furthermore one should not care about incurring the reputation of those vices without which it is difficult to save one's state; for if one considers everything well, one will find something appears to be virtue, which if pursued would be one's ruin, and something else appears to be vice, which if pursued results in one's security and well-being.

也要提防那些不会导致亡国的丑恶行径。不过，如果避之不及，那就应该果断地撒开手，顺其自然。而如果不实施一些恶行，就难于挽救国家的命运，那我们就该斤斤计较荣誉了。倘若我们仔细考虑一下，就会发现有些事看上去蛮不错，一落到实处便会叫我们身败名裂，有些事情看上去是恶行，可一旦实施，却会给国家带来安定和繁荣。



Book 16 Of Liberality and Parsimony

Beginning, then, with the first of the above-mentioned qualities, I say that it would be good to be held liberal; nonetheless, liberality, when used so that you may be held liberal, harms you. For if it is used virtuously and as it should be used, it may not be recognized, and you will not escape the infamy of its contrary. And so, if one wants to maintain a name for liberality among men, it is necessary not to leave out any kind of lavish display, so that a prince who has done this will always consume all his resources in such deeds. In the end it will be necessary, if he wants to maintain a name for liberality, to burden the people extraordinarily, to be rigorous with taxes, and to do all those things that can be done to get money. This will begin to make him hated by his subjects, and little esteemed by anyone as he becomes poor; so having offended the many and rewarded the few with this liberality of his, he feels every least hardship and runs into risk at every slight danger. When he recognizes this, and wants to draw back from it, he immediately incurs the infamy of meanness.

Thus, since a prince cannot, without damage to himself, use the virtue of liberality so that it is recognized, he should not, if he is prudent, care about a name for meanness. For with time he will always be held more and more liberal when it is seen that with his parsimony his income is enough for him, that he can defend himself from whoever makes war on him, and that he can undertake campaigns without burdening the people. So he comes to use liberality with all those from whom he does not take, who are infinite, and meanness with all those to whom he does not give, who are few. In our times we have not seen great things done except by those who have been considered mean; the others have been eliminated. Pope Julius II, while he made use of a name for liberality to attain the papacy, did not think of maintaining it later, so as to be able to make war. The present king of France has carried on many wars without imposing an extraordinary tax on his subjects, because the extra expenses were administered with his long-practiced parsimony. If the present king of Spain had been held liberal he would not have been able to make or win so many campaigns.

Therefore, so as not to have to rob his subjects, to be able to defend himself, not to be-

第十六章 慷慨与吝啬

对于以上列举的品质，我要先谈一谈头一条。享有慷慨之名，固然是件好事，但为了沽名钓誉而行慷慨之事，也许会害了你。因为即便你行侠仗义，慷慨待人，别人也不一定会买账，反而落下与之相反的恶名。如果一个人想在人们之间博得慷慨之美名，势必免不了要讲讲排场，作为一个君主要是如此行事，就会倾其所有、耗空国库。到头来，他如果还想保住慷慨的美名，就需要对人民横征暴敛，拼命加重赋税，不遗余力地搞钱。这最终会导致臣民们怨恨，而且由于他手头拮据，他会得不到任何人的尊重。这样，他以慷慨的馈赠奖励少数人，得罪的却是广大民众，这会使得他步履维艰、四面楚歌。一旦他省悟过来，想痛改前行，就立刻会招致吝啬的恶名。

作为君主，要博得慷慨之誉，势必会威及他自身的利益。所以他应该意识到，作为英明的君主就不该计较落下吝啬这种名声。人们会看到他由于省吃俭用，国库充裕，使得他有能力抵御外敌，无需增加人民的负担就能进行战事。随着时间的推移，他反而会博得越来越响亮的慷慨之名。这样，他的慷慨针对的是不可计数的民众，因为他没有对他们横征暴敛；而他的吝啬针对的则是为数极少的人，因为他没有赐给他们财物。在我们的这个时代，我们所看见的建立丰功伟业的全都是些被认为是吝啬的人，有慷慨之名的君主却难以善终。教皇朱利奥二也曾利用慷慨之美名谋求教皇的权杖，后来为了有能力发动战争，对这种名声就全然不顾了。当今的法国国王频频陷入战争的漩涡，可是并未对臣民横征暴敛，这是因为他常年厉行节约，出得起这笔额外的军费开支。假如现任的西班牙国王落下慷慨的名声，就绝不能够发动这么多场战争并取得胜利。

因而，为了不剥削自己的臣民，为了能出得起钱搞国防，为了不变成个穷光蛋



come poor and contemptible, nor to be forced to become rapacious, a prince should esteem it little to incur a name for meanness, because this is one of those vices which enable him to rule. And if someone should say; Caesar attained empire with liberality, and many others, because they have been and have been held to be liberal, have attained very great rank, I respond: either you are already a prince or you are on the path to acquiring it; in the first case this liberality is damaging; in the second it is indeed necessary to be held liberal. And Caesar was one of those who wanted to attain the principate of Rome; but if after he had arrived there, had he remained alive and not been temperate with his expenses, he would have destroyed that empire. And if someone should reply; many have been princes and have done great things with their armies who have been held very liberal, I respond to you; either the prince spends from what is his own and his subjects' or from what belongs to someone else. In the first case he should be sparing; in the other, he should not leave out any part of liberality. And for the prince who goes out with his armies, who feeds on booty, pillage, and ransom and manages on what belongs to someone else, this liberality is necessary; otherwise he would not be followed by his soldiers. And of what is not yours or your subjects' one can be a bigger giver, as were Cyrus, Caesar, and Alexander, because spending what is someone else's does not take reputation from you but adds it to you; only spending your own is what hurts you. And there is nothing that consumes itself as much as liberality; while you use it, you lose the capacity to use it; and you become either poor and contemptible or, to escape poverty, rapacious and hateful. Among all the things that a prince should guard against is being contemptible and hated, and liberality leads you to both. So there is more wisdom in maintaining a name for meanness, which begets infamy without hatred, than in being under a necessity, because one wants to have a name for liberality, to incur a name for rapacity, which begets infamy with hatred.

而遭人蔑视，为了避免在万不得已的情况下巧取豪夺，作为一个君主是不应该计较落下吝啬的坏名声的，因为这固然不是件好事，却能维护他的统治。也许有人会说：“恺撒正是因为慷慨大方才获得了帝国的权柄，还有许多人也是因为出手阔绰，落下了慷慨的美名，才得以身居要职。”我的回答是：你要么已经当上了君主，要么你正在努力登上君主的宝座。如果是第一种情况，一味地慷慨只会坏事；如果遇到的是第二种情况，实际上是很有必要表现得慷慨一些。恺撒是其中的一个渴望独揽帝国大权的人，但如果在他如愿以偿之后仍大难不死，却又不厉行节约，那就会毁掉整个帝国。也许有人会反驳说：有许多君主历来都是非常慷慨的，他们照样率领着自己的军队创造了辉煌的业绩。我的回答是：他们花的要不是自己的钱以及他们臣民的钱，就是慷他人之慨。如果属于第一种情况，他们应该厉行节约，但倘若遇到后一种情况，慷慨的举措就是必不可少的了。君主率军出征时，靠抢劫、掠夺的财物以及赎金补充给养，把属于别人的东西据为己有，此时很有必要表现得大方一些，否则他的士卒就不会跟随他了。君主可以把不属于自己或他们臣民的东西拿来慷慨地赠人，就像居鲁士、恺撒以及亚历山大一样，因为慷他人之慨不会损害他们的名声，反而会令他们美名远扬。一味地挥霍自己的财物，对君主来说是有害的。没有什么比乱花钱更能损耗一个人的元气了。你若挥金如土，那就是在丧失充大方的资本。你会变得手头拮据，被人瞧不起；如果为了躲避穷困，你去巧取豪夺，就会被人怨恨。作为君主，最应该提防的是千万不要被人瞧不起，千万不要被人民怨恨，而乱花钱到头来会使你落到这种下场。所以，聪明人宁肯落下吝啬的名声，也不愿为了追求慷慨的美誉，最终落得贪得无厌的骂名。因为吝啬只是名声不好，而不会招致怨恨，而贪得无厌既不是好名声，还会招致怨恨。



Book 17 Of Cruelty and Mercy, and Whether It Is Better to Be Loved than Feared, or the Contrary

Descending next to the other qualities set forth before, I say that each prince should desire to be held merciful and not cruel; nonetheless he should take care not to use this mercy badly. Cesare Borgia was held to be cruel; nonetheless his cruelty restored the Romagna, united it, and reduced it to peace and to faith. If one considers this well, one will see that he was much more merciful than the Florentine people, who so as to escape a name for cruelty, allowed Pistoia to be destroyed. A prince, therefore, so as to keep his subjects united and faithful, should not care about the infamy of cruelty, because with very few examples he will be more merciful than those who for the sake of too much mercy allow disorders to continue, from which come killings or robberies; for these customarily harm a whole community, but the executions that come from the prince harm one particular person. And of all princes, it is impossible for the new prince to escape a name for cruelty because new states are full of dangers. And Virgil says in the mouth of Dido: "The harshness of things and the newness of the kingdom force me to contrive such things, and to keep a broad watch over the borders."

Nonetheless, he should be slow to believe and to move, nor should he create fear for himself, and he should proceed in a temperate mode with prudence and humanity so that too much confidence does not make him incautious and too much diffidence does not render him intolerable.

From this a dispute arises whether it is better to be loved than feared, or the reverse. The answer is that one would want to be both the one and the other; but because it is difficult to put them together, it is much safer to be feared than loved, if one has to lack one of the two. For one can say this generally of men; that they are ungrateful, fickle, pretenders and dissemblers, evaders of danger, eager for gain. While you do them good, they are yours, offering you their blood, property, lives and children, as I said above, when the need for them is far away; but, when it is close to you, they revolt. And that prince who has founded himself entirely on their words, stripped of other preparation, is ruined; for friendships that are acquired at a price and not with greatness and nobility of spirit are bought, but they are not

第十七章 论残酷与仁慈，被人爱是否强似令人恐惧

前边还谈到过一些别的品质，现在我再花些笔墨加以论述。应该说，每一位君主都渴望做一名仁君而非暴君。但是，这种仁慈可要当心，别用错了地方。切萨雷·博尔贾被认为是暴君，但正是他的残暴才使罗马格纳失而复得，归于统一，令那个地方安享太平，把彼处变成了信义之邦。假如我们仔细想想就会发现，他比那些佛罗伦萨人仁慈得多了，因为那些人为了逃避残酷之嫌，竟能任由皮斯托亚遭到摧毁。因而，作为君主，如果能让臣民们团结一致、保持忠诚，就不应该斤斤计较是否落下了残酷的名声。因为除少数情况之外，与那些由于过度仁慈而坐视社会动荡的君主相比较，他的举措反而要仁义得多。社会的混乱会导致杀人放火或打家劫舍的现象发生。这些现象危及的通常是整个国家，而君主执行刑罚危及的仅是某一个人。在所有的君主中，唯有新上台的君主是不可能脱掉残酷之名的，因为新的国家里危机四伏。维吉尔曾借迪多之口说道：“王国草创，形势严峻，我不得不殚精竭虑、严厉果断，还得处处留意边境的安危。”

然而，作为君主也不该轻信于人，草率地采取行动，或者着意地引起别人对自己的恐惧。他应该以一种温和的方式循序渐进，谨言慎行，行仁义之政。过于自信会导致鲁莽，过多的敌对情绪则会叫他变得难以容人。

由此引发了一种争论：是受人爱戴好呢，还是被人害怕好？谁都想兼而得之，既让人爱又让人怕，但鱼和熊掌是很难兼得的。假如，必须把这两点当中的一个舍弃，那还是选择让人害怕比受人爱戴安全些。我们可以笼统地做一评价：世人皆忘恩负义、见异思迁，一个个都是装模作样的伪君子，避害趋利惟恐不及。你给他们点儿好处，他们就听命于你。我前边讲过，当你根本不需要他们的时候，他们向你提出要为你抛头颅、洒热血，献出自己的财产和子女，可一旦到了危急关头，他们就会背叛你。作为君主，一味地相信他们的话，荒于备战，到头来会亡国亡身。花钱买来的情谊缺乏伟大、崇高的精神作基础，是靠不住的，一到关键的时候就会失去作用。人们宁肯得罪一个受爱戴的人，也不愿冒犯自己害怕的人。因为爱是由恩惠



owned and when the time comes they cannot be spent. And men have less hesitation to offend one who makes himself loved than one who makes himself feared; for love is held by a chain of obligation, which, because men are wicked, is broken at every opportunity for their own utility, but fear is held by a dread of punishment that never forsakes you.

The prince should nonetheless make himself feared in such a mode that if he does not acquire love, he escapes hatred, because being feared and not being hated can go together very well. This he will always do if he abstains from the property of his citizens and his subjects, and from their women; and if he also needs to proceed against someone's life, he must do it when there is suitable justification and manifest cause for it. But above all, he must abstain from the property of others, because men forget the death of a father more quickly than the loss of a patrimony. Furthermore, causes for taking away property are never lacking, and he who begins to live by rapine always finds cause to seize others' property; and, on the contrary, causes for taking life are rarer and disappear more quickly.

But when the prince is with his armies and has a multitude of soldiers under his control, then it is above all necessary not to care about a name for cruelty, because without this name he never holds his army united, or disposed to any feat. Among the admirable actions of Hannibal is numbered this one; that when he had a very large army, mixed with infinite kinds of men, and had led it to fight in alien lands, no dissension ever arose in it, neither among themselves nor against the prince, in bad as well as in his good fortune. This could not have arisen from anything other than his inhuman cruelty which, together with his infinite virtues, always made him venerable and terrible in the sight of his soldiers; and without it, his other virtues would not have sufficed to bring about this effect. And the writers, having considered little in this, on the one hand admire this action of his but on the other condemn the principal cause of it.

And to see that it is true that his other virtues would not have been enough, one can consider Scipio, who was very rare not only in his times but also in the entire memory of things known – whose armies in Spain rebelled against him. This arose from nothing but his excessive mercy, which had allowed his soldiers more license than is fitting for military discipline. Scipio's mercy was reprov'd in the Senate by Fabius Maximus, who called him the corruptor of the Roman military. After the Locrians had been destroyed by an officer of Scipio's, they were not avenged by him, nor was the insolence of that officer corrected – all of which arose from his agreeable nature, so that when someone in the Senate wanted to excuse him, he said that there were many men who knew better how not to err than how to correct errors.

这个链条所维系的，而世人生性奸险，一遇到有利可图的机会就会扯断这根链条；恐惧的心理则是由始至终伴随着我们的对惩罚的畏惧所维系的。

不过，君主在让人感到害怕的时候应注意方式——如果得不到爱戴，起码要避免让人痛恨。让人畏惧以及不招人怨恨，这二者是可以很好地并存的。只要不侵犯自己的人民及大臣的财产，不垂涎于他们的女人，这一点是可以办得到的。如果有必要剥夺某人的生命时，必须要有正当的说法和光明正大的理由。而其中最为重要的是，绝不能侵吞他人的财产，因为亡父之痛很快便可以忘掉，但遗产的丧失却叫人耿耿于怀。再说，侵占别人的财产是从来都不缺乏理由的，以劫掠为生的人总是能找到借口把他人的钱财据为己有。相反，剥夺别人生命的机会却很少，而且转瞬即逝。

当君主统率全军，麾下将士如云时，最为当紧的是不要顾忌是否会落下残酷的骂名。不担这种名声，就无法使全军团结一致，难以令将士用命。汉尼拔创造了令人钦羡不已的业绩，其中之一即：他率领着一支由形形色色的兵源组成的庞大军队赴异国他乡作战时，无论战局的好坏，军队中从未出现过内讧的现象，也无人站出来跟他作对。其原因并非别的，而是由于他惨无人道，同时又具有非凡的能力，使他在士卒们的眼里成了一个令人又敬又畏的君主。而如果不采用残酷的手段，他就是再有才能也无法产生这样的影响。史学家们却很少考虑这一点，他们一方面敬佩他的业绩，另一方面又对他取得辉煌成就的主要原因横加指责。

要说汉尼拔仅靠能力不足以成就功业，我们不妨看看西庇阿的情况。西庇阿不仅在他们那个时代，就算在整个历史中也是个罕见的伟人，但他的军队在西班牙却背叛了他。究其原因，全都是因为他过于仁慈的缘故，结果士卒们不守军纪，干出了无法无天的事情。在元老院，仁慈的西庇阿遭到了法比奥·马克西姆的指责，说他腐蚀了罗马军队。西庇阿的一位军官曾经滥杀了很多无辜的洛克伦斯人，而他却没有为洛克伦斯人报仇雪恨，没有纠正那位军官的放肆行为，这些全都是由于他那温和的本性所致。在元老院，有人想为他辩解，说天下有许许多多的人比较了解的是如何避开错误，而非如何纠正错误。西庇阿在罗马帝国如果继续他的统治，他的



Such a nature would in time have sullied Scipio's fame and glory if he had continued with it in the empire; but while he lived under the government of the Senate, this damaging quality of his not only was hidden, but made for his glory.

I conclude, then, returning to being feared and loved, that since men love at their convenience and fear at the convenience of the prince, a wise prince should found himself on what is his, not on what is someone else's; he should only contrive to avoid hatred, as was said.

仁慈迟早都会给他的名声和荣誉带来污点。可是，元老院一手遮天，不仅掩盖住了他的这种给帝国造成损失的性格，还使他荣誉加身。

我们现在回到被人畏惧和爱戴的话题上。我的结论是：人们爱戴君主是出于他们自己的意愿，畏惧君主则是出于对方的意愿。英明的君主应该把统治建立在自己的意愿上，而不以其他人的意愿为转移；只不过，他还应该像前边说的那样避免招人怨恨。



Book 18 In What Mode Faith Should Be Kept by Princes

How laudable it is for a prince to keep his faith, and to live with honesty and not by astuteness, everyone understands. Nonetheless one sees by experience in our times that the princes who have done great things are those who have taken little account of faith and have known how to get around men's brains with their astuteness; and in the end they have overcome those who have founded themselves on loyalty.

Thus, you must know that there are two kinds of combat; one with laws, the other with force. The first is proper to man, the second to beasts; but because the first is often not enough, one must have recourse to the second. Therefore it is necessary for a prince to know well how to use the beast and the man. This role was taught covertly to princes by ancient writers, who wrote that Achilles, and many other ancient princes, were given to Chiron the centaur to be raised, so that he would look after them with his discipline. To have as teacher a half-beast, half-man means nothing other than that a prince needs to know how to use both natures; and the one without the other is not lasting.

Thus, since a prince is compelled of necessity to know well how to use the beast, he should pick the fox and the lion, because the lion does not defend itself from snares and the fox does not defend itself from wolves. So one needs to be a fox to recognize snares and a lion to frighten the wolves. Those who stay simply with the lion do not understand this. A prudent lord, therefore, cannot observe faith, nor should he, when such observance turns against him, and the causes that made him promise have been eliminated. And if all men were good, this teaching would not be good; but because they are wicked and do not observe faith with you, you also do not have to observe it with them. Nor does a prince ever lack legitimate causes to color his failure to observe faith. One could give infinite modern examples of this, and show how many peace treaties and promises have been rendered invalid and vain through the infidelity of princes; and the one who has known best how to use the fox has come out best. But it is necessary to know well how to color this nature, and to be a great pretender and dissembler; and men are so simple and so obedient to present necessities that he who deceives will

第十八章 君主该如何守信

人人都知道，如果一位君主能言而有信，靠诚实而非诈术实行统治，那该是多么好的一件事啊。可是，根据我们这个时代所经历的事件看，干出伟大事业的君主对信义都颇不以为然，而是精通于诈术，对世人瞒天过海，最终战胜了以忠诚的原则为统治基础的君主。

你必须清楚，世间有两种类型的搏斗，一种搏斗靠的是法律，还有一种靠的是力量。第一种适合于人类，第二种适合于野兽。但由于仅靠第一种类型往往是不够的，所以人们必须选择第二种类型的搏斗。因而，君主必须精通野兽的搏斗方法以及人类的处世原则。古代的作家们已经在向君主们传授如何充当这种角色了。在他们的笔下，阿基里斯以及许多其他的古代君主被交给半人半马的怪物基罗尼培养，由基罗尼用自己的一套规矩对他们施教。君主拜一个半人半兽的怪物为师，就意味着他应该知道怎样运用人性和兽性，二者缺一不可。

作为君主，既然必须清楚地知道如何运用兽性，那他应该同时效仿狐狸和狮子，因为狮子容易掉入陷阱，难以自保其身，而狐狸却抵御不了恶狼的进攻。掌握了狐狸的本事，就能辨出陷阱，雄狮则可以吓跑恶狼。仅仅效仿狮子的君主不明白其中的道理。一位审时度势的君主在忠信对自己有害时，或原来许诺时所根据的条件不复存在的情况下，就不能够，也不应该盲目地守信了。如果天下皆君子，这种劝诫就不是忠言了，但世人奸诈，不会对你守信用，所以你也不必充当君子。君主们在掩饰自己背信弃义的行径时从不缺乏冠冕堂皇的理由。对于这一点，现在有许多实例，简直不胜枚举，从中都显示出种种和平协议及承诺都会因为君主的背信弃义而化为一纸空文。熟谙狐狸本性并能善加利用的人最后会大获全胜。不过，他们很有诀窍，必要掌握给狡猾的天性披上伪装，要善于行骗术，当一个出色的伪君子。人



always find someone who will let himself be deceived.

I do not want to be silent about one of the recent examples. Alexander VI never did anything, nor ever thought of anything, but how to deceive men, and he always found a subject to whom he could do it. And there never was a man with greater efficacy in asserting a thing, and in affirming it with greater oaths, who observed it less; nonetheless, his deceits succeeded at his will, because he well knew this aspect of the world.

Thus, it is not necessary for a prince to have all the above-mentioned qualities in fact, but it is indeed necessary to appear to have them. Nay, I dare say this, that by having them and always observing them, they are harmful; and by appearing to have them, they are useful, as it is to appear merciful, faithful, humane, honest, and religious, and to be so; but to remain with a spirit built so that, if you need not to be those things, you are able and know how to change to the contrary. This has to be understood: that a prince, and especially a new prince, cannot observe all those things for which men are held good, since he is often under a necessity, to maintain his state, of acting against faith, against charity, against humanity, against religion. And so he needs to have a spirit disposed to change as the winds of fortune and variations of things command him, and as said above, not depart from good, when possible, but know how to enter into evil, when forced by necessity.

A prince should thus take great care that nothing escape his mouth that is not full of the above-mentioned five qualities and that, to see him and hear him, he should appear all mercy, all faith, all honesty, all humanity, all religion. And nothing is more necessary to appear to have than this last quality. Men in general judge more by their eyes than by their hands, because seeing is given to everyone, touching to few. Everyone sees how you appear, few touch what you are; and these few dare not oppose the opinion of many, who have the majesty of the state to defend them; and in the actions of all men, and especially of princes, where there is no court to appeal to, one looks to the end. So let a prince win and maintain his state; the means will always be judged honorable, and will be praised by everyone. For the vulgar are taken in by the appearance and the outcome of a thing, and in the world there is no one but the vulgar; the few have a place there when the many have somewhere to lean on. A certain prince of present times, whom it is not well to name, never preaches anything but peace and faith, and is very hostile to both. If he had observed both, he would have had either his reputation or his state taken from him many times.

们头脑简单，总是为眼前的利益所迷惑，所以骗子总能得手，找到愿意上钩的人。

最近就有一个例子，对此我不想保持沉默。亚历山大六世除了行骗，什么也不做，心里什么也不想。他行骗时，总是能找到对象以施展自己的才能。天下没有谁比他更善于玩伎俩了，许诺时信誓旦旦，事后却言而无信。他随心所欲，屡屡得逞，是因为他对世人的心态了如指掌。

事实上，对于以上提及的素质，作为一名君主并不一定必须样样都具备，不过表面上倒的确很有必要显得有德行些。我敢说，拥有种种的美德，并时时弘扬美德，反而是有害的，而表面上做出有美德的样子，显得仁慈、诚挚、人道、敦厚和虔诚，则是很有益处的。在思想上，你应该有所准备，一旦不需要做正人君子时，就可以顺应潮流，向相反的方向转变。我们必须明白一点：作为君主，尤其是新登位的君主，是不可能把世人所认为的美德都集于一身的，因为他为了保全国家的利益，常常需要干些不诚挚、不仁慈、不人道、不虔诚的事情。所以，一位君主应该持应变之心，观潮流、察风向，如我以上所言，在不偏离正道的情况下审时度势，倘若有必要，要懂得如何使用邪恶的手段。

作为一名君主应该特别当心，一定要谨言慎行，不符合以上五种美德的话不说，让别人看到的你以及听到的你一定要显得仁慈、诚挚、敦厚、人道及虔诚。最有必要做到的是一定要在表面上拥有最后的那一条美德。世人通常用眼睛观察你，而非用手触摸你，因为人人都可以看到你，但能摸到你的却寥若晨星。每个人都能够看到你表面的样子，几乎无人可以触摸到你的本质。了解你的少数人是不敢跟多数人唱对台戏的，因为国家的权力会为多数人提供保护。人们的行为，尤其是君主的所作所为，有时没有法庭为之判断黑白，世人的眼睛就是砝码。所以，一个君主掌握了国家政权并加以巩固，他所采用的手段总会被认为是光荣体面的，会为世人所称颂。因为庸人会被假象以及事情的结局蒙住眼睛，而这个世界上除过庸人还是庸人。大多数人只要众口一词，少数人也就随大流了。现代有一位君主（此处不便提及其尊姓大名），他张口闭口说的都是和平及诚信，其实心底却仇视这两条准则。假如他遵守了这两条准则，他的威信以及国家政权就恐怕会多次丧失于他人之手。



Book 19 Of Avoiding Contempt and Hatred

But because I have spoken of the most important of the qualities mentioned above, I want to discourse on the others briefly under this generality, that the prince, as was said above in part, should think how to avoid those things that make him hateful and contemptible. When he avoids them, he will have done his part and will find no danger in his other infamies. What makes him hated above all, as I said, is to be rapacious and a usurper of the property and the women of his subjects. From these he must abstain, and whenever one does not take away either property or honor from the generality of men, they live content and one has only to contend with the ambition of the few which may be checked in many modes and with ease. What makes him contemptible is to be held variable, light, effeminate, pusillanimous, irresolute, from which a prince should guard himself as from a shoal. He should contrive that greatness, spiritedness, gravity, and strength are recognized in his actions, and he should insist that his judgments in the private concerns of his subjects be irrevocable. And he should maintain such an opinion of himself that no one thinks either of deceiving him or of getting around him.

The prince who gives this opinion of himself is highly reputed, and against whoever is reputed it is difficult to conspire, difficult to mount an attack, provided it is understood that he is excellent and revered by his own subjects. For a prince should have two fears; one within, on account of his subjects; the other outside, on account of external powers. From the latter one is defended with good arms and good friends; and if one has good arms, one will always have good friends. And things inside will always remain steady, if things outside are steady, unless indeed they are disturbed by a conspiracy; and even if things outside are in motion, provided he has ordered and lived as I said, as long as he does not forsake himself he will always withstand every thrust, as I said Nabis the Spartan did. But, as to subjects, when things outside are not moving, one has to fear that they may be conspiring secretly. From this the prince may secure himself sufficiently if he avoids being hated or despised and keeps the people satisfied with him; this is necessary to achieve, as was said a-

第十九章 如何避免遭人蔑视和仇恨

上文提到的一些素质，都是一些极为重要的素质，而现在我想就同一话题再简单谈些别的情况。以上也有过片言只语的论述，讲到过君主应该懂得做人的技巧，避免做出让人仇视和瞧不起的事情来。能这般洁身自好，他就算达到了目的，即便干出些不明不白的东西也不会惹火烧身。我前边讲过，如果一位君主贪婪成性，霸占臣民的田产和妻女，那才是最让人痛恨的。他必须对这些恶行如避水火。只要不欺男霸女，不践踏老百姓的荣誉，让他们安居乐业，君主便可高枕无忧，只需对付野心勃勃的少数几个人就行了。对付那些人，他可以采用多种办法，而且不费吹灰之力。一个朝令夕改、轻言寡信、软弱无能、左右摇摆、优柔寡断的君主会遭到人们的蔑视，所以他必须远离这些缺点，像躲避暗礁一样。他应该竭尽全力在行动中表现出伟大、勇敢、沉着和坚强的气质；他应该有主见，在处理臣民们的事务时，让人觉得他的裁断是不可更改的。他应该让别人对他有这样一种看法：谁都别想要弄他或对他玩欺骗的把戏。

一位君主赢得了世人的这种看法，就会备受尊敬，而阴谋推翻这样的君主是很困难的。如果大家都认为他是出类拔萃的，为自己的臣民所敬重，就难以对他发动攻击。作为君主，应该有两方面的忧患：一是内部的，来自于本国的臣民；二是外部的，来自于国外的势力。对于后者，要靠坚甲利兵以及可靠的友人加以抵御；如果手中掌握了坚甲利兵，就绝对会争取到可靠的友人。除非有人阴谋篡权，打破宁静的局面；否则，只要外部风平浪静，内部就会国泰民安。即便国外兵革骤起，君主只要像我所说的那样安身立命，不放任自己，照样能顶得住一切进攻，正如前文提到过的斯巴达的纳比斯一样。就是在没有外患的情况下，君主也应对国内的臣民们多长双眼睛，小心他们暗中蠢蠢欲动。只要不让自己遭受仇视或轻蔑，让人民对他感到满意，君主就可以安如泰山了。君主必须尽力做到这一点，该理论前边已



bove at length. And one of the most powerful remedies that a prince has against conspiracies is not to be hated by the people generally. For whoever conspires always believes he will satisfy the people with the death of the prince, but when he believes he will offend them, he does not get up the spirit to adopt such a course, because the difficulties on the side of the conspirators are infinite. And one sees from experience that there have been many conspiracies, but few have had a good end. For whoever conspires cannot be alone, but he cannot find company except from those he believes to be malcontents; and as soon as you disclose your intent to a malcontent, you give him the matter with which to become content, because manifestly he can hope for every advantage from it. So, seeing sure gain on this side, and on the other, dubious gain full of danger, he must indeed either be a rare friend, or an altogether obstinate enemy of the prince to keep his faith with you. And to reduce this to brief terms, I say that on the part of the conspirator there is nothing but fear, jealousy, and the terrifying anticipation of punishment; but on the part of the prince there is the majesty of the principality, the laws, the protection of friends and of the state which defend him, so that when popular good will is added to all these things, it is impossible that anyone should be so rash as to conspire. For whereas a conspirator ordinarily has to fear before the execution of the evil, in this case (having the people as enemies) he must fear afterwards too, when the excess has occurred, nor can he hope for any refuge.

One might give infinite examples of this matter, but I wish to be content with only one that happened within the memory of our fathers. Messer Annibale Bentivoglio, grandfather of the present Messer Annibale, who was prince in Bologna, was killed by the Canneschi conspiring against him, and no one survived him but Messer Giovanni, who was in swaddling clothes. Immediately after that homicide the people rose up and killed all the Canneschi. This came from the popular good will the house of Bentivoglio had in those times, which was so great that since there remained no one of that house in Bologna who could rule the state, Annibale being dead, and since there was indication that in Florence someone had been born of the Bentivoglio who was considered until then the son of a blacksmith, the Bolognese came to Florence for him and gave him the government of their city, which was governed by him until Messer Giovanni reached an age suitable for governing.

I conclude, therefore, that a prince should take little account of conspiracies if the people show good will to him; but if they are hostile and bear hatred for him, he should fear everything and everyone. And well-ordered states and wise Princes have thought out with all diligence how not to make the great desperate and how to satisfy the people and

有详尽的交待。对付图谋不轨的人，君主最有效的办法就是不要激起民众的公愤。因为凡是要阴谋诡计的人都认为君主的死亡会让民心大快。可是，阴谋者觉得自己的行动会惹怒民众时，就不敢轻举妄动了，因为他们的行动会遇到重重艰难险阻。从经验中我们可以看得到，阴谋篡权者大有人在，但结局好的寥寥无几。因为这类阴谋家不可能单枪匹马地干；可是他又找不到同伙，除非去找他认为心怀不满的人。他只要一对这样的人讲出他的意图，就等于对他们说出了承诺，让他们感到满意。他们这下就有了盼头，指望能得到这样那样的好处。一方面的利益是稳固的，另一方面的利益则是缥缈的，而且危机四伏，心怀不满的人看得很清楚；除非他们是刎颈之交，或者和君主是不共戴天的敌人，否则他们不会和阴谋者订立攻守同盟。这一道理可以归纳为简单的几句话：凡是阴谋篡权的人，心里都充斥着恐惧、妒忌，他们惶惶不可终日，唯恐受到惩罚；君主却掌握着君主国的权力、法律，并且受到朋友们以及国人的保护。一旦知道君主民心所向，阴谋者们就不可能鲁莽行事，去搞阴谋诡计了。通常，阴谋者在未实施计划之前倒是前怕狼后怕虎的，而这时与人民为敌，事后也得提心吊胆了。到了越过雷池的时候，就不能指望会有什么避难所了。

对于这种情况，可以举出数不清的例子。不过我觉得举一个例子就够了，那是一件我们的父辈记忆犹新的事情。当今的梅塞尔·安尼巴莱的祖父叫梅塞尔·安尼巴莱·本蒂沃利，曾经是波洛格纳的君主，被阴谋推翻他的坎尼斯基家族所杀害。在这个遇害的家族中，除年幼的梅塞尔·乔万尼之外，无一人幸免于难。大屠杀发生之后，人民立刻起来造反，灭掉了坎尼斯基家族。这是因为本蒂沃利一家人在当地深得民心。可安尼巴莱一死，这家人中再没有能够统治波洛格纳的君主了。后来听说佛罗伦萨有本蒂沃利家的骨血，可一直被人们视为一个铁匠的儿子，于是波洛格纳人便前往佛罗伦萨迎接他，把他们城邦国家的统治权交给他。自此，这个人便登上了君主的宝座，直至梅塞尔·乔万尼到了能够治理国家的年龄。

我的结论是：一位君主如果深得民心，受到人民的爱戴，就不必害怕别人搞阴谋诡计，但如果遭到人民的敌视和仇恨，那他就要处处小心，提防所有的人了。秩序井然的国家以及英明的君主都殚精竭虑，想尽办法要避免迫使贵族铤而走险，同

keep them content, because this is one of the most important matters that concern a prince.

Among the well-ordered and governed kingdoms in our times is that of France; and in it are infinite good institutions on which the liberty and security of the king depend. The first of these is the parliament and its authority. For the one who ordered that kingdom, knowing the ambition of the powerful and their insolence, and judging it necessary for them to have a bit in their mouths to correct them, and on the other side, knowing the hatred of the generality of people against the great, which is founded in its fear, and wanting to secure them, intended this not to be the particular concern of the king, so as to take from him the blame he would have from the great when he favored the popular side, and from the popular side when he favored the great; and so he constituted a third judge to be the one who would beat down the great and favor the lesser side without blame for the king. This order could not be better, or more prudent, or a greater cause of the security of the king and the kingdom. From this one can infer another notable thing: that princes should have anything blameable administered by others, favors by themselves. Again I conclude that a prince should esteem the great, but not make himself hated by the people.

It might perhaps appear to many, considering the life and death of some Roman emperor, that there were examples contrary to my opinion, since one may find someone who has always lived excellently, and shown great virtue of spirit, and has nonetheless lost the empire or indeed been killed by his own subjects who conspired against him. Since I want, therefore, to respond to these objections, I shall discuss the qualities of certain emperors, showing the causes of their ruin to be not unlike that which I have advanced; and in part I shall offer for consideration things that are notable for whoever reads about the actions of those times. And I want it to suffice for me to take all the emperors who succeeded to the empire, from Marcus the philosopher to Maximinus; these were Marcus, Commodus his son, Pertinax, Julianus, Severus, his son Antoninus Caracalla, Macrinus, Heliogabalus, Alexander, and Maximinus. And first it is to be noted that whereas in other principalities one has to contend only with the ambition of the great and the insolence of the people, the Roman emperors had a third difficulty, of having to bear with the cruelty and avarice of their soldiers. This was so difficult that it was the cause of the ruin of many, since it was difficult to satisfy the soldiers and the people. For the people loved quiet, and therefore loved modest princes, and the soldiers loved a prince with a military spirit who was insolent, cruel, and rapacious. They wanted him to practice these things on the people so that they could double

时要满足人民的需求，让他们安居乐业，因为这对于一位君主而言才是最最重要的。

在我们这个时代，有一个管理得比较好的秩序井然的王国，那就是法国。法国有许多行之有效的典章制度，为国王提供了自由及安全。在这一大堆制度中，有一个是议会制以及议会的权威。王国的统治者深知那些王公贵族们一个个野心勃勃、桀骜不驯，认为很有必要给那些人的嘴上套上嚼子以便加以约束，而且也知道广大人民对贵族深恶痛绝，那是一种由于恐惧而产生的仇恨。国王想安抚民众，又不愿显得过于关心，既要维护大众的利益，又不想跟贵族结怨，还想在偏向贵族时又不得罪民众，于是他就设立了一个作为第三者的仲裁机构。该机构负责弹劾贵族，维护民众的利益，同时又不会给国王惹来怨恨。这种管理方式是无与伦比的、深思熟虑的，大大有利于国王以及国家的安全。从此，我们可以得出另外一种精彩的结论：君主应该把招人怨恨的事情交给他人去办，自己要做的是布施恩泽的事。我还要强调的是，君主应该尊重贵族，但不能因此惹起民怨。

研究一下罗马皇帝的生平与死亡，也许有许多人都会觉得有些实例与我的观点格格不入。他们发现有的罗马皇帝虽然立身处世超凡入圣，表现出伟大的精神和美德，但照样丧失了帝国，惨死在那些阴谋推翻他的臣民的手中。我想对这种不同的看法发表些意见，讨论讨论某些皇帝的素质，说明导致他们毁灭的原因跟我提到的并非不一样。而且，我还要讲述一些事情，供钻研那段时期史料的人考虑。我很想把罗马帝国那不断更迭的皇帝们尽收笔端，从享有哲学家美誉的马可，一直到马克西米诺。我要介绍的人有马可、他的儿子科莫多、佩尔蒂纳、尤利亚诺、塞韦罗及其儿子安托尼诺·卡拉卡拉、马克里诺、埃利奥加巴洛、亚历山大和马克西米诺。首先，应该注意的是，在别的君主国里，君主只需要对付野心勃勃的贵族以及桀骜不驯的臣民就行了，而罗马的皇帝还得面对第三种困难——他们必须容忍士兵们的残暴及贪婪行为。这种困难把许多罗马皇帝推上了绝路，因为既要让士兵们满意，同时又要让人民满意，是很难做得到的。人民喜欢安居乐业，因而他们拥戴的是谦和的君主，而士兵们喜欢具有武士道精神的君主，喜欢野蛮、残忍和掠夺性强的君主。士兵们希望君主对人民横征暴敛，这样他们便可以拿到双倍的军饷，让自己的贪婪和残暴得逞。凭着自己的天性或者能力无法驾驭士兵和人民的君主，便不会具



their pay and give vent to their avarice and cruelty. These things always brought about the ruin of those emperors who by nature or by art did not have a great reputation such that they could hold both in check. And most of them, especially those who came to the principate as new men, once they recognized the difficulty of these two diverse humors, turned to satisfying the soldiers, caring little about injuring the people. This course was necessary; for since princes cannot fail to be hated by someone, they are at first forced not to be hated by the people generally; and when they cannot continue this, they have to contrive with all industry to avoid the hatred of those communities which are most powerful. And so those emperors who because they were new had need of extraordinary support stuck to the soldiers rather than the people, which nonetheless turned out useful for them or not according to whether that prince knew how to keep himself in repute with them. From the causes mentioned above, Marcus, Pertinax, and Alexander, all living a modest life, lovers of justice, enemies of cruelty, humane and kind, all, except for Marcus, came to a bad end. Only Marcus lived and died most honorably, because he succeeded to the empire by hereditary right and did not have to acknowledge it as from either the soldiers or the people; then, since he was attended with many virtues that made him venerable, while he lived he always kept the one order and the other within its bounds, and was never either hated or despised. But Pertinax was created emperor against the will of the soldiers, who, since they were used to living in license under Commodus, could not tolerate the decent life to which Pertinax wanted to return them; hence, having created hatred for himself, and to this hatred added disdain since he was old, he was ruined in the first beginnings of his administration.

And here one should note that hatred is acquired through good deeds as well as bad ones; and so, as I said above, a prince who wants to maintain his state is often forced not to be good. For when that community of which you judge you have need to maintain yourself is corrupt, whether they are the people or the soldiers or the great, you must follow their humor to satisfy them, and then good deeds are your enemy. But let us come to Alexander. He was of such goodness that among the other praise attributed to him is this: that in the fourteen years he held the empire no one was ever put to death by him without a trial. Nonetheless, since he was held to be effeminate and a man who let himself be governed by his mother, and for this came to be despised, the army conspired against him and killed him.

Reviewing now, by contrast, the qualities of Commodus, of Severus, Antoninus Caracalla, and Maximinus, you will find them very cruel and very rapacious. To satisfy the soldiers, they would not spare any kind of injury that could be inflicted on the people; and all

有很高的威望，而这些就是导致那些皇帝毁灭的原因。大多数君主，尤其是那些掌握国家政权的新君主，一旦意识到难以满足国内完全对立的两种情绪，便肆无忌惮地伤害人民的感情，只知一味地取悦于士兵们。这一步骤是很有必要的。作为君主，免不了要遭人痛恨。起初，他们出于无奈，尽量不招致民众的怨恨。可是到了万不得已的时候，他们会竭尽全力、千方百计地避免跟那些最强大的势力结仇。刚刚承继大统的新皇帝们需要别人给予全力的支持，于是便向士兵们靠拢，而不是依赖民众。这种作法是否会产生效用，要取决于君主是否知道如何在士兵们中间赢得威望。出于以上提及的原因，马可、佩尔蒂纳和亚历山大虽然全部是谦谦君子，拥戴正义、仇恨暴行，都奉行人道主义，都有一副菩萨心肠，可他们当中除马可之外，均落了个悲惨的结局。只有马可生活得体面，死得也光荣，因为他是靠世袭的权力继承皇位的，不需要得到士兵们或者民众的认可。他身上有许多美德，所以很受人尊敬。在他的有生之年，他令士兵们循规蹈矩，使人民安居乐业，没有人仇恨他和蔑视他。然而，佩尔蒂诺执掌皇权是违背士兵们的意愿的。那些将士们在科莫多统领下过惯了放荡的生活，现在佩尔蒂纳却想让他们过规矩的日子，这就叫他们无法忍受了。于是，佩尔蒂纳为军人所仇恨，由于年事已高，又被人瞧不起，所以刚刚执政就遭到了灭顶之灾。

至此，我们应该注意到了，无论是积德行善还是作恶多端都会引起别人的仇视。前边讲过，君主如果想保住国家的政权，常常被迫要行不义之事。为了保住自己的地位，你需要一些人的帮助，可是他们一旦堕落，不管他们是民众、士兵还是贵族，你都得投其所好奉迎他们，于是这便与正义的行为背道而驰了。下边还是一起看看亚历山大的情况吧。他是个品德高尚的人，口碑载道，其中有一条颂扬之词是说：他在统治帝国的十四年间，从未未经审判便草菅人命。可是，人们却认为他过于懦弱，受他母亲的操纵。就是因为这个缘故，他被人看不起，后来军队起来造反，结果了他的性命。

相反，我们回忆一下科莫尔、塞韦罗、安托尼诺·卡拉卡拉以及马克西米诺的性格，就会发现他们一个个狼如豺狼，而且贪得无厌。只要让士兵们满意，至于对人民造成多大的伤害他们都在所不惜。这些人除过塞韦罗之外，都没有遇到好下场。



except Severus came to a bad end. For in Severus was so much virtue that, by keeping the soldiers his friends, although the people were overburdened by him, he was always able to rule prosperously because his virtues made him so admirable in the sight of the soldiers and the people that the latter remained somehow astonished and stupefied, while the former were reverent and satisfied.

And because the actions of this man were great and notable in a new prince, I want to show briefly how well he knew how to use the persons of the fox and the lion, whose natures I say above are necessary for a prince to imitate. Since Severus knew of the indolence of Emperor Julianus, he persuaded his army, of which he was captain in Slavonia, that it would be good to go to Rome and avenge the death of Pertinax, who had been put to death by the praetorian soldiers. Under this pretext, without showing that he aspired to the empire, he moved his army against Rome; and he was in Italy before his departure was known. When he arrived at Rome, he was elected emperor by the Senate out of fear and Julianus was put to death. After this beginning there remained two difficulties for Severus if he wanted to become lord of the whole state: one in Asia, where Pescennius Niger, the head of the Asian armies, had had himself called emperor; and the other in the West, where Albius also aspired to the empire. And because he judged it dangerous to disclose himself as an enemy to both, he determined to attack Niger and deceive Albinus. To Albinus he wrote that since he had been elected emperor by the Senate he wanted to share that dignity with him; he sent him the title of Caesar, and by decision of the Senate accepted him as colleague. These things were accepted by Albinus as true. But after Severus had defeated Niger, put him to death, and brought peace to affairs in the East, he returned to Rome and complained in the Senate that Albinus, hardly grateful for the benefits he had received from him, had perfidiously sought to kill him, and for this it was necessary for Severus to go to punish his ingratitude. Then he went to meet him in France, and took from him his state and his life.

Thus, whoever examines minutely the actions of this man will find him a very fierce lion and a very astute fox, will see that he was feared and revered by everyone, and not hated by the army, and will not marvel that he, a new man, could have held so much power. For his very great reputation always defended him from the hatred that the people could have conceived for him because of his robberies. But his son Antoninus [Caracalla] was himself a man who had most excellent parts that made him marvelous in the sight of the people and pleasing to the soldiers. For he was a military man, very capable of enduring every trouble,

塞韦罗非常有手腕，和士兵们保持着友好的关系，虽然对人民横征暴敛，也照样能使他的统治一帆风顺。他有本事，所以在军队和人民的眼里他是可敬的。人民对他充满敬畏，而士兵们对他则恭顺而满意。

此人作为一个新登位的君主，创立了伟大和辉煌的业绩。我在此想简单地介绍一下他是怎样精通狐狸的狡猾以及狮子的凶残的。我前边说过，这两种特性对一位君主而言是很有必要模仿的。塞韦罗深知尤利亚诺皇帝是个昏君，于是便对自己所统领的斯基亚沃尼亚驻军摇唇鼓舌，声称应该进军罗马，为被罗马禁卫军处死的佩尔蒂纳报仇雪耻。他对自己觊觎皇位的意图深藏不露，在这种借口之下挥师罗马，神不知鬼不觉便来到了意大利。他抵达罗马后，被心惊胆寒的元老院推举为皇帝，随即将尤利亚诺送上了黄泉之路。在此之后，塞韦罗要想主宰整个帝国，剩下来要解决的还有两个困难：一个困难在亚洲，统领着亚洲军团的波西尼斯·尼格已经在那儿称帝；还有一个困难是在西方，那儿的阿尔比诺正虎视眈眈地觊觎着皇帝的宝座。塞韦罗认为四面树敌是很危险的，于是便决定先稳住阿尔比诺，对尼格实施攻击。他给阿尔比诺写了封信，说他被元老院推举为皇帝，但他愿意跟阿尔比诺共享这一殊荣。他送给阿尔比诺皇帝的称号，并通过元老院做出决定接受阿尔比诺和他并肩为帝。阿尔比诺对这些信以为真。可是，当塞韦罗击败并处死了尼格，使东方的事态平息之后，便立即返回罗马，向元老院提出申诉，说阿尔比诺忘恩负义，对他不是知恩图报，而是行奸计想谋害他，所以元老院应该惩罚这种不忠不义的行为。随后，他赶到法国去，夺走了阿尔比诺的王权，并结束了他的性命。

只要详细研究一下塞韦罗的所作所为，我们就会发现他是一只非常凶猛的雄狮，同时又是一只极为狡猾的狐狸；我们发现民众对他又敬又畏，而军队对他也无仇视之心。这样，他作为一个登基不久的皇帝便可以拥有如此之大的权力，便不足为奇了。他巧取豪夺，原来应该引起公愤，但正是因为他威名赫赫，才屡屡令他化险为夷。他的儿子安托尼诺（卡拉卡拉）也不是等闲之辈，在人民的眼里是个出类拔萃的人物，深得士卒们的喜爱。安托尼诺是个尚武之人，能够忍受一切艰难困苦，蔑



disdainful of all delicate food and of all other softness, which made him loved by all the armies. Nonetheless, his ferocity and cruelty were so great and so unheard of – for after infinite individual killings he had put to death a great part of the people of Rome and all the people of Alexandria – that he became most hateful to all the world. He began to be feared even by those whom he had around him, so that he was killed by a centurion in the midst of his army. Here it is to be noted that deaths such as these, which follow from the decision of an obstinate spirit, cannot be avoided by princes because anyone who does not care about death can harm him; but the prince may well fear them less because they are very rare. He should only guard against doing grave injury to anyone of those whom he uses and has around him in the service of his principality, as Antonius had done. He had put to death with disgrace a brother of that centurion, and threatened him every day; yet he kept him in his body-guard, which was a rash policy likely to bring ruin, as happened to him.

But let us come to Commodus, who held the empire with great ease because he had it by hereditary right, being the son of Marcus. It was enough for him only to follow in the footsteps of his father, and he would have satisfied both the soldiers and the people. But since he had a cruel and bestial spirit, so as to practice his rapacity on the people he turned to indulging the armies and making them licentious. On the other hand, by not keeping his dignity, by descending often into theaters to fight with gladiators, and by doing other very vile things hardly deserving of the imperial majesty, he became contemptible in the sight of the soldiers. And since he was hated on one side and despised on the other, he was conspired against and put to death.

It remains now to tell of the qualities of Maximinus. He was a very warlike man; and since the armies were disgusted with the softness of Alexander, whom I discussed above, when he was put to death they elected Maximinus to the empire. He did not possess it for long because two things made him hated and contemptible: one was being of very base origin because he had formerly herded sheep in Thrace (which was very well known everywhere and caused great disdain for him in the sight of everyone); the other was that because at the start of his principality he had deferred going to Rome and taking possession of the imperial throne, he had established an opinion of himself as very cruel, since he had committed many cruelties through his prefects in Rome and everywhere in the empire. So, since the whole world was excited by indignation at the baseness of his blood and by hatred arising from fear of his ferocity, Africa rebelled first, then the Senate with all the people of Rome; and all Italy conspired against him. These were joined by his own army, which, while besieging Aquileia

视珍馐美味以及声色犬马的生活，这一点赢得了全体将士的爱戴。可是，他的凶狠及残暴令人发指、前所未闻——他杀人如麻，把罗马的许多居民以及亚历山大里亚的人不分良贱全都送上了不归之路，于是便成了全世界民愤最大的人。甚至连他身边的人也开始害怕他，后来在军营中他被一位“百夫长”谋害了。这儿应该注意的是，一个孤注一掷的人一旦下定了决心，就会造成这种伤亡，君主们躲也躲不过去，因为任何一个不避生死的人完全可以致君主于死地。不过，作为君主不必草木皆兵，这种情况毕竟是极为罕见的。只要留点儿心就行了，注意不要过度伤害对自己有用的人，以及周围为君主国效力的人。千万不要像安托尼诺那样。安托尼诺对那位“百夫长”的弟弟百般凌辱，并处死了他，还日日对“百夫长”进行威胁。可是，他还用“百夫长”作为贴身侍卫，结果，这一草率的行为给他酿成了杀身之祸。

现在，我们来看看科莫多的情况。他是马可的儿子，根据继承权掌握了帝国，所以没费吹灰之力便把江山坐得稳稳的。他只需沿循父亲的足迹就够了，如此便可以让士卒及民众双方都满意。可他生性残忍野蛮，为了鱼肉百姓，不惜纵容军队干无法无天的事。另一方面，他净干有失尊严的事，竟然跑进竞技场跟角斗士决一生死，还干了一些与皇帝的身份不相符的极为下流的勾当，被将士们所蔑视。一方面有人仇恨他，另一方面有人瞧不起他，结果他遭人谋害，死于非命。

现在该谈一谈马克西米诺的性格了。他是一个非常好战的人。军队对亚历山大懦弱的性格感到厌恶（我在上文已交代过），便处死他，把马克西米诺推上了皇帝的宝座。马克西米诺却没能长时间地掌握皇权，因为有两种情况使他遭受到了痛恨以及蔑视。其一，他出身卑贱，以前曾在特拉恰当过牧羊人（这一点世人皆知，让所有的人都因此而瞧不起他）；其二，执掌国政伊始，他迟迟不到罗马去登上帝王的宝座，而是由着执政官在罗马以及帝国各地犯下种种暴行，使他本人背上了暴君的千秋骂名。全世界一片哗然，为他卑贱的出身感到气愤，同时又因为害怕他的残暴而产生了仇恨的情绪。于是，非洲首先发难，接着，元老院和全体罗马人民也群情激愤，整个意大利都要置他于死地。就连他自己的军队也沸反盈天。军队在围攻阿奎莱亚时，发现难以占领该地，转而又对他的暴行感到厌恶，同时也不再害怕他了，



and finding difficulty in capturing it, became disgusted with this cruelty, and fearing him less because it saw he had so many enemies, it killed him.

I do not want to reason about either Heliogabalus or Macrinus or Julianus, who, because they were altogether contemptible, were immediately eliminated; but I shall come to the conclusion of this discourse. And I say that the princes of our times have less of this difficulty of satisfying the soldiers by extraordinary means in their governments. For notwithstanding that one has to show them some consideration, yet this is quickly settled because none of these princes has armies joined together which are entrenched in the government and administration of provinces, as were the armies of the Roman Empire. And so, if at that time it was necessary to satisfy the soldiers rather than the people, it was because the soldiers could do more than the people. Now it is necessary for all princes except the Turk and the Sultan to satisfy the people rather than the soldiers, because the people can do more than the soldiers. I except the Turk from this, since he always keeps around him twelve thousand infantry and fifteen thousand horse on whom the security and strength of his kingdom depend; and it is necessary for that lord to put off every other consideration and keep them his friends. Similarly, since the kingdom of the sultan is in the hands of the soldiers, he also is required to keep them his friends, without respect for the people. And you have to note that the sultan's state is formed unlike all other principalities because it is similar to the Christian pontificate, which cannot be called either a hereditary principality or a new principality. For it is not the sons of the old prince who are the heirs and become the lords, but the one who is elected to that rank by those who have the authority for it. And this being an ancient order, one cannot call it a new principality, because some of the difficulties in new principalities are not in it; for if the prince is indeed new, the orders of that state are old and are ordered to receive him as if he were their hereditary lord.

But let us return to our matter. I say that whoever considers the discourse written above will see that either hatred or disdain has been the cause of the ruin of the emperors named before, and will also know whence it arises that, though some of them proceeded in one mode and some in the contrary mode, in whichever mode, one of them came to a prosperous end and the others to unprosperous ends. For to Pertinax and Alexander, because they were new princes, it was useless and harmful to wish to imitate Marcus, who was in the principate by hereditary right; and similarly, for Caracalla, Commodus, and Maximinus it was a pernicious thing to imitate Severus, because they did not have as much virtue as would allow them to follow in his footsteps. Therefore, a new prince in a new principality cannot imitate the ac-

因为将士们发现他树敌太多。最后，他的军队把他送上了绝路。

关于埃利奥加巴洛、马克里诺和尤里亚诺，我在此处就不想议论了，因为他们简直太让人瞧不起，立刻就被剪除了。对于这一章节，我现在做一归纳。我认为，当代的君主由于采用非同一般的方式管理国家，所以就不难让军人们称心如意了。君主要向将士们表示关怀，很快就能立竿见影，因为他们的军队跟罗马帝国的军队不一样，和地方的行政管理部门没有那种千丝万缕的联系。如果说在罗马时期取悦军队比取悦民众更有必要，那是因为军队的作用比民众大。如今，除过土耳其皇帝和苏丹之外，所有的君主都应该让民众先感到满意，然后再考虑军队，因为民众比军队可以有更大的作为。我没有将土耳其皇帝包括在内，是因为他周围总簇拥着一万两千名步兵和一万五千名骑兵，维系着国家的安全，决定着国家的实力，统治者很有必要将所有其他的因素都搁置一旁，跟这些人保持友好的关系。苏丹的处境也是一样的，他的王国掌握在军队的手中，所以他也必须以友好的态度对待军队，而将民众置之度外。必须注意的是，苏丹的国家在结构上跟别的所有的君主国都不一样，而与天主教的教皇制类似，既不能被称为世袭君主国，也不能叫新建的君主国。在这个国家，君主的儿子是不能继承王位、统治国家的，而是由权威人士选举出君主执掌王权。这是一种古老的体制，而非新君主国的体制，所以没有新君主国所遇到的一些困难。君主的确是新选出来的，国家的制度却是旧的；由旧的典章加以规范，新君主仿佛就成了世袭的统治者。

我们还是言归正传吧。我认为，任何一个人只要考虑一下前边陈述的道理都会发现，上文提到的那些皇帝之所以遭到毁灭，不是因为被人仇视就是因为被人瞧不起。我们还会了解到这样一种情况：有些皇帝采用的是一种统治方法，有的则采用的是相反的方法，不管用的是何治国之术，他们当中只有一人遇到了好的结局，别的全部落了个悲惨的下场。至于佩尔蒂纳和亚历山大，因为他们是新君主，要想仿效靠着世袭权登上皇帝宝座的马可，非但无益，反而有害。同样的道理，让卡拉卡拉、科莫多及马克西米诺去模仿塞韦罗也是很危险的，因为他们不具备塞韦罗的实力，无法亦步亦趋地走老路。因而，新的君主国内的新君，万不可照葫芦画瓢地学



tions of Marcus, nor again is it necessary to follow those of Severus; but he should take from Severus those parts which are necessary to found his state and from Marcus those which are fitting and glorious to conserve a state that is already established and firm.

习马可，也不应按照塞韦罗的方式走路，不过却应该学习塞韦罗建立国家的经验，还应该借鉴马可的作法，以恰当和精彩的方式巩固业已建立并稳定的国家。



Book 20 Whether Fortresses and Many Other Things Which Are Made and Done by Princes Every Day are Useful or Useless

Some princes have disarmed their subjects so as to hold their states securely; some others have kept their subject towns divided; some have nourished enmities against themselves; some others have turned to gaining to themselves those who had been suspect to them at the beginning of their states; some have built fortresses; some have knocked them down and destroyed them. And although one cannot give a definite judgment on all these things unless one comes to the particulars of those states where any such decision has to be made, nonetheless I shall speak in that broad mode which the matter permits in itself.

There has never been, then, a new prince who has disarmed his subjects; on the contrary, whenever he has found them unarmed, he has always armed them. For when they are armed, those arms become yours; those whom you suspected become faithful, and those who were faithful remain so; and from subjects they are made into your partisans. And because all subjects cannot be armed, if those whom you arm are benefited, one can act with more security toward the others. The difference of treatment that they recognize regarding themselves makes them obligated to you; the others excuse you, judging it necessary that those who have more danger and more obligation deserve more. But, when you disarm them, you begin to offend them; you show that you distrust them either for cowardice or for lack of faith, both of which opinions generate hatred against you. And because you cannot remain unarmed, you must turn to a mercenary military, which is of the quality described above; and even if it were good, it cannot be so good as to defend you against powerful enemies and suspect subjects. So, as I said, a new prince of a new principality always has ordered the arms there. The histories are full of examples of this.

But when a prince acquires a new state that is added as a member to his old one, then it is necessary to disarm that state, except for those who were your partisans in acquiring it. These, too, it is necessary to render soft and effeminate, in time and with opportunity, and to be ordered so that the arms of all your state are only with your own soldiers, who live next to you in your old state.

第二十章 修建堡垒以及君主许多其他的 日常活动是否有用

有些君主为了使国家长治久安，便将臣民的刀枪收缴入库，有的对国内的城镇分而治之，有的四面树敌，有的建国伊始便将自己怀疑过的人夺取到他们的一边，有的修建堡垒，有的却拆毁堡垒。对于这种种的情况，我们无法妄下结论，除非考虑到那些国家的具体情况，才可以得出确切的结论。不过，我还是要在事实允许的情况下，泛泛地议论议论。

从来没有哪位新君主会解除臣民的武装；相反，他一旦发现国内的人民手无寸铁，总是会发给他们刀枪。人民手里有了刀枪，就成了君主的武装，骑墙派成了忠君派，忠君派则一如既往，原来的臣民就变成了君主的死党。并非所有的臣民都能够武装起来，如果说被你武装起来的臣民沐浴了你的恩泽，那你对付其他的人时就多了一份保障。他们认识到自己受到了特殊的恩宠，就会对你感恩戴德。别的人也会体谅你的。他们会认为，那些出生入死、责任重大的人理应受到恩宠。可当你解除他们的武装时，就会得罪他们。这表明你可能是因为胆怯或者缺乏诚意而不再信任他们了。这两种看法会孕育出对你的仇恨。你总不能没有武装的护卫吧？这样你就得去请雇佣军，那些人的素质前边已做过交代。即便你请到的是精锐之师，也无法保卫你不受强敌及疑窦丛丛的臣民们的攻击。所以像我说过的那样，新君主国里的新君总是把人民武装起来。历史上这样的例子比比皆是。

可是，一位君主征服了一个新的国家，又给原来的王国增加了一个附庸国时，则很有必要解除这个国家的武装，这其中不包括那些帮助过他的人。即便对帮助过你的人，也应该寻找机会使他们变得软弱无能，让他们俯首帖耳。国内所有的武装都应控制在你自己的士卒手中，而那些士卒驻扎在宗主国，守卫在你的身旁。



Our ancients, and those who were esteemed wise, used to say that it was necessary to hold Pistoia with parties and Pisa with fortresses; and because of this they nourished differences in some towns subject to them, so as to hold them more easily. In times when Italy was in balance in a certain mode, this would have been good to do, but I do not believe that one could give it today as a teaching. For I do not believe that divisions ever do any good; on the contrary, when the enemy approaches, of necessity divided cities are immediately lost, because the weaker party always joins the external forces and the other will not be able to hold out.

The Venetians, moved as I believe by the reasons written above, nourished the Guelf and Ghibelline sects in the cities subject to them. Although the Venetians never let them come to blood, still they nourished these dissensions among them, so that occupied as those citizens were with their differences, they did not unite against the Venetians. As may be seen, this did not turn out according to their plan later, because when they were defeated at Vaila, one party immediately became daring, and took all of their state from them. Such modes, therefore, imply weakness in the prince. For in a vigorous principality such divisions are never permitted, because they bring profit only in time of peace, as subjects can be managed more easily through them; but when war comes, such an order shows its own fallaciousness.

Without doubt princes become great when they overcome difficulties made for them and opposition made to them. So fortune, especially when she wants to make a new prince great – since he has a greater necessity to acquire reputation than a hereditary prince – makes enemies arise for him and makes them undertake enterprises against him, so that he has cause to overcome them and to climb higher on the ladder that his enemies have brought for him. Therefore many judge that a wise prince, when he has the opportunity for it, should astutely nourish some enmity so that when he has crushed it, his greatness emerges the more from it.

Princes, and especially those that are new, have found more faith and more utility in those men who at the beginning of their states were held to be suspect than in those whom they trusted at the beginning. Pandolfo Petrucci, prince of Siena, ruled his state more with those who had been suspect to him than with the others. But one cannot speak broadly of this thing because it varies according to the subject. I will only say this, that the prince will always be able to win over to himself with the greatest ease those men who in the beginning of a principality had been enemies, and who are of such quality that to maintain themselves

我们的古人以及那些备受尊敬的智者经常说，要守住皮斯托亚必须利用党派之争，而要保住比萨则需要堡垒的掩护。他们在属于自己的一些城镇制造纷争，就是为了更容易地守住那些城镇。当年的意大利以某种方式保持着平衡，这倒是救世良方，可我认为今天就不能将其作为经验传授予人了。我觉得制造分裂没有什么好处；相反，大敌压境时，内部分裂的城市很快就会沦陷，因为势力较弱的一方肯定会投靠外敌，另一方也就无法再坚持下去了。

威尼斯人的所作所为，我想也是出于以上描述的动机。他们在属于他们的城市里培植格尔夫派以及吉柏林派。威尼斯人虽然从不让他们发生流血冲突，但是却煽风点火，在两派之间制造不和，让他们斗得不可开交，所以也就没有联合起来一起对付威尼斯人。后来我们却可以看到，事情并没有按照威尼斯人的如意算盘进行。他们在维拉战败，其中有一派势力立刻变得胆大起来，把整个国家都夺了去。这样的权宜之计暴露了君主的弱点。在强有力的君主国里，绝对不允许有这种分裂的现象，因为分裂的局面只在太平时期有益于君主。利用这种局面，可以更容易地操纵臣民们。可战争的烽烟一起，此类局面就显示出了其本身的不利之处。

毋庸置疑，君主们在克服了重重艰难险阻，战胜了反对力量之后，就会成为伟大的君主。于是，尤其是当幸运女神想把一位新君造就成伟人时（新君比世袭的君主更需要赢得美誉），就给他设置一些敌人，让那些敌人设计陷害他，这就给了他克敌制胜的条件。他会顺着敌人给他搬来的梯子愈爬愈高。所以，许多人都认为，一位英君明主只要有机会都会巧妙地树立敌对面，再将其摧毁，从中更显示出他的伟大。

大凡君主们，尤其是新君们，往往发现建国初期被他们怀疑过的人反而比起初受信赖的人更为忠实和有用。西耶纳的君主潘多尔福·佩特鲁奇统治他的国家靠的多是曾被他们怀疑过的人。不过，这种情况不能一概而论，应该酌情而定。我只是说，对于那些君主国建立初期的敌人，君主总是轻而易举便能够将他们争取过来。那些人举棋不定，为了保全自己，必须倾向君主这一边。他们情知应该拿出实际行动来，打消君主对他们形成的不好的看法，于是便不得不竭诚为君主效犬马之力。所以，



they need somewhere to lean. They are all the more forced to serve him faithfully as they know it is more necessary for them to cancel out with deeds the sinister opinion one has taken of them. And so the prince always extracts more use from them than from those who, while serving him with too much security, neglect his affairs.

And since the matter requires it, I do not want to leave out a reminder to princes who have newly taken a state through internal support within it, that they consider well what cause moved those who supported them to support them. If it is not natural affection toward them but only because those supporters were not content with that state, he will be able to keep them his friends with trouble and great difficulty, because it is impossible for him to make them content. And while reviewing well the cause of this, with examples drawn from ancient and modern things, he will see that it is much easier to gain as friends to himself men who were content with the state beforehand, and therefore were his enemies, than those who, because they were not content with it, became friends and gave him support in seizing it.

It has been the custom of princes, so as to be able to hold their states more securely, to build fortresses that would be a bridle and bit for those who might design to act against them, and to have a secure refuge from sudden attack. I praise this mode because it has been used since antiquity. Nonetheless, in our times Messer Niccolò Vitelli was seen to destroy two fortresses in Città di Castello in order to hold that state. When Guidobaldo, duke of Urbino, returned to his dominion from which Cesare Borgia had expelled him, he razed all the fortresses in that province to their foundations; and he judged that without them he would with greater difficulty lose his state again. When the Bentivogli returned to Bologna, they adopted similar measures. Fortresses are thus useful or not according to the times, and if they do well for you in one regard, they harm you in another. And one may discuss this issue thus. The prince who has more fear of the people than of foreigners ought to make fortresses, but the one who has more fear of foreigners than of the people, ought to omit them. The castle in Milan built by Francesco Sforza has brought and will bring more war to the Sforza house than any other disorder of that state. Therefore the best fortress there is, is not to be hated by the people, because although you may have fortresses, if the people hold you in hatred fortresses do not save you; for to peoples who have taken up arms foreigners will never be lacking to come to their aid. In our times fortresses have not been seen to bring profit to any prince, unless to the Countess of Forli, when Count Girolamo, her consort, died; for by means of a fortress she was able to escape a popular uprising, to await help from

这些人给予君主的帮助更大，要强似君主身旁的那些过于心安理得、从而对自己的职责掉以轻心的人。

由于实际情况的要求，我还是想提醒一下那些依靠内战的力量刚刚夺取了一个国家的君主，我要奉劝他们好好考虑考虑那些人是出于什么目的才为他们架桥铺路。假如那些内线不是出于对他们自然的的爱戴，而是对国家心生不满，那么，新的君主非得花很大的气力、克服很大的困难才能够和那些支持者保持友好的关系，因为新君主不可能让他们心满意足。仔细思考一下原因，再回顾一下古往今来的事例，新君主就会发现，跟那些对前政权感到很满意、因而与他为敌的人交朋友，要比跟这些对前政权不满意、因而靠拢他并帮他夺取政权的人反而容易得多。

为了能使自己的国家处于比较安全的状态，君主们习惯于修筑堡垒。对于那些图谋不轨、想攻击他们的人，这些堡垒就是阻挡那些人的障碍；遇到突然的进攻，君主们还可以将这儿作为安全的避难所。我赞扬这种从古沿用至今的方法。然而，在我们这个时代，人们看见梅塞尔·尼科洛·维泰利拆毁了卡斯得洛市的两处堡垒，为的是保住他的国家。乌尔比诺的公爵圭尔巴曾被切萨雷·博尔贾赶出了国门。当他返回自己的国土之后，便将当地的堡垒全都夷为了平地。他认为，没有堡垒，别人再攻占他的国家就不那么容易了。本蒂沃利回到波洛格纳时，也采取过同样的措施。因此，堡垒究竟是否有用，就要看是处于什么样的时代了。有的时候，堡垒发挥了很大的作用，有时反而会带来害处。对于这个问题，可以这样说：如果君主害怕人民甚于害怕外来之敌，那就应该构筑堡垒，但如果对外来之敌的恐惧大于对人民，那就会舍弃堡垒。弗朗切斯科·斯福尔扎在米兰修建的堡垒给斯福尔扎家族带来的战乱所造成的损失比国内任何其他的骚动都要严重。因而，最好的办法就是不要为国人所仇恨。你即便修筑了堡垒，但如果遭到国人的怨恨，在危急关头堡垒也是救不了你的驾的。国人一旦拿起武器造反，外国人势必会跑来助他们一臂之力。在我们这个时代，谁也没见过堡垒曾给君主带来什么好处。但富尔利伯爵夫人的情况是个例外。她丈夫季罗拉莫伯爵死后，她以堡垒为藏身之地，躲过了一场民众大起义。她在堡垒里等待米兰的救兵，并恢复了国内的失地。当时的情况是：外国人



Milan, and to recover her state. And the times then were such that a foreigner could not help the people. But later, fortresses were worth little to her when Cesare Borgia attacked her, and her hostile people joined with the foreigner. Therefore, then and before it would have been more secure for her not to be hated by the people than to have had fortresses. So, having considered all these things, I shall praise whoever makes fortresses and whoever does not, and I shall blame anyone who, trusting in fortresses, thinks little of being hated by the people.

无法帮助那些起义的民众。但后来切萨雷·博尔贾向她发动攻击时，那些堡垒对她就没有价值了。仇视她的民众们加入了外来之敌的行列。所以，事先只要不遭到国人的仇视，那比修筑堡垒还要安全。把这种种情况都考虑在内，我赞成修筑堡垒的君主，也赞成不修筑堡垒的君主，但是我却要批评那些只一味地信赖堡垒，全然不管是否会受到国人仇视的君主。



Book 21 What a Prince Should Do to Be Held in Esteem

Nothing makes a prince so much esteemed as to carry on great enterprises and to give rare examples of himself. In our times we have Ferdinand of Aragon, the present king of Spain. This man can be called an almost new prince because from being a weak king he has become by fame and by glory the first king among the Christians; and, if you consider his actions, you will find them all very great and some of them extraordinary. In the beginning of his reign he attacked Granada, and that enterprise was the foundation of his state. First, he made it at leisure and without fear of being interfered with; he kept the minds of the barons of Castile preoccupied; while thinking of that war, they did not think of innovating. And in the meantime he acquired reputation and power over them which they did not perceive. He was able to sustain armies with money from the Church and the people, and with that long war to lay a foundation for his own military, which later brought him honor. Besides this, in order to undertake greater enterprises, always making use of religion, he turned to an act of pious cruelty, expelling the Marranos from his kingdom and despoiling them; nor could there be an example more wretched and rarer than this. He attacked Africa under this same cloak, made his campaign in Italy, and has lately attacked France; and so he has always done and ordered great things, which have always kept the minds of his subjects in suspense and admiration, and occupied with their outcome. And his actions have followed upon one another in such a mode that he has never allowed an interval between them for men to be able to work quietly against him.

It also helps very much for a prince to give rare examples of himself in governing internally, similar to those that are told of Messer Bernabo da Milano, when the opportunity arises of someone who does something extraordinary in civil life, either for good or for ill, and of picking a mode of rewarding or punishing him of which much will be said. And above all a prince should contrive to give himself the fame of a great man and of an excellent talent in every action of his.

A prince is also esteemed when he is a true friend and a true enemy, that is, when

第二十一章 君主怎样才能受人尊敬

如果致力于创建伟大的业绩，为世人树立卓越的典范，那就会赢得无与伦比的尊敬。在我们这个时代，阿拉贡的费迪南多，即当今的西班牙国王，就是这样的一位君主。此人几乎可以被称为一位新君主，因为他从一个弱君一跃而成为基督教世界的头号英主，为自己赢得了盛名及荣耀。如果你细想一下他的所作所为，就会发现他所从事的全是极其伟大的事业，有些事业简直是超群绝伦的。他刚开始实施统治的时候，对格拉纳达发动了攻击。这一举措奠定了他的政权基础。首先，他做事从容不迫，不害怕别人进行干涉。他让卡斯蒂利的贵族们全身心投入战争，脑子里只想着战争的事务，而无暇顾及他的改革之举了。与此同时，他为自己赢得了声誉，并在他们不知不觉之中拥有了控制他们的力量。他从教会以及民众那儿收敛钱财养活军队，并通过漫长的战争为建立自己的武装奠定了基础，也正是这支武装日后给他带来了荣誉。另外，为了创建更辉煌的业绩，他总是利用宗教作为工具，披着宗教的外衣干下残酷的事情。他将马拉尼人赶出他的王国，将他们的财物掠夺一空，恐怕再也没有比这更悲惨、更罕见的事例了。他披着同样的宗教外衣大举进攻非洲，接着在意大利燃起战火，近来又对法国发动了进攻。他就是这样一直从事和经营着伟大的事业，让他的臣民们心中悬念迭生，对他佩服得五体投地，始终关注着事情的结局。他的行动一个接一个，一环套一环，中间连空隙都没有，使得国人无暇谋反。

一个君主在管理国内事务时，以身作则地树立卓越的典范，也是非常有益处的。据说，米兰的麦瑟尔·贝尔纳博大概就属于这种情况。一旦有人在民事活动中有特别之举，无论是好事还是坏事，他都会不失时机地进行奖励或惩罚。这一点被世人所津津乐道。最为重要的是，作为一个君主，应该不遗余力，通过自己的每一举措为自己赢得美名，让世人觉得他是个伟大的人物、一个不同凡响的人物。

君主无论是作为真正的朋友还是真正的敌人，都会赢得世人的尊敬。这就是说，



without any hesitation he discloses himself in support of someone against another. This course is always more useful than to remain neutral, because if two powers close to you come to grips, either they are of such quality that if one wins, you have to fear the winner, or not. In either of these two cases, it will always be more useful to you to disclose yourself and to wage open war; for in the first case if you do not disclose yourself you will always be the prey of whoever wins, to the pleasure and satisfaction of the one who was defeated, and you have no reason, nor anything, to defend you or give you refuge. For whoever wins does not want suspect friends who may not help him in adversity; whoever loses does not give you refuge, since you did not want to share his fortune with arms in hand.

Antiochus came into Greece, summoned there by the Aetolians to expel the Romans from it. Antiochus sent ambassadors to the Achaeans, who were friends of the Romans, to urge them to remain in the middle; and on the other side, the Romans sought to persuade them to take up arms for them. This matter came up for decision in the council of the Achaeans, where the legate from Antiochus was persuading them to remain neutral, to which the Roman legate responded: "As to what they say, moreover, that you should not intervene in the war, nothing is more alien to your interests; without thanks, without dignity you will be the prize of the victor."

And it will always happen that the one who is not friendly will seek your neutrality, and he who is friendly to you will ask that you declare yourself with arms. And irresolute princes, in order to escape present dangers, follow that neutral way most times, and most times come to ruin. But, when the prince discloses himself boldly in support of one side, if the one to whom you adhere wins, although he is powerful and you remain at his discretion, he has an obligation to you and has a contract of love for you; and men are never so indecent as to crush you with so great an example of ingratitude. Then, too, victories are never so clear that the winner does not have to have some respect, especially for justice. But if the one to whom you adhere loses, you are given refuge by him; and he helps you while he can, and you become the companion of a fortune that can revive. In the second case, when those who fight together are of such quality that you do not have to fear the one who wins, so much the greater is the prudence of joining sides; for you assist in the ruin of one with the aid of the other who ought to save him, if he were wise; and when he has won, he remains at your discretion; and with your aid it is impossible that he not win.

And here it is to be noted that a prince must beware never to associate with someone more powerful than himself so as to attack others, except when necessity presses, as was said

他要毫不犹豫地挺身而出，支持一方，反对另一方。这种策略往往比保持中立更有用。如果你的两个强邻打起仗来，一方赢得了战争，你可能会对胜利者产生畏惧之心，或者对其并不感到害怕。这两种情况不管出现了哪一种，你都应该站出来公开对一方宣战，这样做对你会更有用的。因为，如果遇到第一种情况，你不公开表明自己的态度，你就会成为胜利者的猎物，而战败的一方也会幸灾乐祸，对你的遭遇感到高兴。到时候你就没有理由为自己辩护，没有力量保护自己，也没有地方避难了。因为胜利者并不需要那种在他身处逆境时不愿帮助他的可疑人作朋友，失败的一方，也不会收留你，因为你没有拿起武器来和他同甘共苦。

安太阿卡斯跑到希腊去，应埃托利亚人之邀，要将罗马人赶出希腊。安太阿卡斯派使者去见罗马人的盟友亚该亚人，怂恿他们保持中立。另一方面，罗马人则竭力劝说亚该亚人拿起武器和他们一道作战。亚该亚人召开会议，要对此事做出决断。安太阿卡斯的使者苦口婆心地劝他们中立，而罗马人代表的对答之辞是：“依照他们的说法，你们不该卷入战争，没有什么比这更有悖于你们的利益了。你们将得不到任何一方的感激，也得不到尊重，势必会成为胜利者的战利品。”

事情历来如此：和你没有友好关系的人会请求你保持中立，而你的盟友则要求你拿起武装表明自己的态度。优柔寡断的君主为了避免眼前的危险，十有八九会走中立之路，也十有八九会身败名裂。但是，作为君主，如果你勇敢地挺身而出支持其中的一方，而你支持的一方又取得了胜利，那么，即便胜利者势力强大，你仍得听命于他，他也会对你承担一种义务，注定会对你有几分柔肠。他绝对不会不仁不义地使你处于死地，落下个忘恩负义的千秋骂名。再说，胜败乃兵家常事，胜利者不会无所顾忌，尤其是对正义不会无所顾忌。假如你支持的一方吃了败仗，他可以收留你避难嘛，他会竭尽全力帮助你。你和他同呼吸共命运，还可以东山再起嘛。要是遇到第二种情况，参战的双方实力是这样的：你没必要害怕得胜的一方。这样，你在选择盟友时就更应该慎之又慎了。你可以协助一方消灭另一方；如果你协助的一方明智的话，倒应该挽救敌方。有了你的支持，他肯定会赢得战争，但即便他打了胜仗，也得受你的钳制。

此处必须指出的是，作为君主，必须要清楚千万不要和那些比自己强大的人联合起来去进攻别人，除非形势所迫。这一点前边已讲过。因为他们取得了胜利，你



above. For when you win, you are left his prisoner, and princes should avoid as much as they can being at the discretion of others. The Venetians accompanied France against the duke of Milan, and they could have avoided being in that company – from which their ruin resulted. But when one cannot avoid it (as happened to the Florentines when the pope and Spain went with their armies to attack Lombardy), then the prince should join for the reasons given above. Nor should any state ever believe that it can always adopt safe courses; on the contrary, it should think it has to take them all as doubtful. For in the order of things it is found that one never seeks to avoid one inconvenience without running into another; but prudence consists in knowing how to recognize the qualities of inconveniences, and in picking the less bad as good.

A prince should also show himself a lover of the virtues, giving recognition to virtuous men, and he should honor those who are excellent in an art. Next, he should inspire his citizens to follow their pursuits quietly, in trade and in agriculture and in every other pursuit of men, so that one person does not fear to adorn his possessions lest they be taken away from him, and another to open up a trade for fear of taxes. But he should prepare rewards for whoever wants to do these things, and for anyone who thinks up any way of expanding his city or his state. Besides this, he should at suitable times of the year keep the people occupied with festivals and spectacles. And because every city is divided into guilds or into clans, he should take account of those communities, meet with them sometimes, and make himself an example of humanity and munificence, always holding firm the majesty of his dignity nonetheless, because he can never want this to be lacking in anything.

就成了你盟友的俘虏。作为一国之君应尽量避免听命于他人。威尼斯人曾与法国结盟，共同对付米兰的公爵（他们原来是可以避开这样的联盟的），结果使他们自己走向了毁灭。但是如果躲也躲不过去的时候（就像教皇伙同西班牙派兵进攻伦巴第时，佛罗伦萨人所面临的形势那样），出于以上所论述的原因，君主应该加入联盟。任何一个国家都不能认为自己采取的都是万全之策；相反，作为一个国君，应该认为自己的政策是值得怀疑的。根据事物变化的规律，人们在躲避一种不利因素的同时，势必会遇到另一种不利的因素。但谨慎的人知道如何区分不利因素的性质，并选择危害性较小的不利因素以趋利避害。

作为君主，还应该表明自己是爱惜人才的，要懂得发掘英才，要把荣誉赐给那些才华横溢的人。还有，他应该鼓励国民踏踏实实做自己的营生，去从事贸易、农业以及其他各种各样的行业。要让国民不要因为害怕自己的财产被夺走而不愿发家致富，不要因为害怕交税就不愿开办新的生意。君主应该奖励勤勤恳恳工作的人，还应该奖励那些为城市或国家的发展出谋划策的人。除此之外，他还应该在每年适当的时间让国人热热闹闹地过节日和举办盛大集会。由于每一座城市里都有各种行会以及家族，他应该对他们表示关心，使自己成为谦和仁厚、慷慨大度的典范，时常与他们来往。但是，他也应保持君王的尊严，一举一动都丝毫不能减弱自己的威仪。



Book 22 Of Those Whom Princes Have as Secretaries

The choice of ministers is of no small importance to a prince; they are good or not according to the prudence of the prince. And the first conjecture that is to be made of the brain of a lord is to see the men he has around him; and when they are capable and faithful, he can always be reputed wise because he has known how to recognize them as capable and to maintain them as faithful. But if they are otherwise, one can always pass unfavorable judgment on him, because the first error he makes, he makes in this choice.

There was no one who knew Messer Antonio da Venafro as minister of Pandolfo Petrucci, prince of Siena, who did not judge Pandolfo to be a most worthy man, since he had Antonio as his minister. And since there are three kinds of brains: one that understands by itself, another that discerns what others understand, the third that understands neither by itself nor through others; the first is most excellent, the second excellent, and the third useless – it follows, therefore, of necessity that, if Pandolfo was not in the first rank, he was in the second. For every time that one has the judgment to recognize the good or evil that someone does or says, although he does not have the inventiveness by himself, he knows the bad deeds and the good of his minister and extols the one and corrects the other; and the minister cannot hope to deceive him and remains good himself.

But as to how a prince can know his minister, here is a mode that never fails. When you see a minister thinking more of himself than of you, and in all actions looking for something useful to himself, one so made will never be a good minister; never will you be able to trust him, because he who has someone's state in his hands should never think of himself but always of the prince, and he should never remember anything that does not pertain to the prince. And on the other side, the prince should think of the minister so as to keep him good – honoring him, making him rich, obligating him to himself, sharing honors and burdens with him so that he sees he cannot stand without the prince and so that many honors do not make him desire more honors, much wealth does not make him desire more wealth, and many burdens make him fear changes. When, therefore, ministers and princes in relation to minis-

第二十二章 为君主效力的大臣们

大臣的人选对君主来说可是非同小可的事。大臣选的好坏，就要看君主是否谨慎了。要判断一位君主的智力如何，首先要看他周围的大臣怎样了。有精明强干、忠心耿耿的大臣，君主就可以说是英君明主，因为他知道如何识别有才能的人，并使他们忠心耿耿。不过，如果大臣不是能臣和忠臣，世人就会对君主产生不好的印象，因为他在选拔人才上出的错是头号大错误。

麦瑟尔·安东尼奥·达·韦纳弗罗是西亚纳君主潘多尔福·佩特鲁奇的一位贤臣。凡是知道这种情况的人，无不称赞潘多尔福，认为他是个了不起的人，因为他慧眼识星，让安东尼奥做了他的大臣。人类的大脑可分为三类：一类是自身就能够洞察一切；另一类是利用他人的智慧以明辨是非；第三类则是本身浑浑噩噩，也不知如何利用人才。第一类属于出类拔萃的，第二类也相当优秀，而第三类却是酒囊饭袋。由此判断，我们可以说，潘多尔福即便不属于第一类，也应属于第二类。一位君主必须善于根据大臣们的所言所行判断是非，即便他自己不具备独创性，他也应对大臣们的恶行及善举了然于胸，从而达到避恶扬善的目的。如此，大臣们就不敢生欺君之心，只好洁身自好。

至于如何对大臣们知才善用，有一个百试不爽的办法。如果一个大臣心里只有自己，把自己看得重于君主，为人处世只顾谋求一己私利，这种德性的人绝对不会成为良臣，千万不能委之以重任。一个为国事殚精竭虑的大臣肯定只把君主装在心中，绝不会只想着他的私事。他所考虑的事情应该都是与君主有关的。另一方面，君主应该多关心大臣，让他保持良臣的本色。君主应该给他以荣誉，赐给他财富，让对方感恩戴德，也要和他一道分享荣耀，并委以重任。这样，大臣就会看到自己离开君主将无处立足；他身上戴满了光荣的花环，使他对别的荣誉再无覬覦之心；他已家资巨万，再不会去追求更多的财富；他身负重任，如临深渊，害怕再生变乱。



ters are so constituted, they can trust one another; when it is otherwise, the end is always damaging either for one or the other.



大臣在这种处境，以及有了这样的君臣关系，大家便会互相信任，如若不然，便会
落个玉石俱焚、双方皆亡的下场。



Book 23 In What Mode Flatterers Are to Be Avoided

I do not want to leave out an important point and an error from which princes defend themselves with difficulty, unless they are very prudent or make good choices. And these are the flatterers of whom courts are full; for men take such pleasure in their own affairs and so deceive themselves there that they defend themselves with difficulty from this plague, and in trying to defend oneself from it one risks the danger of becoming contemptible. For there is no other way to guard oneself from flattery unless men understand that they do not offend you in telling you the truth; but when everyone can tell you the truth, they lack reverence for you. Therefore, a prudent prince must hold to a third mode, choosing wise men in his state; and only to these should he give freedom to speak the truth to him, and of those things only that he asks about and nothing else. But he should ask them about everything and listen to their opinions; then he should decide by himself, in his own mode and with these councils and with each member of them he should behave in such a mode that everyone knows that the more freely he speaks, the more he will be accepted. Aside from these, he should not want to hear anyone; he should move directly to the thing that was decided and be obstinate in his decisions. Whoever does otherwise either falls head-long because of flatterers or changes often because of the variability of views, from which a low estimation of him arises.

I want to bring up a modern example in this regard. Father Luca, a man of the present emperor Maximilian, speaking of his majesty, told how he did not take advice from anyone and never did anything in his own mode; this arose from holding to a policy contrary to that given above. For the emperor is a secretive man who does not communicate his plans to anyone, nor seek their views; but as in putting them into effect they begin to be known and disclosed, they begin to be contradicted by those whom he has around him, and he, an agreeable person, is dissuaded from them. From this it arises that the things he does on one day he destroys on another, that no one ever understands what he wants or plans to do, and that one cannot found oneself on his decisions.

A prince, therefore, should always take counsel, but when he wants, and not when

第二十三章 如何远避阿谀小人

有一个重要的问题，我不想避而不谈。这是一个凡是君主都很难躲开的错误，除非他是个谨小慎微的人，做出了明智的选择。在朝廷之上到处都有谄媚小人。人们往往过于沉湎于自身的利益，相当容易上当受骗，所以很难防御这种瘟疫。君主如果想远避其祸，就会冒险，受到别人的轻蔑。君主除了广开言路，懂得忠言逆耳的道理，就再也没有办法远避谄媚了。可是，一旦人人都直言犯上，大家对君主就无敬畏之心了。于是，作为英明的君主就必须另辟蹊径，采取第三种办法——在国内选拔智囊团。君主只允许这些人畅所欲言地讲真话，而且只针对他所问及的事情，不许妄论其他。不过，君主还是应该广泛征求意见，聆听智囊团人物的高见的。然后，他再做出决定，按自己的方式行事。对于顾问团里的每一名成员，他都应该申明自己的观点，让他们知道越是直言不讳的人，其建议越容易被采纳。除过这些人之外，他就再也不需要听取别人的看法了，而应该直接采取行动，对自己的决定义无反顾。如若不然，君主就会因为听信谗言栽跟头，要不就会因为听信了纷杂的建议而朝令夕改，到头来被别人瞧不起。

对于这种情况，我想举一个现代的例子。当今皇帝马克西米利安的谋臣卢卡神父在谈到皇帝陛下时，曾评论说他从不听取任何人的意见，也没有按自己的方式办事，这是因为他所奉行的政策与以上的途径背道而驰。这位皇帝守口如瓶，从不把自己的计划透露给任何人，也不征求大臣的意见。可是，在执行计划的过程中，事情便被人们所了解，于是周围的人便提出相反的意见。皇帝是个耳朵根软的人，结果就放弃了计划。由此而导致的情况是：他今天干一件事，明天又会弃而不予。没有人知道他到底想干什么，或者他到底打算做什么。对于他的决策，任何人都不敢相信。

作为一位君主，应时时集思广益，但必须是在他需要，而不是别人需要的情况



others want it; on the contrary, he should discourage everyone from counseling him about anything unless he asks it of them. But he should be a very broad questioner, and then, in regard to the things he asked about, a patient listener to the truth; indeed, he should become angry when he learns that anyone has any hesitation to speak it to him. And since many esteem that any prince who establishes an opinion of himself as prudent is so considered not because of his nature but because of the good counsel he has around him, without doubt they are deceived. For this is a general rule that never fails: that a prince who is not wise by himself cannot be counseled well, unless indeed by chance he should submit himself to one person alone to govern him in everything, who is a very prudent man. In this case he could well be, but it would not last long because that governor would in a short time take away his state. But by taking counsel from more than one, a prince who is not wise will never have united counsel, nor know by himself how to unite them. Each one of his counselors will think of his own interest; he will not know how to correct them or understand them. And they cannot be found otherwise, because men will always turn out bad for you unless they have been made good by a necessity. So one concludes that good counsel, from wherever it comes, must arise from the prudence of the prince, and not the prudence of the prince from good counsel.

下。除非他征求人们的意见，否则不能允许任何人在他面前指指点点。不过，他还应该是一个广泛听取别人意见的人，针对他所关心的问题，虚心地听大臣们讲真话。实际上，如果有人吞吞吐吐地不愿说心里话，他应该生气才对。许多人都认为，那些享有英主美誉的君主之所以会享有美誉，并非其素质使然，而是因为他身边有好的谋臣。这种看法毫无疑问是站不住脚的。因为有一条颠扑不破的真理：本身缺乏聪明才智的君主是不能够接受良策的。不过，实际上也有偶然的情况——他会独独对一个人言听计从，而此人胆识过人。在这种情况下，他倒是可以听到锦囊妙计，但时间不会很长，因为那位谋臣很快便会夺走国政。可是，如果听取多人的建议，一位缺乏智慧的君主就得不到统一的意见，而他本人也不知道如何把意见合而为一。他的每一位谋臣都会为自己的利益考虑，而他不懂得怎样纠正谋臣的过失，也不明白他们心中的小算盘。他们也只能如此，因为人性除非在某种压力之下才会表现出好的一面，否则总是邪恶的。我们的结论是：忠言良策不管出自何人，都是因为君主英明才产生的，但是英君明主却不是出自于忠言良策。



Book 24 Why the Princes of Italy Have Lost Their States

When the things written above have been observed prudently, they make a new prince appear ancient and immediately render him more secure and steady in his state than if he had grown old in it. For a new prince is observed much more in his actions than a hereditary one; and when they are recognized as virtuous, they take hold of men much more and obligate them much more than ancient blood. For men are much more taken by present things than by past ones, and when they find good in the present, they enjoy it and do not seek elsewhere; indeed they will take up every defense on behalf of a new prince if he is not lacking in other things as regards himself. And so he will have the double glory of having made the beginning of a new principality, of having adorned it and consolidated it with good laws, good arms, good friends, and good examples, just as he has a double shame who, having been born prince, has lost it through his lack of prudence.

And if one considers those lords in Italy who have lost their states in our times, like the king of Naples, the duke of Milan, and others, one will find in them, first, a common defect as to arms, the causes of which have been discussed at length above; then, one will see that some of them either had a hostile people or if they had friendly peoples, did not know how to secure themselves against the great. For without these defects, states that have enough nerve to put an army into the field are not lost. Philip of Macedon, not the father of Alexander but the one who was defeated by Titus Quintius, did not have much of a state by comparison to the greatness of the Romans and of Greece, who attacked him; nonetheless, because he was a military man and knew how to deal with the people and secure himself against the great, he kept up a war against them for many years; and if at the end he lost dominion over several cities, his kingdom remained to him nonetheless.

Therefore, these princes of ours who have been in their principalities for many years may not accuse fortune when they have lost them afterwards, but their own indolence; for, never having thought that quiet times could change (which is a common defect of men, not to take account of the storm during the calm), when later the times became adverse, they

第二十四章 意大利的君主为何痛失国权

对于以上论及的条件，如果能谨慎地加以遵守，就可以让一个新君显得像一个出身于古老家族的君主，这可以让他的江山坐得更安全、更稳固，甚至强似一位旧君主。一位新君比世袭王位的君主，一言一行都更受世人的关注。人们一旦发现了他的美德，就会比对待有着古老血统的君主，更忠实于他，对他多几分感激之心。因为人们注意的是眼前的利益，而非旧日的史话。他们一旦眼下就从中获益，便会安享太平，不再生左顾右盼之心。假如一位新君在别的方面不亏行止，大家便会不遗余力地捍卫他的王权。新君获得的是双倍的荣耀：一是亲自缔造了一个新的君主国，二是由于推行好的法律、建立精锐之师、结交好的盟友，并且以身作则，而使国家繁荣、稳定。这就犹如一位世袭的君主如果由于缺乏谋略而丧失王权，就会得到双倍的耻辱一样。

在我们这个时代，意大利的统治者，诸如那不勒斯的国王、米兰的公爵等，都丧失了自己的王权。如果考虑一下他们的情况，我们就会发现他们有一个共同的缺陷——都是吃了军队的亏。其原因在上文已做了详细论述。我们还会发现，他们当中有些人遭到国人的敌视，有些虽然有友好的人民，却不知如何防范贵族以保全自己。倘若没有这些缺陷，国家就敢于派军队决战沙场，而不至于吃败仗。马其顿的菲利普——就是败在蒂托斯·昆托斯手下的那个菲利普，而非亚历山大的父亲——与前来攻打他的强大的罗马人及希腊人相比，其国家虽然并不强盛，但他精通军事，又懂得如何交好国人以及防范贵族，跟敌人打了许多年的仗，虽然最终失去了几座城市的统治权，但却保住了自己的王国。

有一些可爱的君主们把君主国统治了许许多多多个年头，却在一夜之间失去了王权，这不应该怪时乖命蹇，而应该怪他们庸碌无能。他们从不考虑太平时期也会风云突变（人们的一个通病就是心中全然没有“天有不测风云”的概念），后来遇到了惊涛骇浪，他们就狼狈逃窜，全然不思保家卫国。他们抱着希望，认为他们的国



thought of fleeing and not of defending themselves. And they hoped that their peoples, disgusted with the insolence of the victors, would call them back. This course is good when others are lacking; but it is indeed bad to have put aside other remedies for this one. For one should never fall in the belief you can find someone to pick you up. Whether it does not happen or happens, it is not security for you, because that defense was base and did not depend on you. And those defenses alone are good, are certain, and are lasting, that depend on you yourself and on your virtue.

人一旦不堪忍受胜利者的蛮横无礼，就会迎他们归国。如果别无良策，这样做倒也可以。可根本不考虑别的方法，只靠这一种途径，就的确不应该了。作为君主，千万不要做黄粱美梦，指望着有人为你匡扶社稷。不管这样的事会不会发生，此计都不是万全之策，而是拙劣的下策，因为这种机会很渺茫，也不是自己所能左右的。只有将命运把握在自己手中，依靠自身的实力，才是稳定长久的治国良策。



Book 25 How Much Fortune Can Do in Human Affairs, and in What Mode It May Be Opposed

It is not unknown to me that many have held and hold the opinion that worldly things are so governed by fortune and by God, that men cannot correct them with their prudence, indeed that they have no remedy at all; and on account of this they might judge that one need not sweat much over things but let oneself be governed by chance. This opinion has been believed more in our times because of the great variability of things which have been seen and are seen every day, beyond every human conjecture. When I have thought about this sometimes, I have been in some part inclined to their opinion. Nonetheless, in order that our free will not be eliminated, I judge that it might be true that fortune is arbiter of half of our actions, but also that she leaves the other half, or close to it, for us to govern. And I liken her to one of these violent rivers which, when they become enraged, flood the plains, ruin the trees and the buildings, lift earth from this part, drop in another; each person flees before them, everyone yields to their impetus without being able to hinder them in any regard. And although they are like this, it is not as if men, when times are quiet, could not provide for them with dikes and dams so that when they rise later, either they go by a canal or their impetus is neither so wanton nor so damaging. It happens similarly with fortune, which shows her power where virtue has not been put in order to resist her and therefore turns her impetus where she knows that dams and dikes have not been made to contain her. And if you consider Italy, which is the seat of these variations and that which has given them motion, you will see a country without dams and without any dike. If it had been diked by suitable virtue, like Germany, Spain, and France, either this flood would not have caused the great variations that it has, or it would not have come here.

And I wish that this may be enough to have said about opposing fortune in general. But restricting myself more to particulars, I say that one sees a given prince prosper today and come to ruin tomorrow without having seen him change his nature or any quality. This I believe arises, first, from the causes that have been discussed at length in the preceding, that is, that the prince who leans entirely on his fortune comes to ruin as it varies. I believe, fur-

第二十五章 天命对人事的影响力 以及如何与之抗衡

我并非不了解，许多人历来都持这样一种看法，认为世间的事都由天命及上帝主宰，人类靠智慧是不能够改变命运的，对此他们的确束手无策。鉴于此因，人们也许会认为，没必要费心劳神地干事业，只能听天由命、随波逐流。这种观点在我们这个时代被更多的人所信奉，因为如今风云变幻、世事更迭，每天都可以看到纷纭的现象，让我们眼花缭乱、始料不及。有时我虑及此事，也多多少少与他们有相同的看法。但是，人类的主观意志并非完全不顶用。我认为，事实上命运主宰着我们一半的活动，而我们的另一半活动，或接近一半的活动，是由我们自己支配的。我将命运比作汹涌澎湃的河流，一朝发怒，便淹没平原，冲毁树木、房屋，把泥土卷起，冲到别的地方去；面对肆虐的河流，人们争相逃命，万物都屈服于那雷霆万钧之力，谁都无法阻挡它们的势头。情况确实如此，但并不等于人类就无计可施了。他们可以在平安无事的时候修水渠、筑河坝，以备不时之需。如此，河水一旦暴涨，就可以由水渠疏导，使之无法宣泄淫威，造成灭顶之灾。对于“天命”，情况大同小异。如果人们不防患于未然，不采取抵御的措施，它就会滥施淫威。它知道何处没有“修渠筑坝”对它进行限制，于是便在那儿为非作歹。我们还是想想意大利的情况吧。那儿是滋生变乱的温床，使形势变得一团糟。你所到的是一个既无“河坝”又无“水渠”的国家。假如意大利像德国、西班牙及法国那样，适当地修些“水渠”，洪水就不会把那儿冲得一片狼藉，或者说，洪水压根就不会来。

如此概括地讨论与天命的抗衡，但愿这些已经能说明问题。不过，我还是想多费些笔墨，讲一些细节的事情。我们会看到一个君主今天还是一派兴旺发达的景象，明天就是穷途末路，中间觉察不到他在本性及素质上有什么变化。我认为，首先，这是由以上所论述的原因造成的。一位君主假如一味地听天由命，那么，如果天道一变，他就会彻底完蛋。另外，我还觉得，一个与时俱进、顺应潮流的君主，才会



ther, that he is prosperous who adapts his mode of proceeding to the qualities of the times; and similarly, he is unprosperous whose procedure is in disaccord with the times. For one sees that in the things that lead men to the end that each has before him, that is, glories and riches, they proceed variously: one with caution, the other with impetuosity; one by violence, the other with art; one with patience, the other with its contrary – and with these different modes each can attain it. One also sees two cautious persons, one attaining his design, the other not; and similarly two persons prosper equally with two different methods, one being cautious, the other impetuous. This arises from nothing other than from the quality of the times that they conform to or not in their procedure. From this follows what I said, that two persons operating differently come out with the same effect; and of two persons working identically, one is led to his end, the other not. On this also depends the variability of the good: for if one governs himself with caution and patience, and the times and affairs turn in such a way that his government is good, he comes out prosperous; but if the times and affairs change, he is ruined because he does not change his mode of proceeding. Nor may a man be found so prudent as to know how to accommodate himself to this, whether because he cannot deviate from what nature inclines him to or also because, when one has always flourished by walking on one path, he cannot be persuaded to depart from it. And so the cautious man, when it is time to come to impetuosity, does not know how to do it, hence comes to ruin; for if he would change his nature with the times and with affairs, his fortune would not change.

Pope Julius II proceeded impetuously in all his affairs, and he found the times and affairs so much in harmony with his mode of proceeding that he always achieved a prosperous end. Consider the first enterprise that he undertook in Bologna, while Messer Giovanni Bentivoglio was still living. The Venetians were not pleased with it; nor was the king of Spain; with France he was holding discussions on that enterprise; and nonetheless, with his ferocity and impetuosity, he personally put that expedition into motion. This move made Spain and the Venetians stand still in suspense, the latter out of fear and the other because of the desire he had to recover the whole kingdom of Naples. From the other side he pulled the king of France after him; because when that king saw him move, and since he desired to make Julius his friend in order to bring down the Venetians, he judged he could not deny him his troops without injuring him openly. Julius thus accomplished with his impetuous move what no other pontiff, with all human prudence, would ever have accomplished, because if he had waited to depart from Rome with firm conclusions and everything in order, as any other pontiff would have done, he would never have succeeded. For the king of France would have had

事业昌隆。反过来说，一个君主悖天逆道，事业就会日薄西山。我们会看到，人们都在追求着同一目标——荣誉和金钱，但他们为达到目的所采取的方式不同：有的谨小慎微，有的简单鲁莽；有的使用暴力，有的使用计谋；有的不急不躁，有的则相反。不管在方法上有什么差异，人们还是都可以如愿以偿的。我们还会看到两个小心翼翼的人，一个达到了目的，另一个却无果而终。还有这样两个人，行为方式大相径庭，一个谨慎，另一个急躁，可二人全都兴旺发达。这不是别的原因造成的，而是看他们在行动中是否顺应了时代的发展。正如我说过的那样，有的时候，两个人行为方式不同，产生的效果却一样；还有的时候，两个人干的事一模一样，其中的一个如愿以偿，另一个却未达到目的。这其中也有时代变迁的缘故。如果一个君主兢兢业业、如履薄冰，同时国泰民安，局势稳定，那他一定会走向成功；但如果时代变迁、世事更迭，而他固守原来的模式，那他就会一败涂地。可能没有一个人会如此深谋远虑，懂得如何顺应潮流，这是因为人们出于天性选择的事业是不会轻易改弦易辙的，或者是由于人们一旦沿着一条道走得顺顺当当，就无法说服他们另辟蹊径。所以，即便是一个谨小慎微的人，到了该急转弯的时候，却茫然不知所措，结果也会照样走上绝路。如果懂得与时俱进，随着时代的变化而变化，就不会遭遇悲惨的命运。

教皇朱利奥二世于任何事情都雷厉风行，他发现世事的运行与他做事的方式非常和谐，所以他总是志得意满。我们可以回忆一下他在波洛格纳发动的第一场战役，当时麦瑟尔·乔万尼·本蒂沃利还活着。威尼斯人对这件事颇为不满，西班牙的国王也不高兴。朱利奥二世就与法国协商此事。不过，由于他刚勇有余，干事麻利，便亲自挂帅开始了远征。兵戈一交接，西班牙和威尼斯人便犹豫不定地隔岸观火，后者是出于恐惧，而前者则是希望他恢复整个那不勒斯王国。另一方面，朱利奥二世把法国国王也拉上跟他一起行动。法王见他采取了行动，心里还是很希望跟他交朋友的，为的是击垮威尼斯人。法王不想公开得罪他，认为无法拒绝派兵随征。就这样，朱利奥二世以大刀阔斧的行动成就了事业，这是任何一个别的教皇，哪怕再深谋远虑，都无法企及的。如果他当时像别的教皇那样，等到万事俱备，一切都停停当当的时候再从罗马出兵，就绝不会高奏凯歌。因为那时候，法国国王会找出一千条理由加以推托，而其他的人则会令他生出一千种顾虑来。对于他别的事业，我



a thousand excuses and the others would have raised in him a thousand fears. I wish to omit all his other actions, since all have been alike and all succeeded well. And the brevity of his life did not allow him to feel the contrary, because if times had come when he had needed to proceed with caution, his ruin would have followed; he would never have deviated from those modes to which nature inclined him.

I conclude, thus, that when fortune varies and men remain obstinate in their modes, men are prosperous while they are in accord, and as they come into discord, unprosperous. I judge this indeed, that it is better to be impetuous than cautious, because fortune is a woman; and it is necessary, if one wants to hold her down, to beat her and strike her down. And one sees that she lets herself be won more by the impetuous than by those who proceed coldly. And so always, like a woman, she is the friend of the young, because they are less cautious, more ferocious, and command her with more audacity.

就不想赘言了，因为那些事业大都雷同，而且无一没有获得成功。他那短暂的生命使他无暇左顾右盼。如果到了他必须谨小慎微地处理事务时，他就会满盘皆输，因为他绝不会违背天性，偏离自己所走的道路。

我的结论是：命运千变万化，人们往往墨守成规；顺应潮流者兴旺发达，逆流而动者势衰运退。我的深切体会是，以雷霆万钧之势行事胜于拖泥带水，因为命运就像个女人，要想征服她，就应该痛打她，将她击翻在地。我们可以看到，她愿意屈服于干事火爆的人，而不愿听命于四平八稳的人。命运总是像女人一般跟年轻人交朋友，因为他们不瞻前顾后，行动比较勇烈，能够以大胆的方式降服命运。



Book 26 Exhortation to Seize Italy and to Free Her from the Barbarians

Thus, having considered everything discussed above, and thinking to myself whether in Italy at present the times have been tending to the honor of a new prince, and whether there is matter to give opportunity to someone prudent and virtuous to introduce a form that would bring honor to him and good to the community of men there, it appears to me that so many things are tending to the benefit of a new prince that I do not know what time has ever been more apt for it. And if, as I said, it was necessary for anyone wanting to see the virtue of Moses that the people of Israel be enslaved in Egypt, and to learn the greatness of spirit of Cyrus, that the Persians be oppressed by the Medes, and to learn the excellence of Theseus, that the Athenians be dispersed, so at present to know the virtue of an Italian spirit it was necessary that Italy be reduced to the condition in which she is at present, which is more enslaved than the Hebrews, more servile than the Persians, more dispersed than the Athenians, without a head, without order, beaten, despoiled, torn, pillaged, and having endured ruin of every sort.

And although up to now a glimmer has shone in someone who could judge that he had been ordered by God for her redemption, yet later it was seen that in the highest course of his actions, he was repulsed by fortune. So, left as if lifeless, she awaits whoever it can be that will heal her wounds, and put an end to the sacking of Lombardy, to the taxes on the kingdom and on Tuscany, and cure her of her sores that have festered now for a long time. One may see how she prays God to send her someone to redeem her from these barbarous cruelties and insults. One may also see her ready and disposed to follow a flag, provided that there be someone to pick it up. Nor may one see at present anyone in whom she can hope more than in your illustrious house, which with its fortune and virtue, supported by God and by the Church of which it is now prince, can put itself at the head of this redemption. This is not very difficult if you summon up the actions and lives of those named above. And although these men are rare and marvelous, nonetheless they were men, and each of them had less opportunity than the present; for their undertaking was not more just than this one, nor easier,

第二十六章 劝君控制意大利，使其 摆脱蛮族的欺压

对于以上论述的诸般情况，我做了通盘考虑，心中不由在想：目前意大利的局势是否有利于一位新君主创造光辉的业绩，是否能够给有胆识、有美德的伟人提供机会，使他崭露才华，为自己赢得荣誉，而且造福于国人呢？我觉得现在的机会很多，都对新君有益。据我所知，以前从未有过如此成熟的时机。我在前边说过，如果有必要让世人看到摩西的美德，就得让以色列人在埃及遭受奴役，如果要了解居鲁士思想之伟大，就得使波斯人受梅迪人的压迫，如欲窥见提修斯超人的品质，就得让雅典人流离失所。目前的情况也同出一理，要展示某一位意大利伟人的美德，就有必要使意大利处于眼前的这种境况。现在的意大利人比当年的希伯来人遭受着更沉重的奴役，比波斯人的命运更悲惨，比雅典人更居无定所。他们群龙无首，秩序混乱，心灰意冷，情绪低落，遭受着蹂躏，忍受着各种各样不幸的遭遇。

虽然就在最近，也有人给我们带来了一线希望，可以被认为是上帝派来拯救意大利的，然而正当他的事业抵达巅峰时，却遭到了命运的抛弃。意大利气息奄奄，期待着有人能为她医治好创伤，制止对伦巴第的洗劫，消除对那不勒斯王国以及托斯卡尼的巧取豪夺，治好意大利那久已缠身的病痛。世人有目共睹：意大利渴望着上帝派圣人救她出苦海，摆脱蛮族的残暴压迫及侮辱。天眼昭昭：假如有人举起大旗，她时刻都准备跟随他向前。我们还可以看到：意大利目前寄予希望最大的不是旁人，而正是您那显赫的家族。您的家族受到命运的青睐，功德无量，并受到上帝的辅佐和教会的支持，成为教会的领袖，完全可以领导意大利自救。对于以上所提及的人物，总结一下他们的事迹和生平，做起来并不十分困难。这些人是世间罕有的不同凡响的人物，但他们毕竟还是脱不了肉胎俗骨。他们当中不管谁的机遇也不如现在。他们的事业不如现在的事业正义性强，也不如现在的事业容易成就，而且



nor was God more friendly to them than to you. Here there is great justice: "for war is just to whom it is necessary, and arms are pious when there is no hope but in arms." Here there is very great readiness, and where there is great readiness, there cannot be great difficulty, provided that your house keeps its aim on the orders of those whom I have put forth. Besides this, here may be seen extraordinary things without example, brought about by God: the sea has opened; a cloud has escorted you along the way; the stone has poured forth water; here manna^① has rained; everything has concurred in your greatness. The remainder you must do yourself. God does not want to do everything, so as not to take free will from us and that part of the glory that falls to us.

And it is not a marvel if none of the Italians named before has been able to do what it is hoped will be done by your illustrious house, and if in so many revolutions in Italy and in so many maneuvers of war, it always appears that military virtue has died out in her. This arises from the fact that her ancient orders were not good, and that there has not been anyone who has known how to find new ones; and nothing brings so much honor to a man rising newly as the new laws and the new orders found by him. When these things have been founded well and have greatness in them, they make him revered and admirable. And in Italy matter is not lacking for introducing every form; here there is great virtue in the limbs, if it were not lacking in the heads. Look how in duels and in encounters with few the Italians are superior in force, dexterity, and ingenuity. But when it comes to armies, they do not compare. And everything follows from the weakness at the head, because those who know are not obeyed, and each thinks he knows, since up to now no one has been able to raise himself, both by virtue and by fortune, to a point where the others will yield to him. From this it follows that in so much time, in so many wars made in the last twenty years, when there has been an army entirely Italian it has always proven to be poor. The first testimony to this is Taro, then Alessandria, Capua, Genoa, Vailà, Bologna, Mestre.

Thus, if your illustrious house wants to follow those excellent men who redeemed their countries, it is necessary before all other things, as the true foundation of every undertaking, to provide itself with its own arms; for one cannot have more faithful, nor truer, nor better soldiers. And although each of them may be good, all together become better when they see themselves commanded by their prince, and honored and indulged by him. It is necessary, therefore, to prepare such arms for oneself so as to be able with Italian virtue to

① 吗哪:基督教《圣经》中所说古代以色列人经过旷野时获得的神赐食物。

上帝相比较而言更垂青于您。我们的事业是十分正义的，因为“必须进行的战争才是正义的战争，在只有拿起刀剑才有希望的时候，刀剑就是神圣的”。现在已经万事俱备，民心所向。只要民心所向，您的家族致力于建立我所倡导的那种伟人的秩序，事业就不会有很大的困难。另外，我们还可以看见上帝所创造的一些绝无仅有的现象：大海分开一条路；祥云伴您前行；石缝间喷出瑞泉；吗哪似甘露从天而降；所有的一切都有利于您成就伟大事业。除天意之外，其他的事情就要您身体力行了。上帝不愿意包办一切，不愿意剥夺我们的主观意志，所以，有一部分光荣的使命就落在了我们的身上。

毫不奇怪，人民希望您显赫的家族成就的事业是前边所提到的所有意大利人都力所不及的；意大利的革命风起云涌，意大利的战争连绵不断，她的军事实力已是东逝之水。这是因为意大利旧的秩序是不好的，又苦于没有救国良策，不能建立新的秩序。如果有一位新人涌现出来，创建新的法律和新的秩序，就会获得至高无上的荣誉。新的法律和新的秩序建立了起来，并且包含着伟大之处，人民就会尊敬他、崇拜他。在意大利，开创事业的因素并不缺乏。意大利人如果不缺乏智力，他们肢体的力量是很惊人的。诸位不妨瞧瞧他们的决斗以及在战场上的表现吧！他们不管是在体力、技巧还是在智慧上，都是无与伦比的。可是，一旦他们组织成军队，就不能和别人比高下了。这都是因为他们的脑子里缺根弦的缘故。懂军事的人却得不到别人的服从，谁都觉得自己是个能人。时至今日，都没有一个人能脱颖而出，凭着自己的美德及运势让别人服从他。由此所导致的结果是：在漫长的岁月里，在近二十年频仍不断的战争中，只要参战的是一支纯粹由意大利人组成的军队，就注定缺乏战斗力。最能证明这一点的就是塔罗之战，此后还有亚历山大之战、卡普亚之战、热那亚之战、维拉之战、波洛格纳之战以及梅斯特里之战。

如果您显赫的家族想仿效那些拯救了自己祖国的出类拔萃的人物，当务之急就是组建一支自己的军队，作为一切事务牢固的基础。只有自己的军队，才会有最为忠实的、真诚的、优秀的士兵。每一位士兵都会成为出色的战士，而他们一旦听命于自己的君主，得到君主的嘉奖和恩宠，就会成为齐心协力的劲旅。所以，对君主而言，拥有这样的武装很有必要，这样就可以以意大利人的实力抵御外来之敌了。



defend oneself from foreigners. And although Swiss and Spanish infantry are esteemed to be terrifying, nonetheless there is a defect in both, by means of which a third order might not only oppose them but also be confident of overcoming them. For the Spanish cannot withstand horse, and the Swiss have to be afraid of infantry if they meet in combat any that are obstinate like themselves. Hence it has been seen, and will be seen by experience, that the Spanish cannot withstand French cavalry, and the Swiss are ruined by Spanish infantry. And although a complete experiment of this last has not been seen, yet an indication of it was seen in the battle of Ravenna, when the Spanish infantry confronted the German battalions, who use the same order as the Swiss. There the Spanish, with their agile bodies and aided by their bucklers, came between and under the Germans' pikes and attacked them safely without their having any remedy for it; and if it had not been for the cavalry that charged them, they would have worn out all the Germans. Having thus learned the defects of both of these infantry, one can order a new one that would resist horse and not be afraid of foot soldiers; this will be done by a regeneration of arms and a change in orders. And these are among those things which, when newly ordered, give reputation and greatness to a new prince.

Thus, one should not let this opportunity pass, for Italy, after so much time, to see her redeemer. I cannot express with what love he would be received in all those provinces that have suffered from these floods from outside; with what thirst for revenge, with what obstinate faith, with what piety, with what tears. What doors would be closed to him? What peoples would deny him obedience? What envy would oppose him? What Italian would deny him homage? This barbarian domination stinks to everyone. Then may your illustrious house take up this task with the spirit and hope in which just enterprises are taken up, so that under its emblem this fatherland may be ennobled and under its auspices the saying of Petrarch's may come true:

*Virtue will take up arms against fury,
and make the battle short,
because the ancient valor in Italian hearts
is not yet dead.*

瑞士和西班牙的步兵都是劲敌，值得世人敬重，但他们都有着自身的缺陷，前面我们所说的那种军队不仅能与之抗衡，而且一定可以战胜他们。西班牙的军队经不住骑兵的攻击，瑞士的军队在战场上一旦遇到跟他们一样强硬的步兵，势必会感到头疼。西班牙人抵抗不了法国骑兵的进攻，而瑞士的军队被西班牙的步兵打得落花流水，这样的事情已经有目共睹，以后还会发生。虽然第二例的结局还未完全见分晓，但其征兆已见于拉文纳战役之中。当时，西班牙的步兵面对的是跟瑞士人采取同样战术的德国军队。西班牙人身体灵活，举着圆盾牌冲入德国人的长矛阵，对德国人实施攻击，而德国人无计可施，展不开拳脚。要不是德国的骑兵冲过来，步兵一定会全军覆没。我们了解了这两种步兵的短处之后，可以组建一支新军，一支既能抵御骑兵，又不惧怕步兵的新军。实现这一目标，一定要建立一支与前两种军队在编制上不同的武装。这一业绩，连同其他革新的措施一道，会给新君主带来美誉和伟大的地位。

良机不可错过。意大利久旱逢甘霖，一定会看到自己的救星。他在饱经外来忧患的各地都会受到爱戴，意大利人渴望复仇，他们对救星忠贞不渝、无限虔诚，他们热泪盈眶，这种情况是无法用语言表达的。千家万户都会敞开房门欢迎他，人民会心甘情愿服从于他，没有人会出于妒忌从中作梗，所有的意大利人都会效忠于他。每一个人都对蛮族的统治深恶痛绝。愿您显赫的家族以从事正义事业的那种精神，满怀希望地担负起重任。那时，我们的祖国会在您家族徽章的指引下获得荣誉。有您的家族指点迷津，佩特拉克的诗句将会成为现实：

正义之师拿起武器讨伐邪恶，
战争将速战速决；
在意大利人的心中，
古人的刚勇还没有湮灭。

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